1. ' The petitioners have called into question conversion of Bungalow No,44-M, situated in Block-6 P.E..C.H.S. Karachi, from residential to commercial use. The grievance of the petitioners is that the said bungalow which had originally been constructed for residential use, has been rented-out to respondent No,1, which has converted it into a school. The petitioners are also aggrieved on account of addition and alterations made in the said bungalow by respondent No, 1 which, according to them, were unauthorised.
2. ' The petition has been resisted by respondent No, 1, as according to the said respondent, a number of commercial buildings already exist in the said area, including one Progressive School, but no objection has been raised by the petitioners in respect thereof. As to making of additions or alterations, the contention of the said respondent is that no such unauthorised construction was carried out in violation of any rules or regulations., Before us, the main contention of Mr. K.B. Bhutto, learned counsel for the petitioners, has been that by converting the use of the said bungalow from residential to commercial purposes, the landlord of the building had violated clauses (7) and (9) of the lease agreement, according to which the plot in question, upon which the said building had been constructed, could be used only for residential purposes. According to clause (9) of the lease agreement, the lease was liable to be cancelled in case of such violation, if committed by the lessee. Learned counsel has also invited our attention to section 6(3) of the Buildings Control Ordinance, 1979, according to which: ' "No building mentioned in subsection (1) shall, except with the permission of the Authority, be used for the purpose other than that for which its plans were approved."
3. ' Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the Karachi Buildings Control Authority (Respondent No,4) was duty bound to proceed against the respondent in accordance with section 7-A of the said Ordinance.
4. So far as the first contention of Mr. K.B. Bhutto is concerned, it may be pointed-out that contractual obligations between the parties cannot be enforced by a writ petition. If any covenant in the lease agreement was violated B by respondent No,2, although such violation could be enforced by filing of a suit, but the obligation cannot be enforced by a writ. In the case of Messrs Mall Square Residents Association v. Messrs Mall Developers (Pvt.) Limited, (PLD 1997 Kar. I), a Division Bench of this Court had observed.
5. ' "Therefore, the petitioners had no locus standi to challenge the alterations in the building plan allowed by respondent No,3 or 4 in pursuance of the terms of the subsequent agreement executed by the respondent No, 1 and the respondent No,3. The petitioners could only claim such right if the said alterations had violated any law or rules or bye-laws relating to construction or reconstruction of buildings. The petitioners have rested their case upon the alleged breach of contractual obligations, which cannot be enforced by filing a Constitutional petition."
6. ' Reference may also be made to the case of Naseer Ahmed v. Hafiz Muhammad Ahmad (1984 CLC 340), wherein it had been observed as follows: ' "In all the three cases, it was held, inter alia, that breach of restrictive covenants in respect of leases of urban lands could be resisted by only the lessor. In the instant case, only the lessors, namely the Karachi Development Authority, could have cause of action to resist the conversion of the premises. The respondents 1 to 16 (the plaintiffs in the suit) are only the lessees of the adjoining/nearby plots on the same terms and conditions as are applicable to the appellant. They do not have actionable cause of action to resist breach of restrictive covenant by the appellant unless there is tangible evidence that their rights as lessees will thereby be infringed."
7. ' It would not be out of place to point-out that the said case was approved by the Supreme Court in Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee (PLD 1995 SC 423), as in the said case it was observed by the Supreme Court that, "the same view has been taken in the case of Naseer Ahmed v. Hafiz Muhammad Ahmed and 17 others (1984 CLC 340), in which the Division Bench has held that breach of restrictive covenants in respect of leases of urban lands could be resisted by lessor alone and not by other lessees unless there was tangible evidence that their rights as lessee will be infringed".
8. ' So far as the contention of the learned counsel that by such conversion, the provisions of subsection (3) of section 6 of the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance were violated is concerned, it" may be pointed-out that, although restriction has been placed by the said subsection on conversion of the use of the plots but no consequential obligation has been placed upon any authority to take further action against such violation as referred to in subsection (3). No doubt, section 7-A authorises the Buildings Control Authority to take further action in case of certain violations, but reference can be found in the said section only to subsection (1) of section 6.
9. Subsection (1) of section 6 of the said Ordinance only provides for construction of a building in the prescribed manner after approval has been accorded by the Authority through a building plan. Mr. K.B. Bhutto, on our query, was unable to refer to any provision in the Ordinance indicating placing of an obligation upon Karachi Building Control Authority or any other authority to take consequential measures in case of the violation of the provisions of subsection (3) of section 6 of the said Ordinance. In such a situation, in case of non-existence of any provisions in the said Ordinance authorising any authority to take consequential action in case of such breach of the provisions of the said subsection, no writ can be issued by this Court giving such directions to respondent No,4.
10. In fact, the learned counsel himself very candidly conceded that no writ could lie on such grounds.
11. ' The next contention of Mr. K.B. Bhutto, however, was that the respondent No,4 had failed to take appropriate action against the said respondent on additions and alterations made in the said building. It may be pointed out that unless it is shown that any addition or alterations were made which were not permitted under the law, even additions or alterations ipso facto would not invite any action from the respondent No,
4. However, the contention of Mr. K.B. Bhutto has been that additions were made by the respondent in violation of the Building rules. In this regard, it may be pointed out that the question raised by Mr. Bhutto is a pure question of fact. In the first instance, details of such additions or alterations have not been provided by the petitioners and secondly, even if the same were provided, this Court is not called upon to determine questions of fact which require evidence. Therefore, even if the respondent No, 4 has failed to take action as desired by the petitioners, the matter can be determined by the Civil Court. The relief granted under Article 199 of the Constitution is purely discretionary and this Court would always be loathsome to take action where disputed issues of fact are involved. In the result, the petition is dismissed in limine together with the miscellaneous applications.