' MUNAWAR AHMED MIRZA, J.---This appeal, by leave of the Court, is directed against judgment dated 9-4-1995 passed by Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, in Appeal No,628 of 1992.
2. Relevant facts briefly mentioned are that respondent Mrs. Jamida Malik passed her matriculation examination in year 1950 as private candidate from District Multan. Her date of birth in matriculation certificate was recorded as 6-7-1930. After obtaining Masters Degree respondent joined as Lecturer in Education Department during January, 1958 and with passage of time became Professor in Government Degree College for Women, Multan. Entries in the service book of respondent also mention 6th July, 1930 to be her date of birth.
3. It is the case of respondent that when she approached retiring age during discussion elderly members of the family informed that her correct date of birth was 17-12-1934 instead of 6th July, 1930. Thereupon, respondent carried out research and traced from the record of Municipal Corporation that her name appeared at Serial No,4306 which contained actual date of birth to be 17-12-1934. It, thus, revealed that entries regarding her date of birth were incorrectly recorded in the matriculation certificate and other connected documents, including service book. Respondent, therefore, on 3-9-1989 filed Civil Suit No,220 before Civil Judge, Multan, praying for declaration, mandatory injunction and correction of her date of birth from 6-7-1930 to actual date being 17-12- 1934 in the matriculation certificate, other related documents and service record. The suit was contested by the University of Punjab, which, however, was eventually decreed vide judgment dated 9-5-1990, University of Punjab on 19-6-1990 preferred Civil Appeal No,85/13 before District Judge, Multan challenging above decision but same was dismissed on 1-7-1.990. Civil Revision Petition No,800 of 1990 filed by Government of Punjab against above decisions of two Courts came up for hearing before learned Judge in Chambers of Lahore High Court, which was accepted vide judgment, dated 16-12-1990 whereby setting aside the judgments of both the Courts below to the extent of Government of Punjab the plaint in that behalf was rejected.
4. Respondent herein feeling aggrieved had filed Civil Appeal No,136 of 1991 before this Court challenging above judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 16-12-1990, but same was ultimately withdrawn on 21-3-1992 on the ground that she would seek remedy through representation before the department. Thereafter, respondent submitted a representation to the Secretary, Education Department, Government of Punjab, Lahore and then towards 5th December, 1992 filed Appeal No,628 of 1992 before Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, for redressal of grievances and correction of her date of birth. The appeal was contested by the authorities. However, the Tribunal considering the documents relied upon by respondent finally accepted the appeal vide judgment, dated 9th April, 1995 and declared that her actual date of birth was 17-12-1934. It was also held that respondent's retirement which had occasioned with effect from 5-7-1990 on the basis of service record was of no legal effect. Operative portion is reproduced herein below:-- "The facts and circumstances of the case did not leave much room for the respondent department to avoid the effect of correction of the date of birth of the appellant by the decree of the Court which indeed was upheld up to the Supreme Court in so far as the Punjab University was concerned. No doubt the decree was set aside at the instance of the department, yet it could not much insist upon the Notification dated 13-11-1984 permitting such correction within two years soon after joining service. Exactly such objection was overruled in PLD 1970 Lahore 33 and correction allowed long after initial two years of service, was accepted. In fact the process of obtaining decree from the Civil Court lent authenticity to it and probably there was no choice to avoid its implementation. Even the Supreme Court felt the need of suggesting a representation to be made by the appellant in this behalf indicating that the plea had some substance. Refusal on the part of the department was based on a mere technicality without expressing any opinion about the probative force of the entry found in the Municipal record and accepted thereof by Courts of law. It appears that the appellant agitated the matter well before her retirement but owing to litigation reaching the Supreme Court, considerable time was taken so much so that she made to retire. The Supreme Court in a way permitted her to take up the matter even after her retirement and this was how she could still adhere to her demand in spite of retirement.
' As a result, the appeal is allowed. The appellant's correct date of birth is held to be 17-12-1934 and the same shall be taken into account in ordering her retirement on superannuation. In the sequel, the Notification dated 9-1-1990 whereby she was retired with effect from 5-7-1990 is set aside and shall be of no legal effect against her. Obviously, she shall be entitled to consequential benefits."
5. Government of Punjab being dissatisfied from the above decision of Tribunal whereby date of birth of respondent was changed, preferred C.P.L.A. No, 699-L of 1995 before this Court. Leave was granted on 8-10-1995 in the following terms:- "The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that under Rule 7.3 of the Punjab Financial Rules Volume-I, any civil servant who requires the date of birth to be corrected should apply for such correction within 2 years from entering into service. There are the instructions under the said rules.
The learned counsel contended that the respondent has not followed the rule and that the date sought to be substituted in place of the original date could not legally be allowed under the law.
Leave is granted. The operation of the impugned judgment is stayed."
