1. ' BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J.--- Arguments were heard in this case on 5th November, 1998. The judgment of the High Court which has been challenged in this appeal is based on a judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in Civil Revision No,8 of 1968 titled Muhammad Yousaf v. Gul Muhammad which was pronounced on 16th March, 1969. It was thought necessary that, if available, the original file may be summoned. About this file it had been stated at the Bar by both the parties that the tile had been destroyed due to fire which engulfed the Court premises at Rawalakot. We directed that efforts may be made to find out whether the f was available or not. It was ultimately reported by the High Court that the file had in fact been destroyed as mentioned above.
2. ' It is claimed by the appellant that land under survey No,216 measuring 41 Kanals and 16 Marlas situated in village Qillan in Tehsil. Pallandri belonged to Moloo son of Masti Ram, an evacuee. It is claimed that on 4th Sawan 2004 Bk. (1947) Moloo sold the aforesaid land for Rs,675 to the appellant. As claimed, a sale-deed was executed and registered but the original sale-deed was sent for counter signatures of Wazir Poonch but it was not received back because War of Liberation had meanwhile started.
3. ' Thereupon, the appellant obtained a certified copy from the Sub-Registrar's office and filed a declaratory suit in respect of the land mentioned above in the Court of Sub-Judge, Rawalakot. A decree was passed in his favour on 30th October, 1951 that the appellant had become full owner of the land under reference. A mutation was also sanctioned to the same effect on 22nd September, 1955. The original suit file has also been destroyed along with the High Court file as mentioned above. However, there is sufficient proof that a decree was in fact passed as mentioned above.
4. ' One Muhammad Yousaf, not before the Court, filed a revision petition in the High Court in the year 1968, being Civil Revision No,8 of 1968. In which he prayed for setting aside 'of the decree passed in favour of the appellant on the ground that it had been passed in respect of evacuee property over which the jurisdiction of the Sub-Judge was specifically barred and as such the decree, being without jurisdiction, be set aside. The prayer was accepted by the High Court on 16th March, 1972.
5. ' On 17th July, 1997. Twenty five years later, Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property in the office of the Custodian at Muzaffarabad sent a letter/order to the Manager Custodian at Rawalakot in which he stated that land under survey No,216 measuring 41 Kanals and 16 Marlas situated in village Qillan Tehsil Pallandri was declared as evacuee property by the High Court in its judgment of 16th March, .1972 in case titled Muhammad Yousaf Khan v. Gul Muhammad Khan etc., but Gul Muhammad Khan was still in occupation of the land as illegal occupant.' The Manager was directed to recover lease money from the appellant for all the period. Alternatively the Manager was directed, in case of default, to dispossess the appellant and to lease out the land in dispute to some other person. The appellant challenged this order by filing writ petition in the High Court which has been dismissed on the ground that the order passed by the Additional Custodian is in light of the Full Bench judgment of the High Court, dated 16th March, 1972. Appeal has been filed against the judgment of the High Court with leave of the Court.
6. ' Sardar Muhammad Sayab Khan, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the High Court misconstrued the previous Full Bench judgment of the High Court. He explained that the revision petition filed by Muhammad Yousaf, Civil Revision No,8 of 1968, came up before Single Bench of the High Court who, as is clear from the Full Bench judgment itself, referred the following two questions for determination to the Full Bench:--- "(1 ) Whether the words 'No appeal lies thereto' occurring in section 115, C.P.C., include second appeal and what is the effect of not filing the appeal before the District Judge?
(2) Whether the High Court can interfere suo motu in revision if no appeal has been filed before the District Judge?"
7. ' It was contended by Sardar Sayab Khalid that the Full Bench was only competent to answer the two points referred to it and after recording the answers to the questions the case was to go back to the Single Bench who was to decide the case on its merits. He explained that the Full Bench did answer the two questions but the members of the Full Bench also recorded the finding that the decree of the learned Sub-Judge Rawalakot challenged in the revision petition was without jurisdiction and, thus, illegal and void. It was vehemently contended by the learned counsel that the order passed by the Full Bench was without jurisdiction because the Bench had the jurisdiction only to answer the 'questions referred to it and had no authority to decide the revision petition which could only be decided by the learned Single Judge. On this point he referred to Rule 16 of the High Court Procedure Rules, 1984. The phraseology of Rule 16 tends to support the contention of the learned counsel but it may be pointed out that the said Rules were enforced in 1984 while the judgment of the Full Bench was pronounced on '16th March, 1972. Sardar. Muhammad Sayab Khalid also stated that the view of the Full Bench was incorrect that the Sub-Judge had no jurisdiction to pass a decree in respect of evacuee property.
8. ' We have perused the judgment of the Full Bench and have anxiously adverted to the arguments of Mr. Muhammad Sayab Khalid. On the face of it his arguments about the Full Bench judgment appeared to have weight but a closer examination has revealed that the situation is different from what has been stated by fife learned counsel.
