' On the complaint of Muhammad Arshad Chowhan, the respondent No,2, a case under sections 365, 342 and 337 H(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code was registered against the present petitioner vide F.I.R. No,221 of 1998, dated 28-8-1997, at Police Station City, Rawalpindi. On 18-11-1997, the Investigation Officer (IJaz Hussain Shah, S.I., CIA) reported that on investigation, the case was found to be false as the same was got registered only to extract money from the petitioners. He, therefore, recommended for discharge of the accused. This report was duly verified by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, City, Rawalpindi. In turn, the learned Magistrate accepted the claim of the police and discharged the petitioner by his order in vernacular of even date as reproduced below:- - {{URDU TEXT}} * L zpit.4%;:J.4.10.4141,-=47-1..;;OZ 4)4), le-r- .
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2. Later on, the investigation was entrusted to the Superintendent of Police who got the matter re- investigated through Muhammad Khan, Inspector Range crime, and found the petitioners involved in the offences for which they were charged in the F.I.R. This view was also endorsed by the D.S.P.
(Legal). In consequence thereof, the warrants for arrest were issued against the petitioners.
3. The petitioners being aggrieved of issuance of the warrants have brought the present Constitutional petition claiming that they were falsely involved in the case. It was also contended that, since the permission of the learned Magistrate who had earlier discharged the petitioners was not obtained the case could not be re-investigated.
4. Mr. Abdul Rashid Sheikh, Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioner, relying upon Mst. Iqbal Begum v. The State (1991 PCr.LJ 1755), contended that, since the Investigating Officer had not sought the necessary permission from the learned Magistrate before re-investigation of the case, the whole proceedings were illegal and on the basis whereof the petitioner could not be arrested.
5. Malik Muhammad Kabir, the learned A.A.-G. Appearing on behalf of the State, however, very ably controverted this position and claimed that this principle was applicable only where the F.I.R. Is cancelled. The learned A.A.-G. Relied upon Ijaz Ahmad. v. Home Secretary Government of Punjab (1992 PCr.LJ 1662), wherein it was held that no curb could be imposed upon powers of the police to investigat a case as many time as they choose. In this context, he also referred to Aftab Ahmad v. Hassan Arshad etc (PLD 1987 SC 13). In the said case it was held by the Supreme Court that there was nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure to prevent the Investigating Officer from submitting the subsequent report in supersession of his earlier order either on his own initiative or on the directions of the superior police officers.
6. In Rehmat Ali Shad v. Fiaz Lodhi and others (1994 PCr.LJ 2206) this Court had also held as under:- "Besides, this order, being administrative in its nature as observed by this Court in Muhammad Akram and another v. The State and another 1986 M LD 2439, will not create any hurdle in the way of the Investigating Agency, if a fresh investigation is taken in hand, without getting the said order set aside or without seeking the permission of the Magistrate. Hence, it would be within the competency of the Investigating. Agency to re-investigate the case without getting permission of the Magistrate because the order of the Magistrate is not with respect to the cancellation of the F.I.R. But it relates to the discharge of the accused persons and thus, the F.I.R. Has not ceased to exit, as such, the matter remained alive and the respondents were well within their right to initiate re- investigation of the case."
' Similar view was adopted in Mulazim Hussain v. S.H.O., Police Station Shorket District Jhang(1995 PC.rLJ 440).
7. It is clear from the above, that where a case is cancelled by a competent " Court, the F.I.R. Ceased to exist. On the other hand, where an accused is discharged F.I.R. Remains in tact and the discharge order being an executive order in nature does not restrain the investigating authority to re-investigate the matter without seeking permission of the Magistrate. In consequence thereof, in the instant case, there was no illegality in re-investigation of the case by the police without seeking permission of the Magistrate who had earlier discharged B the petitioners. In view of the matter, the present Constitutional petition being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed.