' This petition for leave to appeal has been directed against the order of the High Court, dated 4-3- 1999, whereby the review petition filed by the petitioner, herein, was dismissed.
2. The brief facts of the case are that a decree was passed in favour of the petitioners, herein, for the recovery of decretal amount to the tune of Rs,11,73,832. An appeal was by the respondents, herein, before Court which was disposed of in nice of cm promise between the paned the amount was .Reduced to Rs,10,S4 1. Consequently, the appeal filed by the was disposed of with the said modification. The petitioners, herein, filed a review petition before the High Court contending that in fact the appeal before the High Court was filed without any valid power of attorney and, thus, should have been dismissed as being incompetent; according to them, the power of attorney, dated 27-3-1998, filed along with the memo. Of appeal, empowered the counsel to file an appeal to the District Judge and not to the High Court and the other power of attorney, Annexure '0' to the petition, was placed of the record of the High Court after the expiry of the period of limitation. Thus, according to the petitioners, both the aforesaid 'Wakalatnamas' relied upon by the respondents are of no avail to them.
3. The attorney for the petitioners has argued that the 'Wakalatnama', dated 27-3-1998, which was filed along with the memo. Of appeal in the High Court, did not empower the counsel for the respondents to file appeal to the High Court rather that empowered him to file an appeal before the District Judge; similarly, the subsequent 'Wakalatnama' was filed in the High Court after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeal to the High Court. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the appeal filed by the respondents in the High Court was incompetent and entailed dismissal. When the attorney was confronted with the situation that the 'Wakalatnama', dated 27-3-1998, which was filed along with the memo. Of apply in the High Court, why the objection was not taken earlier or at the time of passing the consent decree, he submitted that the said fact was not in his knowledge at that time. The learned counsel has submitted that had he been aware of the said defect, he would have not consented to the judgment and the decree under review.
4. I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It may be observed that irrespective of the objection of the learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to the validity of the appeal filed in the High Court, the fact remains that the review of the consent decree is being sought on the ground which could be raised at the time when the consent decree was passed. It is well-settled principle of law that the review petition on the ground of 'discovery of a new and important matter' can be allowed only if it is shown that such 'matter' could not be discovered earlier, despite exercising-the due care and caution. In the instant case, as the said 'Wakalatnama' was already on the record, the petitioners cannot be heard saying that they had exercised due care and caution but the said defect did not come to their notice. A reference may be made to the following cases which deal with the scope of 'exercise of due diligence' :-- ' In case reported as Soosai Anthony D'Costa Nicholas D'Costa v. Francis Anthoney Kurush Roche (AIR 1962 Madras 304), it has been held that the review cannot be granted on the ground that a particular counsel, who appeared for a party, failed to raise a particular point at the relevant stage.
' In case reported as Fazal Din v. Rehabilitation Commissioner (1987 CLC 1053), it has been held that a review is not available for re-hearing of a case on a point which should have been urged at the time of hearing of the case.
' In case reported as Mst. Rabia Begum v. Mst. Saeeda Khatoon (PLD 1983 Karachi 507), it has been held that as the relevant 'Annexures' were already on the record, the counsel for the petitioner could have found them after due care. Thus, the review -petition was dismissed in limine holding that this was a case of negligence of the counsel.
' In case reported as Shahool Amoeth Ali v. Dayaram Singh alias Jayaram Singh (AIR 1944 Madras 570), the review petition was dismissed on the ground that the compromise decree could not be reviewed on the ground when the error committed was due to the fault of the petitioner himself.
5. Even otherwise. After passing of the consent decree by the parties, the aforesaid ground cannot be pressed into service for assailer the same in exercise of review jurisdictions because it is well- settled principle of law that a compromise decree or a consent order or admission creates estoppel to change the position. A reference may be made to Note 72 of the Law of Evidence (Qanun-eShahadat), Vol. II, 1986 Edition, commentary by Sh. Shaukat Mahmood, wherein after discussing the case-law on the subject; it has been opined that the consent order and decree creates staple to challenge the same afterward.
' In the light of what has been stated above, finding no force in this petition for leave to appeal, it is hereby dismissed.