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1977 PLC 445

MUHAMMAD USMAN vs 5TH SIND LABOUR COURT, KARACHI AND ANOTHER

Citation1977 PLC 445
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Constitutional Petition No. 1473 of 1974
Date1976-04-27
Judge(s)Zakaullah Lodhi
ResultPetition dismissed

The petitioner's case is that he was employed in the organisation of the second respondent as a Sales Manager. The duties assigned to him were sales booking, preparation of the delivery orders, cash memos and indent booking, drafting of litters, etc. According to him, his designation was that of the Sales Manager but he did not enjoy any administrative power to exclude him from the definition of workman. He has admitted that he was drawing a salary of Rs. 1,200.00 per month and was also entitled to commission on the business which he procured for the organisation of second respondent.

2. He worked in the second respondent's organisation up to 5th December, 1973 and subsequently his services were terminated with effect from 6th December, 1973. In this connection a letter dated 5th December, 1973 was issued giving him one month's pay in lieu of notice. The reason assigned for the termination of the services was that the said Organisation was in financial distress and it had therefore become necessary to re-organize the entire working on the company. It was under these circumstances that the post of Sales Manager had been abolished. As after the reorganisa-- tion there was no place left for a Sales Manager therefore the petitioner had become surplus for the purposes of the second respondent.

3. The petitioner has further stated that at the stage when his services were terminated the Workers' Union which existed in the second respondent's organisation had placed some demands before the Management which had not been accepted and therefore the dispute in this regard had been referred to the V Sind Labour Court under section 32(1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969.

4. After the termination of the services of the petitioner to Workers' Union filed an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969 which was allowed by the IV Junior Labour Court. The Junior Labour Court held that the petitioner did not fall within the definition of "workman" as defined under section 2(I) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance of 1968 as he performed the functions of managerial or administrative nature. However, it held that the petitioner was covered by the definition of term "workman" given in section 2(xxviii) of Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969 and therefore "he could competently move the Junior Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969. It also held that since a dispute between the Union of Workers and the Management was pending in the V Sind Labour Court therefore the cover of section 47 of Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969 was available to the petitioner and his services could not be terminated without the permission of the 5th Sind Labour Court.

5. Feeling aggrieved by the Junior Labour Court's order dated 14th March, 1974, the second respondent filed an appeal before the 5th Sind Labour Court who allowed the appeal vide order dated 16th May, 1974 holding that the petitioner was not a workman.

6. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was a workman within the definition of a "Workman" given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969 and he was also a member of the Trade Union of the workers therefore his services could not be terminated during the pendency of the industrial dispute without obtaining prior permission of the Labour Court before which the industrial dispute was pending. Discussing the proposition whether the petitioner was a workman or not I would firstly refer to the admission made by the petitioner himself in his cross-examination before the Junior Labour Court. He categorically stated that he was employed as a Sales Manager at a salary of Rs. 1,000 per month and on 1st December, 1973 he was given an increment of Rs. 200. Though he did not state in his affidavit filed before the Junior Labour Court that he performed any functions of managerial or administrative nature, but he admitted that in the matter of sales he was dealing with the International Organisations under the instructions of the Chairman of the Company and that he used to advise the Management about the prices of the commodities. He also used to issue price lists of commodities which were published under his signatures. He also admitted in his cross---examination that a typist used to do the typing work for him. On evaluating the evidence the Junior Labour Court had also come to the conclusion that the petitioner was performing the functions of administrative nature as Sales Manager as his main duty was to promote the sales of the articles manufactured by the second respondent's organisation and therefore he was not covered by the category of a "workman" as defined in West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance of 1968. If no rights are guaranteed or secured to him under the above-said Ordinance or under any other law as admittedly he is not a workman then he is not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Junior Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969, because only those workers who are covered by the definition of the term "workman" given in the Ordinance or in any other law and to whom certain rights are guaranteed can move the Junior Labour Court under section 25-A of the I. R. O. of 1969. The petitioner was not a workman as is held by the Junior Labour Court, therefore he could not make are application to' that Court for his re-instatement through the Trade Union of Workers The Labour Court therefore rightly reversed the finding of the Junior Labour Court on this point. Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance strictly provides for a workman to approach the junior Labour Court in Other categories of employees are not covered under case of any grievance this section.

7. As far as the second point that during the pendency of the in Industrial dispute, the services of the petitioner could not be terminated, is concerned there was not an iota of evidence to show that the petitioner was ever a member of the Trade Union of Workers. In fact he could not be a member because he was not a workman. It was only after the termination of his services that the Union decided to file an application for his re-instatement. The learned counsel for the petitioner was repeatedly asked to point out to me any such evidence whereby it could be inferred that prior to the filing of the application before the Junior Labour Court the petitioner was a member or officer of the Trade Union of Workers but he has utterly failed in this regard. All what he has stated is that being a member of the Trade Union of Workers the services of the petitioner could not be terminated without the permission of the Labour Court. The contention alone is not enough. It is required to be substantiated by some supporting facts. Evidently the Union assisted the petitioner after his dismissal from services either on his request or on its own initiative to win his sympathies otherwise, if he had been a member of the Union some evidence would have definitely come on record in this connection particularly when the question of his being a member of the Trade Union was not admitted by the second respondent. Since there is absolutely no evidence that the petitioner was a "workman or member of the Union therefore it was not incumbent upon the second respondent to have sought the permission of 5th Sind Labour Court within the meaning of section 47 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969 for the termination of his services.

8. For the foregoing reasons hold that the petitioner was not a workman and therefore he was not entitled to the protection afforded to a workman by section 47 of Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969. The petition has no substance and is hereby dismissed but with no orders as to costs.

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