6. Sh. Altaf Elahi, Additional Advocate-General, Punjab, emphatically argued that respondent had retired from service with effect from 5-7-1990 after attaining age of superannuation. However, steps were commenced by her to convert her date of birth. Learned Additional Advocate-General contended that respondent obtained decree which, however, was set aside by the High Court while, deciding Revision Petition No,800 of 1990. He maintained that reliance placed by Service Tribunal upon documents recently procured by the respondent is highly unwarranted and contrary to law. It was greatly stressed about alleged wrong entries of her age and suddenly woke up near retiring endeavouring for correction of her date of birth. He further expressed that respondent was fully aware about her date of birth recorded in all the documents, including service book, therefore, untold silence for more than 35 years itself disentitles her to any relief relating to correction of age.
7. Mr. Bashir Ahmad Ansari, Senior Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the respondent, vehemently opposed the appeal and argued that age shown in her Nikah Nama, birth certification issued by local Municipal Corporation and other documents fully establish that error about date of birth had crept in the Matriculation Certificate and Service Book. Learned counsel canvassed that Service Tribunal on consideration of facts was quite justified in allowing the appeal and directing correction of entries concerning respondent's date of birth it was strenuously urged that respondent had legal right to get correction of wrong entries in the educational documents or the service record. Therefore, the objections from the other side suggesting delay in awaiting remedy and lapse of time, have no significance.
8. The respondent had passed Matriculation Examination in year 1950. She completed her education and after obtaining Masters Degree joined service as lecturer towards January, 1958.
Admittedly, . Matriculation Certificate, and service book contain an entry showing her date of birth to be 6th July, 1930. Civil,Suit challenging correctness of entries regarding respondent's date of birth was filed on 29th August, 1989. Evidence produced in this proceeding indicates that respondent around 16th March, 1988 moved an application praying for rectifying her age but same was not entertained. However, details showing respondent's first hand knowledge about actual date of birth are mentioned in para. 2 of the plaint filed by her before the Civil Court which, reads thus:-- "2. That about 3/4 months ago, the plaintiff came to know about the incorrectness in the matter of her date of birth, as presently recorded in the Matriculation Certificate issued to her by defendant No,1, and, consequent thereupon in the service record as maintained by defendant No,2 when the fact of her retirement from service after attaining the age of 60 years, as presently due on 6th July, 1990, came known to her elderly family members. She was then informed by them that the date of birth of the plaintiff fell in December, 1934. The plaintiff, thereupon, made searches in the relevant record of the local Municipal Corporation and was ultimately successful, a few weeks ago in tracing that her name stood entered at serial No,4306, with her date of birth entered therein as 17- 12-1934. It was thus confirmed that the actual date of birth of the plaintiff was 17-12-1934 and that the other date of birth as entered in her Matriculation Certificate issued by defendant No,1 and the service records of defendant No,2 as bring 6-7-1930 was factually incorrect. Certified copy of the birth entry as issued by Municipal Corporation, Multan, is enclosed. Photo copy of the Matriculation Certificate is also enclosed."
9. The above background manifestly indicates that towards close of respondent's service career incidentally during family discussion it transpired that her actual date of birth was different than recorded in relevant documents. It appears that respondent thereafter became curious to procure birth certificate and supplementary material to establish that her actual date of birth was 17-12- 1934.
10. It is highly amazing that respondent remained satisfied with regard to entries in Matriculation Certificate and service book for more than 30 years, but abruptly started pursuing different measures for bringing about amendment in her date of birth towards tale end of her service career. Unfortunately, there is growing tendency amongst Government employees for making attempts to change their date of birth, when nearing superannuation. This virus appears to be fast spreading and needs to be effectively checked.
11. Now adverting to merits of instant case and careful examination of material available on record which was produced by respondent before the Service Tribunal to prove her claim, we find that same is discrepant and self-contradictory, therefore, does not inspire confidence. It may be mentioned that respondent is highly educated lady. It cannot be conceived that she would remain unaware about her actual date of birth and keep silent for thirty (30) long years. There does not exist any plausible explanation to justify this deep slumber. Obviously, there must be some reasonable period within which aggrieved person may challenge correctness about date of birth recorded in matriculation certificate or service book. There can be hardly any doubt that in such eventuality burden for justifying each day's delay, rests upon partly seeking the relief. It was, thus, incumbent upon respondent to justify the long silence for more than 30 years by furnishing sound reasons. Besides, under Rule 7.3 of the Punjab Financial Rules Volume-I, it is imperative to apply for correction in entries in service book within two years. Therefore, with whatever angle claim of respondent is scrutinised, delay remains unexplained and uncondonable thereby constituting a bar of limitation for seeking remedy through Court of law.
12. Additionally, respondent having kept quiet had consciously acquiesced to the entries contained in Matriculation Certificate and service book, hence she is estopped by her conduct to challenge the same at such belated stage. Learned Chairman of Punjab Service Tribunal has apparently misconstrued legal position and misread the evidence by taking favourable view towards the respondent, in the impugned judgment. The conclusions drawn by the Tribunal suffer from legal infirmity and contravene principles of justice. Therefore, in our opinion, impugned judgment is not sustainable. In this behalf we are supported by following judgments of this Court extracts whereof are reproduced below:--
(i) 1994 SCMR 1633 (M. R. Khalid v. Chief Secretary, Punjab): "After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, we are not persuaded that any case for interference with the judgment of the learned Tribunal has been made out. Admittedly, while taking the competitive examination the petitioner had himself declared his date of birth to be 2-6-1930.
