' SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J.---This Intra-Court Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 26-10- 1998 of a learned Single Judge of this Court, passed in Writ Petition No,9958 of 1998; and arises out of the following circumstances.
2. The appellant and respondent No,1 are husband and wife, whereas respondents Nos.2 and 3 are daughters and respondent No,4 is a son. All the three children are minors. Respondent No,1 filed a suit for maintenance for herself and three minors in the Court of learned Judge Family Court. The appellant also filed a suit for conjugal rights. The suits were contested by the parties. After the framing of the issues the parties produced their respective evidence.
3. On 13-5-1998, when the matter was fixed for post-trial proceedings for reconciliation, the parties arrived at a compromise and reconciliation proceedings succeeded. The appellant, as a result, made a statement on the said date, that he was prepared to pay Rs,500 as maintenance for each of the minors and respondent No,1, the wife. He agreed to pay an amount of Rs,2,000 per month w,e,f, October, 1995 and future maintenance at the same rate. This statement was signed by the appellant as well as his learned counsel. Respondent No,1 also made a statement before the learned Judge Family Court on the same date accepting the offer of the appellant. She also signed the said statement as well as her learned counsel. As a result of the settlement between the parties, the learned Judge Family Court disposed of the cases, directing the appellant to deposit the arrears of the maintenance allowance for 32 months at the rate of Rs,2,000 per month i,e, Rs,64,000 till 13-7-1998, and decree followed accordingly.
4. It appears that the appellant had a second thought and filed a writ petition before this Court on the ground that:-- "The statement or 'the parties which is the basis of an impugned judgment and decree having been without oath and solemn affirmation all the proceedings, statements and judgment and decree dated 13-5-1998 are coram non judice and are nullity in the eyes of law and have no legal effect." (ground No,1 of the writ petition).
' The learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the said petition on his view that it was not necessary to record the statement on oath.
5. In support of this appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant contends, that, even for a compromise, oath was essential and relies upon Sajjad Ahmad and another v. The State (1992 SCMR 408). It is contended that, in the absence of such an oath, the proceedings dated 13-5-1998 cannot be termed as a compromise even.
6. The undisputed fact is that, after recording of the evidence, the parties did appear in person on 13-5-1998 before the learned Judge, Family Court, when reconciliation effort had to be made in pursuance of section 12 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 which effort succeeded and matured into a compromise between the parties. In token of what the parties had stated before the Court they put their signatures as well as their learned counsel. This was a binding arrangement and agreement between the parties which culminated into the judgment and decree by the learned Judge, Family Court.
7. It may be noted that such an effort for compromise and reconciliation is an obligation of the Presiding Officer of the Court who has to make an attempt at a pretrial stage of the proceedings in terms of section 10 of the Family Courts Act and thereafter to make another effort after the close of evidence of the parties under section 12 of the Act to bring about reconciliation between the parties. This is one of the objectives of the proceedings under a special law. In the instant case,, this object and purpose was accomplished as a result whereof the dispute stood resolved in terms of the compromise so arrived at between the parties.
8. We are of the view that there is no requirement of the law that even for a compromise the statement should be made by a party on oath. The statement itself is not denied by the appellant as the same has been even signed by his counsel. If at all the appellant wanted to be sworn before his statement, he could have requested the learned Judge Family Court, for administering him the oath. The statement glade by him without oath has been accepted by the respondent and the judgment and decree passed accordingly. The mere assertion that the statement should have been on oath cannot result in nullifying the proceedings, the judgment and the decree of the Court which otherwise was possessed of jurisdiction to pass such a judgment and decree. Sajjad Ahmad's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant does not in any way advance the case of the appellant inasmuch as the same arose out of a criminal trial and in that too it was observed that:-- "The objection that the evidence of the P. Ws. Was not recorded by the learned trial Judge on oath is not such a fatal flaw which may vitiate the whole trial and as such it is repelled."
' The contention of the learned counsel that non administration of oath by the learned Judge Family- Court at the time of recording of statement of the appellant on 13-5-1998 would vitiate the proceedings is untenable and is repelled.
9. As has been noted above, making of the statement and the compromise is not denied by the appellant. Thus, by making such a statement, he led the respondents as well as the Court to adopt and follow a particular course as a result whereof the judgment and decree was passed by the learned Judge Family Court. He cannot now be allowed to resile from such a statement. In Haji Muhammad Asghar v. Malik Shah Muhammad Awan and another (PLD 1986 SC 542), it was observed at page 547 that:-- "Where a party to the proceedings before a Court or Tribunal enters into an agreement of its own free will for disposal of the matter, it cannot turn round and successfully plead that it had no legal right to consent, and the Court or Authority could not act such a consent and should not be allowed to do so. It is not the case of the appellant that he did not consent, or had a mistaken view of the situation or otherwise duped or taken in. These are the cases where the doctrine of election, of approbation and reprobation comes into play. This Court has applied it against the party submitting to jurisdiction, or to a procedure not specifically provided for in the law governing the cases."
' Similarly, in A.R. Khan v. P.N. Boga through Legal Heir (PLD 1987 SC 107) the value, sanctity and efficacy of a compromise was highlighted and it was observed that compromise is a lawful method of disposing of a matter brought before the Tribunal/Court and has sanctity and efficacy and that a party cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate or blow hot and cold.
10. The principle highlighted by the Supreme Court is fully attracted to this case. The appellant having made a statement and agreed for disposal of the case on the basis of the compromise he cannot turn round and repudiate or resile therefrom.
11. We may also observe that the compromise so arrived at and decree passed accordingly is just and fair in the facts and circumstances of this case. The appellant being husband of respondent No,1 and father of respondents Nos.2 to 4 is obliged to pay maintenance to them. This fair and just solution of the matter and that too by a voluntary act of the parties cannot be made subject matter of writ jurisdiction. We do not find any error or justification to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court.
' The appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.