1. ' Revision petitions No,70, 89 and 90 or 1997 are proposed to be disposed of by one judgment, as question of law and facts involved therein are identical. II. Petitioner Haji Abdulllah (in C.R. No,70/97) filed suit No,8/1 in the Court of Civil Judge, D.I.Khan, to enforce his right of pre-emption in respect of sale of certain land purchased by Haji Abdul Majeed Khan, vide mutation No,8285, dated 11-8-1990.
2. Similarly, petitioner Khan Bahadar (in C.R. Nos.89 '90 of 1997) filed two suits bearing Nos/25/I and 203/I, both on 10-4-1995, in the Court of Civil Judge-II, D.I. Khan, for possession through pre-emption of land purchased through registered deeds Nos.19 and 20, each dated 16-1-1995, against Abdul Ghaffar.
3. III. The suits were rested on various pleas, both legal and factual. The vendees filed application for dismissal of suits on the ground, that the plaint was deficient with regard to details of 'Talab' in that time, date, place and source of information and name of person in whose presence 'Talab' was made, were not mentioned as held in 1995 CLC 729. The applications were vehemently opposed and, after hearing the counsel for the parties, the learned trial Judge, agreeing with the contention of the vendees, rejected the plaint, holding that the omission to mention particulars of 'Talab' regarding date, time and place etc. Was fatal to the progress of suits and on acceptance of the applications, suits were dismissed. The plaintiffs, approached the learned District Judge D.I. Khan to vacate the orders of the Civil Judge, but with no success as the appeals were dismissed. Hence the present revisions. IV. The sole point for determination is whether it is necessary for a plaintiff in pre- emption suit to specify in the plaint the date, time and place as well as source of information regarding the sale. Order-VI Rule 2, C.P:C. States that every pleading shall contain, and contain only, the statement in concise form of the material facts on which the party relies for his claim, or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved and shall, when necessary, be divided into paragraphs. The object of pleadings is to make the parties aware of each others stand. The material facts on which a party relies should be stated in concise form without mentioning the law. The provisions of Order VI Rule 2, C.P.C. Lays down fundamental principles of pleadings in two modes; one affirmative that the pleadings must contain only material facts on which reliance is placed and the negative that pleadings shall not state evidence through which material facts are to be proved. Indeed, there is difference between the "material facts" and "material particulars". In case material facts are omitted, a party cannot be permitted to raise contention on that point even if there is material in shape of evidence before the Court. The position in case of material particulars is different and in case of allegation of fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, necessary particulars are to be mentioned.
4. V. As regards notice of Talb-i-Ishhad under section 13(3) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, the requirement of Order-VI, Rule-2 read' with Rule-11 C.P.C. Is to simply mention it is the plaint that such notice has been given and the details of the notice need not be described. About construction of pleadings, needless to state that the Courts should avoid to scrutinize with such meticulous care as to genuine claim being defeated, keeping in view the low legal literacy rate, more particularly, in this part of the country.
5. VI. Similar question, the one involved herein, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in case of Ameer Jan and 3 others v. Haji Ghulam Muhammad PLD 1997 SC 883 wherein on consideration of the provisions of Order VI Rule 2, C.P.C., observed that only material facts are to be averred in the plaint and not any evidence through which such facts are to be proved. While repelling the contention of the vendee that omission to state details of Talab, regarding time, date, place and person in whose presence the Talab was made, in the plaint, is fatal, it was held as under:- ' No doubt Order VI Rule 2 C.P.C. Provides that material facts are to be stated in the pleadings but it does not mean that evidence through which such material fact is to be proved shall also be stated in the pleadings. In our view it would be sufficient requirement of law if it is alleged in the pleading that after having come to know of the sale the preemptor declared his intention to pre-empt the sale. This material fact has to be proved at the trial through evidence on the issue framed in this regard. The evidence to be led need not be alleged in the plaint."
6. VII. Again in C.P.As Nos.44, 573 and 574 of 1997, decided on 30-4-1998, the Supreme Court reiterated the view expressed earlier in the case of Amir Jan V. Haji Ghulam Muhammad and held as follows:- ' "We have followed the principle enunciated by a learned Division Bench in the case of Amir Jan (Supra) on the non-desirability of stating in the plaint the time and place of making "Talb-i- Muwathibat' and the names of the witnesses before whom it was made. We are also inclined to hold that assertion in Para.3 of the plaint coupled with the indication in the notice of "Talb-i-Ishhad' having made "Talb-iMuwathibat" is sufficient compliance of requirement of Section 13 ibid."
7. ' Also in CA No,560 of 1995 titled "Zarghun Shah v. Muhammad Yaqoob Khan" decided on 25-6-1998, the Supreme Court held that the contradiction in the evidence of plaintiff regarding date, time, place of Talb-e-Muwathibat, as pointed by the High Court, were immaterial for the reason that right of pre-emption cannot be allowed to be defeated by technicalities and in this context once again the case of Amir Jan was quoted with approval. VIII. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on cases reported in "1996 SCM R 346 and PLD 1998 SC 121. In the former case there was no specific para regarding "Talab" and para.5 of the plaint was to the effect that the defendant was asked to transfer the suit land in favour of the plaintiff but he refused and hence the suit, while in the latter case there were more than one transactions of sale of different dates and months sought to be pre-empted and the plaint was silent about the 'Talb-i-Muwathibat in respect of each transaction. It will, therefore, be seen that both the cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondents proceed on distinguishable facts. IX. In the three cases before me, each plaint contains a separate para about "Talab". Para. 3 of the plaints in Suits No,25/1& 203/1, it is clearly alleged by the petitioner that he came to know of sale of 20-3-1995 and the moment he came to know of the sale, he made jumping demand by saying that he would pre-empt and thereafter sent Registered A.D. Notice under seciotn 13(3) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, witnessed by Shah Behram and Muhammad Farooq. Whereas petitioner in Para.3 of the plaint in suit No,87/1 asserted that the defendant/vendee and vendor did not give any notice, they secretly struck the deal and when he came to know of the sale of land on 25-4-1991, he immediately made 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' and thereafter in presence of witnesses sent the notice through registered A.D. In point of fact photo copies notices alongwith registered receipt/A.D. Were attached with the plaint. X. In view of what has been stated above, it is not necessary for a plaintiff in a pre-emption suit to mention in the plaint the details of 'Talab-i-Muwathibat' with regard to time, date, place and person in whose presence declaration of his intention to pre-empt the sale. It is sufficient to allege in the plaint that after having come to know of sale, he (pre-emptor) declared his intention to pre-empt the sale and sent notice of Talb-e-Ishhad through registered post Acknowledgment Due.
8. XI. Accordingly, all the three revisions succeed, with the result that the judgments/decrees of the lower Courts are set aside and the case are remanded back to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.