He remained in service for about 35 years thereafter. His name together with his declared date of birth appeared in the gradation lists and civil lists periodically published by the Provincial Government. He did not object to the incorrect publication ' of his date of birth till a few years before his retirement. The mere fact that he was able to obtain a decree from the Additional District Judge did not advance his case for the Government was not a party to the civil suit brought by him. Though the Government has undoubtedly the power to correct an incorrectly recorded date of birth of a civil servant but the silence of the petitioner over the major portion of his service was such that he did not merit a favourable decision from the Government. We are, therefore, unable to find any substance in this petition. It is hereby dismissed."
(ii) 1998 SCMR 801 (Haa Nawaz Kiani v. The Province of Punjab)
"On thorough scrutiny, we have noticed that service rules regarding correction of age within two years from entry into service are apparently sound and logical. Government servant cannot be normally permitted to rise from deep slumber and dramatically announce change in the date of birth when about to retire. The Service Tribunal has properly considered all facts and aspects of the case and has assigned cogent reasons by declining the relief. In our opinion, legal position dismissed that conclusion drawn by the Service Tribunal for passing impugned judgment do not suffer from any defect illegality of impropriety. We wish to observe that lately a tendency has developed whereby unwarranted claims attempting to show errors in 'date of birth' are asserted towards retiring age by fabricating or manipulating documents in that behalf. Obviously, such practice must be discouraged and effectively curbed. Additionally, the grievances agitated before us do not make out any substantial questions of law having public importance."
(iii) 1998 SCMR 602 (Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation v. Subedar Major (Retd.) Abdul Razzaq)
"Coming to the entry copy P-1 in the Birth Register, it is worthy to note that it was issued on 12-8- 1935. The respondent sought declaration from Civil Court in respect of said entry in Birth Register in 1971. Said decree was obtained in a suit filed by the respondent against the publicat-large. At least the Authorities maintaining the Birth Register, should have been impleaded in said suit as defendants. Said decree by no stretch of imagination, can be binding on anybody, much less on the appellant. There is no explanation as to why the respondent waited for a period of 36 years to obtain the decree. In this case deposition, the respondent appearing as P.W.2 admitted that he was recruited in army in August, 1943 and that he had mentioned his age to be 16 years. He further stated that he had obtained the birth certificate in 1971. He denied the suggestion that he was issued the birth certificate in 1935. This would amount to saying that the respondent disowned copy of entry Exh. P-1, which was admittedly obtained on 12-8-1935 as per the endorsement on it."
' Dealing with the evidence, learned Additional District Judge in his judgment dated 30-7-1990 has commented as follows:-- "As already given above in Exh. P-1 date of birth given is 16-4-1929 (Although it relates to the Muhammad Rashid, nevertheless the respondent claims himself as the same person having been born on 16-4-1929) In Exh. P-6 the school leaving certificate of Abdur Razzaq his date of birth shown is 13-3-1929, in Exh. P-4 the application submitted by him for joining the service with the appellant, he himself had given his date of birth to be 29-3-1929. In his Identity Card the said date is shown as 29.3-1929 and with the Army Authorities record Exh. P-3 he was shown to be of 16 years at the time of joining of Army Service on 16-8-1943. It is, thus, very ' much clear that although heavy onus lay upon the respondent to prove his actual date of birth but he miserably failed to discharge such onus. In view of the documentary evidence produced by him and also on the basis of oral evidence led by him he could not be declared as having been born on 16-4-1929."
' The explanation furnished by the High Court about date of birth mentioned in the school leaving certificate P-6 being different from the one given in the National Identity Card is not convincing. It is debatable if the learned Single Judge in the High Court while dealing with the revision application, could have delivered a judgment that can by an Appellate Court.
' In our view, learned Additional District Judge had arrived at the right conclusion, which is supported by valid reasons. Consequently, we accept this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and the decree and restore the judgment and the decree delivered by the learned Additional District Judge on 30-7-1990. No order as to costs".
(iv) 1998 SCMR 1494 (Syed Iobal Haider v. Federation of Pakistan)
"12. We may also refer to the submission made by the learned Attorney-General that in Government service an employee'cannot make any application for change in his date of birth after two years. On analogy, such rule should also be followed in judiciary, which otherwise would lead to serious complications, and open a pandora's box. Similarly authentity of date of birth recorded in the documents cannot be challenged belatedly, specially beyond the abovementioned period."
13. For the foregoing reasons, we have no hesitation, in holding that impugned judgment suffers from legal defects and direct that same be set tside. Consequently, appeal is allowed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.