' SH. RIAZ AHMED, J.---On 31-3-1989 at about 6-30 p.m., the complainant Mehrban Khan reached Police Station Mochh in District Mianwali and lodged F.I.R. In respect of murder of his son, namely, Mohabat Khan. In brief, the first informant stated that he was resident of Dera Mehrban Khan within the area of Mochh and his deceased son Mohabat Khan, who was serving in the Pakistan Army, had come to see the family after taking leave two months. On the fateful day at about 5-30 p.m., the deceased was proceeding towards the wheat crop of Gul Jehan to urinate, followed by the first informant and his other son, namely, Abid Khan to see off Khan Zaman, the brother of the first informant, who had come to the Dera of the first informant to see him. They were following the deceased at a distance of about 20 Karams when suddenly' from the eastern side, Gul Khan appellant armed with rifle accompanied by his two sons, namely, Suba Khan and Shah Jehan and his brother Attaullah Khan armed with guns reached the scene of occurrence and raised a Lalkara addressing the deceased that he would not go alive. Simultaneously with the raising of Lalkara, Attaullah Khan, brother of the appellant and the two sons of the appellant, named above, fired one shot each from their guns, but they missed by deceased. Thereafter Gul Khan fired a shot hitting the deceased, who fell down and succumbed to the injuries at the spot.
2. The appellant Gul Khan absconded while his brother Attaullah Khan and his sons Suba Khan and Shah Jehan were arrested. Warrant of arrest of the appellant was obtained and since was not traceable, therefore, proceedings under sections 87 and 88, Cr.P.C., were initiated against him and he was declared proclaimed offender. A separate challan under section 512, Cr.P.C. Was submitted against the appellant while the other co-accused were sent up by the police to face their trial on the charge under section 302/34, P.P.C. Vide judgment dated 1-7-1990 delivered by Muhammad Siddiq Javed, Additional Sessions Judge, Mianwali, Suba Khan and Shah Jehan sons of appellant Gul Khan were acquitted, but Attaullah Khan was found guilty on the charge and thus was convicted under section 302, P.P.C. And was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs,10,000 or in default thereof to suffer further R.I., for a period of one year. Attaullah assailed his conviction by way of filing an appeal, which was accepted and vide judgment dated 21-9-1992, he was also acquitted of the charge.
3. On 13-7-1990, Munawar Din, Sub-Inspector, Police Station Mochh received secret information about the presence of the appellant at Wandha Sambridiwala, District Mianwali. On the receipt of this information, a raiding party was constituted to apprehend the appellant and on reaching Wandha Sambrdiwala, a fight took place between the raid police party and the appellant and after a pitched fighting the appellant was overpowered and was arrested. His 7 mm rifle alongwith 25 live cartridges was also taken into possession and a separate case under section 307/353 and under section 13 of the Arms Ordinance was registered against the appellant. After his arrest, he was sent up to face his trial before the Sessions Judge, Mianwali on the charge under section 302, P.P.C. For committing the murder of Mohabat Khan deceased. Vide judgment dated 18-11-1991 the learned Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty of the. Charge under section 302, P.P.0 and thus he was convicted and sentenced to death and to pay a fine of Rs,1,UU,000 or in default to suffer R.I., for a term of 4 years. Aggrieved by his conviction, the appellant filed an appeal while the case was also referred to the High Court under section 374, Cr.P.C. The complainant also filed a revision petition assailing the acquittal of the co-accused. Vide judgment dated 22-2-1995, a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal and the revision petition and while answering the reference, the death sentence awarded to the appellant was confirmed. The appellant invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by way of filing petition for leave to appeal and leave was granted to consider whether the statements of the eyewitnesses, could by believed against the appellant while their testimony had been disbelieved qua the acquitted co-accused.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at length and we have also perused the evidence on record. Before proceeding further, it will be appropriate to mention the motive behind the commission of the crime. Perusal of the F.I.R. Shows longstanding enmity between the parties.
