' This writ petition is filed to challenge the judgment, dated 2-6-1996 passed by the learned Senior Civil. Judge, Bhakkar, whereby, a petition under section 12(2), C.P.C. Moved by the present .
Petitioners was dismissed. The petitioner challenged that judgment in a revision petition which was also dismissed vid judgment, dated 22-11-1997 passed by the then learned District Judge, Bhakkar.
2. The brief facts are that Mst Ameeran i,e, respondent No,4 was the resister of the present petitioners. She h allegedly transferred her land through consent decree, dated 10-4-1986 passed in civil suit filed by the present petitioner against her and one Mst. Zainab i,e, another sister of the petitioners. That in pursuance o the consent decree, the 'possession w. Delivered to Ghulam Shabbir one of the petitioners. Later on, another brother of Mst Ameeran Bibi namely Ghulam Hussain i.e respondent No,3 filed a suit for declaration on 13-4-1986 in respect of the aforesaid land measuring 5 Kanals, 3 Marlas which too w. Decreed on 14-4-1986 as Mst. Ameeran Bib appeared before the Court and made consenting statement resulting into the aforesaid consent decree. The present petitioners filed a petition under section 12(2), C.P.C. To challenge the decree dated 14-4- 1986 on the ground that it w obtained through fraud despite the fact that was within the knowledge of Ghulam Hussain, decree-holder that the suit Ian stood already transferred through the decree dated 10-4-1986 in favour of the preset petitioners. The petition was resisted in the trial Court which resulted into framing on following issues:--
(1) Was decree, dated 14-4-1986 in Case No,537 titled Ghulam Hussain v Mst. Amiran obtained through fraud and misrepresentation? OPA
(2) Relief, ' The learned trial Court while deciding Issue No,1 dismissed the petition under section 12(2), C.P.C.
On the ground that consenting decree did not suffer from any fraud or misrepresentation. A revision petition as aforesaid was filed which too was dismissed. Hence this writ petition.
3. It is clear from the perusal of the writ petition that it was presented on 25-5-1999 for fixation although the matter was decided in revision on 22-11-1997. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that in fact the writ petition was "led in the office on 17-2-1998 but it was Ind for hearing for today on an urgent petition moved in the office. The petition of urgency bears the court-fee stamp, dated 7-2-1999 and the stamp paper attached with the original writ petition also bears the date of issue as 25-5-1999. It is, therefore, obvious that the contention that the writ petition was filed on 17-2-1998 would not be ground nor there is any proof that the writ petition was actually instituted on the fore said date. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that if time is given, the can show that the writ petition was filed on 17-2-1998 so that it may not suffer from the laches.
4. There is no point to adjourn the matter only in order to ascertain the date of constitution of this petition because it is clear from the court-fee stamp attached with the write petition that the same was purchased on 55-5-1999. The office also noted that it was received on 25-5-1999 at 11-00 a.m.
Vide diary No,17505 and was fixed for today. In a situation, the date of institution incomes clear and there is no doubt about it that the petitioners have come to file this petition fairly late although the certified copy to them was available on -12-1997. As such, the writ petition suffers from laches and on the same ground, is liable to be dismissed.
5. However, besides the above technical point, I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners on merits of the writ petition as well. It is clear that both the Courts below have determined the factual controversy in the light of the evidence examined at the trial. Both of them have come to the conclusion in giving concurrent finding that the decree in question did not suffer from fraud or misrepresentation and as such, there is no ground to set it aside. As such, the concurrent finding on the question of fact given by the Courts of competent jurisdiction cannot be upset in a writ ,petition nor such finding can be substituted differently in the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to point out the details of fraud committed upon the petitioners nor same has been alleged in the evidence or in the petition under section 12(2), C.P.C. The law requires that the details of fraud should be given and the manner in which it is committed should also be elaborated. One of the petitioners namely Muhammad Ramzan appeared as P.W.1 and stated that the decree in dispute was obtained through fraud. The details of fraud were not given in that statement. It was admitted by him in the cross-examination that Mst.
Ameeran Bibi was his real sister. He also admitted that Mst. Ameeran Bibi had made a petition for setting aside the decree in their favour but that petition was dismissed for non-production of evidence. Now coming to the decree in dispute, it is quite clear that Mst. Ameeran Bibi had appeared in the Court through a counsel and had made consenting statement, whereupon the decree in question was passed. She was identified by her counsel Mr. Mumtaz Ahmad Khan, Advocate at the time of passing of the impugned decree. As such, it cannot be successfully urged that the aforesaid decree suffers -from any fraud or misrepresentation particularly when Mst.
Ameeran Bibi i,e, sisrer of the decree-holder was conceding in his favour. Even otherwise, the evidence examined by the decree-holder consisting of Ghulam Hussain (R.W.1), Ghulam Shabbir (R.W.2) and Samundar Khan (R.W.3) would clearly show that there was some sort of agreement regarding the sale of the aforesaid land by Mst. Ameeran to the decree-holder prior to the passing of the decree in the month of March, 1986. That agreement was placed on record as Exh.R.3 and its execution was proved through its marginal witnesses.
6. 1n such a situation, the view taken by the learned Courts below in the light of the evidence examined at the trial remains unexceptionable and does not call for any interference in the