9. ' The facts are that the decree passed in favour of the appellant had not been challenged before the First Appellate Court or the High Court and Muhammad Yousaf filed a revision-petition directly before the High Court. The decree passed in favour of the appellant was appealable before the learned District Judge and also subsequently before the High Court. Therefore, a question arose whether the revision petition was maintainable. The question also was whether a revision at all is maintainable where second appeal lies to the High Court against a decree. These are the questions which were referred by the learned Single Judge to the Full Bench.
10. ' The judgment of the Full Bench shows that the learned Judge reached the following conclusion on the question referred to it:--- "For the foregoing reasons our answer to the questions referred for determination of this Bench is that the words 'no appeal lies thereto' are not confined to first appeal but include a second appeal as well. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, C.P.C., is limited to those cases only where under the Code of Civil Procedure appeal either in the first instance or eventually would lie to the High Court and if no appeal has been filed before a District Judge in such a case, High Court would be incompetent to exercise its jurisdiction under that section, either on an application or suo motu."
11. ' Having formed the view that revision petition filed by Muhammad Yousaf was not maintainable and the High Court was not even otherwise authorised by law to pass a suo motu order under revisional jurisdiction the learned Judges examined the question whether the High Court had power under any other provisions of law to decide the points raised in the revision petition. The learned Judges brought under consideration section 25-D or Azad Jammu' and Kashmir Government Act, 1970 and section 35 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Courts and Laws Code Act which vested in the High Court the authority of superintendence and control over the Courts .Subordinate to it and, after discussing case-law on the point, reached the following conclusion:--- "But a High Court, in exercise of general powers of superintendence and control, conferred on it under Government Act, and Courts and Laws Code Act, which powers are much wider and larger and more comprehensive as compared to the powers of a High Court under section 115, Cr.P.C., can revise suo mom or otherwise, such order where there is a gross error on the face of record or an erroneous order amounting to injustice or usurpation of jurisdiction that is specifically barred by an enactment, and set aside such order or direct further proceedings to be taken as ends of justice may require."
12. Then the learned Judges noticed at length to different legislations about administration of evacuee property with particular reference to "Bait-ul-Maal Property Act" of 1948 and "Protection of Evacuee Property Act. 1950". After noting the facts of the case it was held that when the appellant Gut Muhammad's suit was instituted and disposed of, the jurisdiction of the Sub-Judge was specifically barred by section 11 of the Protection of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. Thereafter, the following conclusion was recorded about the judgment and decree passed by the Sub-Judge:--- "As such we are of the opinion that the determination of the question by the Court whose jurisdiction, barred by the law over the subject or matter of the litigation, its judgment and order accurately express and technically correct (which in present case are not so) are mere nullities.
13. They are invalid documents not only voidable but void and are not binding on any one. They have effect either as estoppel or otherwise and do not create any right. They are inoperative and may not only be set. Aside at any time by the Court in which they are rendered but may be declared void by any Court in which they are presented. The order passed and all proceedings taken by the Sub-Judge deserve to be quashed for the simple reason that there was a legal bar of jurisdiction.
14. The High Court as a supervising authority is under an obligation to annul such orders as and when they are brought to its notice.
15. ' Legislature has conferred upon the Custodian exclusive jurisdiction and imposed upon him the duty to decide whether a certain property is or is not evacuee property. The proprietary rights vested in the person who has fled to India fall within the ambit of the expression. 'evacuee property' and the power to decide the question as to the nature of the property vests exclusively in the Custodian. The Sub-Judge had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to pass a decree of title in favour of non-petitioner/plaintiff and thereby to extinguish the vested rights of evacuee in the property. Thus, it would appear that the decree of the learned Sub-Judge, Rawalakot, being without jurisdiction is illegal and void."
16. ' From the foregoing it is clear that the contention of Sardar Muhammad Sayab Khalid mentioned above is not correct. In fact the learned Judges composing the Full Bench reached the conclusion that the revision petition filed by Muhammad Yousaf was not maintainable but they proceeded to act under section 25-D of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government Act, 1970 and Azad Jammu and Kashmir Courts and Laws Code Act to declare that the decree of the learned Sub-Judge was illegal and void because, in the words of the learned Judges, "the High Court as a supervising authority is under an obligation to annul such orders as and when they were brought to its notice".
17. It may be pointed out that the declaration mentioned above in respect of the decree passed in favour of the appellant Gul Muhammad was a suo mom action of the High Court. The declaration was given by the Full Bench of the High Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice and two learned Judges of the High Court. This was the total strength of the High Court on 16th March, 1972 when the judgment was delivered. The whole High Court, thus, took suo mow notice and exercised supervisory jurisdiction to make the declaration mentioned above. In these circumstances the view taken by the learned Judge in the High Court in the judgment under appeal that the High Court is bound by the finding of the Full Bench is unexceptionable. We may also add to it that appellant Gul Muhammad was duly impleaded as a respondent in the Full Bench judgment and before giving the judgment his learned counsel was duly heard. If Gul Muhammad was aggrieved, he, could have filed a review petition before the High Court but he did not, according to the record, do so. The result is that the said judgment attained finality and is binding on all executive and judicial authorities in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
18. ' Therefore, we find no force in this appeal and order its dismissal.