On account of some family dispute in 1965 the parties fell out with each other and as a sequel thereto, appellant Gul Khan caused fire-arm injuries to Mehrban Khan, which led to the amputation of his right leg. His left leg also remained defective on account of presence of pellets in it and he walked with the aid of clutches since then. Appellant Gul Khan, who had injured Mehrban Khan was tried under section 307, P.P.C. And having been found guilty was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a term of 4 years. Subsequent thereto, to avenge the said attack on his father, deceased Mohabat Khan injured Gul Khan appellant and a case was registered against him under section 307, P.P.C. Which was still pending. To avenge the said attack, Gul Khan and others had killed Mohabat Khan deceased in the present case.
5. To prove its case at the trial the prosecution placed reliance on the ocular testimony furnished by Mehrban Khan P.W.5 father of Mohabat Khan deceased and Khan Zaman his real brother and uncle of the deceased, who had come to Mochh from Chah Kheliwala to meet his brother. In addition to the ocular testimony, the prosecution also placed reliance upon the abscondence of the appellant for about a year and a half, the motive and the medical evidence as corroborative pieces of evidence. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the motive in this case clearly reveals background of enmity between the parties and the number of attacks made by both sides on each other, and therefore, to convict the appellant on a capital charge, it was the bounden duty of the prosecution to have produced independent corroborative evidence to connect the appellant with the commission of the crime. It was further argued that the abscondence, motive and medical evidence cannot be relied upon as corroborative pieces of evidence inasmuch the appellant had absconded due to the fear of the police and rigour of investigation, and thus, the abscondence does not constitute as a corroborative piece of evidence in this case.
6. After careful consideration of the facts of the case, we are of the view that the contentions raised by the learned counsel are devoid of force. The occurrence in this case took place on 31-3-1989 and thereafter, the appellant absconded. On 13-7-1990, i.e,, after about one year and four months, Munawar Din, Sub-Inspector received secret information about the presence of the appellant at Wandha Sambrdiwala in District Mianwali. The Sub-Inspector thus reached there alongwith the police party to arrest the appellant, but a fight took place between the appellant and his party men and the police and after heavy firing with great difficulty the appellant was overpowered and arrested. At the time of arrest, a 7 mm rifle alongwith 25 cartridges was also recovered from the appellant. This circumstance cannot be easily brushed aside. The abscondence of an accused itself may not point out towards his guilt. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case as to whether abscondence is a pointer or not. This view was taken by this Court in the judgment reported as Aminullah v. The State (PLD 1976 SC 629). It was laid down that abscondence as a circumstance proving the guilt is based upon the assumption that the guilty man tries to escape from the police violence, the innocent man rushes to the police to vindicate his innocence.
It was further held by this Court such assumption is based upon several other assumptions and it would not be safe to hold that abscondence of an accused automatically amounts to proof of his guilt. However, as already observed by us that abscondence_ per se is not sufficient to prove the guilt, but abscondence of an accused for a long time for which no satisfactory explanation is given by the accused coupled with other evidence on record would be the criteria to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused person. The conduct of a person in absconding after the commission of offence would be relevant to, show that he was concerned in'the offence. Thus, the proposition which emerges from the study of the case-law on the subject is that abscondence is equally consistent with the innocence and guilt because different persons are differently constituted and some accused persons though innocent, deliberately abscond rather than to face ordeal of criminal, trial. Judging the case of the appellant, we are of the view that he remained absconding for a year and 4 months and when the police reached the hide out to arrest him, he offered resistance and after exchange of firing, Munawar Din, Sub-Inspector arrested the appellant. It is also pertinent to mention that the proceedings under sections 87 and 88, Cr.P.C., were also initiated and as required by law, on account of the non-availability of the appellant he was declared absconder. The appellant was asked to explain his absence and in his statement under section 342, Cr.P.C., he stated that the proceedings about non-bailable warrants of arrest and proclamation under section 87 had been fabricated and he had never avoided arrest nor absconded. The appellant