1. ' By a short order dated 24-11-1998, I had dismissed the applications under section 33 read with section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and had made the award the rule of the Court for reasons to be recorded. . Following are the detailed reasons for the same.
2. ' Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff took out a Burglary Policy with the defendant No,1 through defendant No,2, being the insurance agent, in the sum of Rs,3,00,000 in respect of the office premises 11-12/A, Shikarpur Market, M.A. Jinnah Road, Karachi. It appears that during the Edul Azha holidays between 3-7-1990 and 7-7-1990 the premises were burgled and allegedly Rs,5,56,500 were stolen. The theft was reported to the police and the plaintiff lodged a claim with the defendant No,1 company under the. Insurance policy. The defendant No,1 in turn appointed an insurance surveyor, who after a detailed examination of the books of accounts of the plaintiffs office as well as other facts came to the conclusion that the amount lying in the safe at the time of Burglary could not be verified as there were discrepancies in the cash book. On the 'basis of survey report the defendant No,1 repudiated the plaintiffs claim leading to filing of this suit. By order dated 10-10-1991, in this suit two arbitrators were appointed to carry out arbitration in respect of disputes between parties. The arbitrators entered upon reference and came to two conflicting conclusions and, hence the dispute was referred to an umpire who came to the conclusion that plaintiffs claim was not payable. This Award was then filed in this Court in this suit.
3. ' The plaintiffs have filed objections to this award and have prayed that the award be set aside. The main ground urged by the plaintiffs is that the umpire has misconducted himself inasmuch as he has not given any consideration to the objections of the plaintiffs to the survey report and that he has wrongly relied on the competency of the surveyor to give their findings regarding the cash book. In effect what the plaintiffs have urged is that learned umpire has misread the evidence or has not appraised the evidence properly.
4. ' I have perused the award and other documents that are on record and I find that the award adequately deals with all the objections raised by the plaintiff. Indeed the award states very clearly that during the course of arbitration plaintiffs had never objected to the surveyor, who were appointed by the defendant No,1 and that in case the plaintiffs were not satisfied with the performance of the surveyor they could always ask for fresh survey under the relevant provision of law. In so far as the discrepancies in the accounts is concerned the learned umpire has correctly pointed out that oven the Chartered Accountant had agreed with the report that there were discrepancies in the accounts but the accountants felt that these could be explained. The most significant observation of the umpire is that the cashier himself, who was responsible for the amount kept in the safe was never ' examined as a witness by plaintiffs and it is an admitted position that there were additional amounts kept in the safe at the time which belonged to other creditors. There is thus, no evidence as to what was the exact amount available in the safe at the time of burglary.
5. ' My aim in referring to various observations of the learned umpire is not to give any assessment of the evidence brought out in the award but only to show that the objections of the plaintiffs are ill- founded. In so far as the law on subject is concerned, it is now well-established that the Court in which the award is filed ought not to launch into an exercise of re-appraisement of the evidence or to set itself up as an Appellate Court and that it should only interfere with the award when there is an error on the face of award. In this regard I am greatly fortified by PLD 1996 SC 108, relevant passage from which reads as under:-- "We may mention here that the Court while examining the validity of an award does not act as a Court of appeal. Therefore, a Court hearing the objections to the award cannot undertake, reappraisal of evidence recorded, by the arbitration in order to discover the error on infirmity in the award. The error on infirmity in the award which rendered the award invalid must appear on the face of the award and should be discoverable by reading, the award itself. Where reason recorded by the arbitrator a nd challenged as perverse, the perversity in the reasoning has to be established with reference to the material considered by the arbitrator in the award."
6. ' It may be added here that invariably the parties after arbitration ends embroil themselves in protracted litigation mostly at the instance of the one against whom the award is given usually to avoid payment. Consequently, the entire purpose of arbitration is lost which is to give opportunity to the parties to settle their disputes quickly in a commercial manner without being hamstrung due to intricacies of Court procedures. Consequently, in my view it is incumbent upon the Courts to strictly follow the rule laid down in the above Supreme Court judgment and interfere with the award only in case the error is apparent on the face of the award. To illustrate, I would go to the extent of saying that the error in the award should he so manifest that a person with even a rudimentary knowledge of law should be able to perceive it, since an arbitration ought to be essentially 'commercial in nature. In so far as this case is concerned I find that let alone there being any error on the face of award I find that the award is well-reasoned and the deductions arrived at by the learned umpire are logical and, hence ought to be endorsed. I, therefore, find no merit in the objections raised by the plaintiff and, therefore, direct that this award dated 28-1-1994 be made rule of the Court and accordingly this suit is disposed of along with the application under section 33 read with section 30 of the Arbitration Act.