' The petitioner is in possession of a portion of House No, S. I. 79-S-30/A, Nisbet Road, Lahore which was transferred to the deceased respondent Muhammad Yousuf on the 24th of April 1960. A notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 was sent to the appellant on the 19th of February 1969 and was served upon him on the 26th of February 1969.
The appellant did not pay or tender the rent to the deceased respondent. On the other hand he deposited rent for the years 1966, 1967 and 1968 on the 10th May 1969 before the Rent Controller and the rent for the month of January 1969 before the same authority on the 3rd of June 1969. The respondent filed an application for ejectment of the appellant on grounds of default on the 1st July 1969. He claimed in that application that the appellant was in possession of three rooms and was liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs, 20 per month, but even if he was taken to be in possession of one room, he would still be liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs, 10 per month.
2. The appellant contested the application not only challenging the allegation about the possession of as many as three rooms but also about the rate of rent. On the first point his contention was that he was in possession of only one room and a kitchen while on the second point his objection was that the rate of rent was Rs, 5 per month which he had deposited before the Rent Controller. The jurisdiction of the Rent Controller was also challenged. The following issues were framed :- (1)Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try the petitioner's petition? O. P. A.
(1-A) Whether the respondent is in possession of 3 rooms in the first floor of the property in dispute?
0.P. A.
(2)Whether a valid notice under section 30 of Act XXVIII of 1958 was served upon the respondent? 0.
P. P.
' The second issue was taken first and was decided in favour of the respondent. Similarly the first issue was also decided in his favour. On issue No, 1-A it was held that the appellant was in possession of three rooms and was liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs, 20 per month. It was further held that even if the possession of the appellant be taken to be only of one room, he was still liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs, 5 per month from the 24th of April 1960, the date of the P. T.
0. To 1st July 1969, while the appellant had deposited rent only with effect from 1966.
3. The appellant filed an appeal before the learned District Judge who confirmed the finding on Issue No,
2. He considered only Issue No, 1.A in detail and found that the appellant was in possession of one room. He also found that the appellant was liable to pay rent of only three years. Findint, that the rate according to the assessm ent Exh. R/1, relied upon by the appellant, was Rs, 10 per month, he held the appellant to be a defaulter.
4. Ch. Habib Ullah in his arguments contended that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to fix the rent at the rate of Rs, 10 per month particularly when there was no cross-objection on behalf of the deceased respondent. He further argued that the rent at the rate of Rs, 5 per month is proved by the document Exh. R/1 and the same had been deposited before the Rent Controller on the 15th of May 1969.
5. Ongoing through the record I find that the learned District Judge was correct in holding that the rent of the portion in possession of the appellant was Rs, 10 per month. Exh. R/1 shows two rooms in possession of the appellant. It further proves the rent of each room to be Rs,
5. It is possible that the kitchen might have been considered to be another room in his possession since it is admitted that he is in possession of one room and one kitchen. The learned District Judge was right in holding that the rent of the property was Rs, 10 per month. The objection that in the absence of cross- objection it was not open to the learned District Judge to give this finding is bereft of any merit. The entire judgment of the learned Rent Controller was in favour of the respondent. It was only in the alternative that the learned Rent Controller had come to the conclusion that even if the appellant be deemed to be in possession of one room, he had not paid the rent at the rate of Rs, 5 w. e. f. 24th April 1960. In these circumstances there was hardly any justification for the respondent to file any cross-objection. It became the duty of the learned Additional District Judge to find out after his finding to the extent of the property in possession of the appellant, the rate of -rent also and this he had done. No law has been shown to one that in these .Circumstances a cross-objection could at all have been filed by the respondent. -This argument is, therefore, of no force.
6. This is sufficient to dismiss the appeal of the appellant but the appellant's case is vulnerable on two other objections. Although the notice under section 30 was served upon the appellant on the 26th of February 1969 and he was required to pay the entire rent to the respondent within 90j days, he deposited the rent for the month of January 1969 on 2nd of June( 199, after the expiry of the above period. This is sufficient to denounce the, appellant as a defaulter.
7. There is yet another formidable objection. The appellant relies upon the deposit of rent from 1966 to 1968 before the Rent Controller within the period of 90 days from the date of service of the notice since this rent was deposited on the 15th of May 1969. It is no doubt true that the provisions of subsection (3) of section 30 in clause (i) contemplate a tender of rent within the period of 90 days to be sufficient compliance with that provision, but the question is whether the deposit of this rent to the Rent Controller within that period would be sufficient tender within the meaning of the above clause. It is no doubt true that if Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 be deemed to be applicable to the parties on the 15th of May 1969 when the above rent was deposited before the Rent Controller, this deposit would be considered to be sufficient tender to the respondent under explanation for the purpose of clause (i) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Ordinance, but in the present case the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties came to be regulated under the ordinary law including the Rent Restriction Ordinance on the 28th of May 1969 in view of the specific language of subsection (4) of section 30 of the Act, 1958 which provides that on the expiry of the period taientioned in proviso (b) to subsection (1) or on the contravention of any of the provisions of subsection (3) whichever is earlier, the relationship o landlord and tenant between the transferee and the tenant shall be regulated in accordance with the law for the time being in force relating to such relationship. Proviso (b) to subsection (1) only places an embargo upon the right of the landlord-transferee to eject a person from the house in his possession for period of 6 years from the date of notice under the provisions of that section. This provision is not applicable to the present case. The other contingency in which the ordinary law becomes applicable is the contravention of the provision of subsection (3). This contravention occurs only when the arrear of rent is not paid within three months from the date of receipt of notice of demand sent to him by the transferee by registered post acknowledgment due or when the tenant sublets or otherwise parts with the possession of the house or again where the tenant owns in the same town or city another house. The last two contingencies also do not arise in the present case. The only question is when did the relationship of landlord and tenant come to be regulated by the ordinary law of the land in view of the default of payment to be paid within 90 days.
8. As stated above this relationship came to be regulated by the ordinary law only on the 28th of May 1969, 90 days after the service of notice of demand. The provision of explanation to clause (1) of subsection (2) of section 13 would apply only after the 28th of May 1959. Any tender made before that date by deposit of the rent before the Rent Controller is no tender in the eye of law. It is like payment of the rent due to the landlord to a third 0 person not connected with the landlord. The tender under the provisions of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 ought to have been directly to the transferee-landlord and not through the agency of the Rent Controller. For this reason also the so-called tender of rent by the appellant cannot be relied upon. Tne appellant has clearly defaulted in the payment or tender of rent. Tae appeal is, therefore, without merits and is dismissed with costs.