further stated that in fact he had gone to Karachi whereas his son Gulistan Khan is an employee in PIA and he was living with him. The appellant denied to have been arrested after exchange of firing and also recovery of 7 mm rifle from him. The appellant further stated that having come to know about the registration of the case, he had voluntarily appeared before Munawar Din, Sub-Inspector. After careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the explanation of the appellant about his disappearance is least satisfactory. In the case reported as Gul Hasan v The State (PLD 1969 SC 89), this Court in the circumstances of that case held that the abscondence of two persons out of four was sufficient corroboration. In another case, reported as Muhammad Bashir v. The State (1970 SCM R 351), this Court came to the conclusion that the abscondence of the accused after the murder and his arrest from a distant place was indicated that he was guilty of the commission of the offence and such abscondence was a strong piece of corroborative evidence. Similarly, in another case reported as Muhammad Rafiq v. The State (PLD 1974 SC 65), this Court held that the abscondence can be treated as a piece of valuable corroboration if supported by other evidence available on record. To sum up, the preponderance of authorities on this subject is that abscondence by itself does not constitute substantive evidence, but it can be used and relied upon as corroborative piece of evidence if it provides support to the other evidence. The abscondence would not remedy any other defect, which may be existing in the prosecution case. The abscondence as a piece of conduct of an accused is to be judged in the light of the other evidence on record. Considering' the case of the appellant on the touchstone of the criteria referred to above, we are of the view that abscondence for a period of a year and 4 months and resistance to the arrest by the appellant corroborate the ocular testimony in this case. As far as the ocular evidence in this case is concerned, we are of the view that the same is unimpeachable. No doubt, enmity exists between the parties, which resulted into attacks on each other. In the circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the prosecution evidence qua the appellant rings true and stands corroborated by the abscondence of the appellant as well as the motive, which stood proved by the statement of the first informant and the other eyewitnesses. The medical evidence in this case is in no manner in conflict with the ocular testimony. The deceased in this case had received fire-arm wounds on the upper part of the cheek and the back of the skull. Furthermore, the relationship by itself is also no ground to discard the evidence in this case. Khan Zaman, real brother of the first informant, Mehrban Khan, had visited the Dera of the first informant to see the deceased, an Army personnel, who had come on leave. The learned counsel attempted to argue that Khan Zaman was a chance witness and had failed to account for his presence satisfactorily but after perusal of his statement, we repel this contention. His explanation is sound and after having met his brother and deceased nephew, he was returning to his own dera while the first informant accompanied him to see him off. The deceased at that time was ahead of them and he was proceeding to urinate. There is nothing odd about these circumstances and during the post-mortem examination, the bladder of the, deceased was found to be full of urine and the stomach was empty, therefore, it conclusively proves that the prosecution version is true and the occurrence had taken place before evening meals, and thus, there is no force in the argument that the occurrence had taken place in the dark hours of night and none had seen it. In our view, the ocular testimony in this case qua the appellant rings true and despite lengthy cross-examination, the defence had failed to elicit anything except the background of enmity. We may reiterate here as laid down by this Court in the case reported as Niaz v. The State (PLD 1960 SC 387) that even testimony of an interested witness can be believed without corroboration if the intrinsic worth of such evidence satisfies the judicial conscience. In our view, in this case, not only the ocular testimony is reliable, but it also stands corroborated by the abscondence, the motive, which is a double-edged weapon as well as the medical evidence.
7. The next question falling for determination is as to whether the testimony of the eye-witnesses should be believed in view of the fact that their testimony has been disbelieved qua the acquitted accused. It may be reiterated here that the concept of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not recognized by our Jurisprudence because the grain has to be sifted from the chaff. Furthermore, we are not prepared to believe that a real father would substitute the culprit responsible for the death of his son, who had come to the village On leave.
8. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The same is hereby dismissed.