' This is a revision application under section 38(3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, against the order, dated 14-5-1998, passed by the learned Labour Court No,VI at Hyderabad in Grievance Application No,75 of 1996.
2. The respondent was appointed by the applicant on different dates for different periods. Mr. Devdas and Wahid Bux for applicant and respondent respectively have filed a joint statement in writing, signed by them in respect thereof, which is reproduced as under:- Details of appointments
(1) First appointment 13-11-1995 to 17-1-1996.61 days.
(2) Second appointment 18-1-1996 to 17-3-1996.60 days.
(3) Third appointment-10-3-1996 to 8-5-1996.60 days.
(4) Fourth appointment 254-1996 to 23-6-1996.60 days. 241 clan (5)Removed on 24-6-1996.
(Sd.)
Representation of respondent.
21-4-1999.
(Sd.)
21-4-1999.
3. Perusal of the record shows, that the respondent was first engaged on daily wages as Conductor at the rate of Rs,60 per day w,e,f, 18-11-1995 (Annexure A-1). He deposited a sum of Rs,500 as Security Deposit (Annexure A-2). He was issued another office order whereby he was, thereafter, engaged as a Conductor -on -monthly basis for two months only w,e,f, 18-1-1996, further stating that engagement was on temporary basis and shall automatically stand terminated after expiry of stipulated period (Annexure A-3). He was issued another office order, dated 20-3-1996 engaging him as Conductor on monthly basis for 60 days w,e,f, 10-3-1996. (Mr. Devdas submitted that it was typing mistake and be read as 20-3-19%). It was also stated that the engagement was on temporary basis and shall stand terminated after expiry of stipulated period (Annexure A-4). Lastly, he was issued an office order, dated 24-3-1996 whereby he was engaged as Conductor on monthly basis for two months w,e,f, 25-4-1996 on temporary basis terminable on expiry of stipulated period (Annexure A-5).
4. It is alleged by the respondent that he remained continuously, without any break, in employment as Conductor from 18-1-1995 up to 23-6-1996 for more than 90 days and thereby attained the status of permanent workman, as required under Schedule (1) to the standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and was, thus, entitled to a notice of termination in writing under Standing Order 12(3). It was further alleged that on 24-6-1996 when he reached the office to attend his duty, he was informed verbally that his services were no more required. He demanded written termination order showing reasons of his termination, but the same was refused. He, thereafter, sent a grievance notice, dated 23-7-1996 by registered post which remained unreplied by the applicant. He then, filed application under section 25-A, of the I.R.O., 1969 in the Sindh Labour Court No,6 at Hyderabad.
5. The applicant filed written statement on 14-11-1997. The learned Presiding Officer, relying upon the Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1994 (XXXI of 1994) held the application as abated. The respondent, being aggrieved with the said order of the learned Labour Court, filed a revision application in this Tribunal, which was allowed by decision, dated 24-9-1997 whereby the said impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded.
6. On remand, written statement was filed on 14-11-1997 by the applicant herein, wherein it was denied that the respondent overworked continuously and was, admittedly, always given separate appointment letter as his nature of job was purely temporary, terminable at any time without notice.
7. Thereafter, the respondent filed his affidavit-in-evidence on 8-12-1997.
8. It appears from the record that the applicant did not persue the matter any further. Neither they filed any affidavit-in-evidence nor cross-examined the respondent. The applicant's side was, therefore, closed on 21-1-1998. The learned Presiding Officer framed the following points/issues for determination: "(1) Whether the applicant is deemed to be a permanent workman within the meaning of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968?
(2) Whether the applicant was entitled to written termination order showing explicit reasons?
(3) What should the order be ?"
9. After hearing arguments of the representative of the respondent, the learned Labour Court allowed the application whereby the respondent was ordered to be reinstated in service with back benefits, as he was not gainfully employed anywhere as stated by him in para. 16 of his affidavit- in-evidence.
10. The applicants did not choose to file the appeal. However, they filed the above revision application on 28-7-1998 under section 38(3-a) of the I.R.O., 1969.
11. I have heard Mr. Devdas Udeshi, learned Advocate for the applicant and Mr. Wahid Bux, Representative of the respondent.
12. The first and foremost question, which arises in the case is whether the respondent, in the facts and circumstances of the case, will be deemed to be a permanent workman, if so, was he entitled to claim notice of termination under Standing Order 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.
On the facts, as to commencement and termination of employment/engagement of the respondent as Conductor, I am clear in my mind that having served the applicant Corporation as Conductor continuously, without any break for 8 months, he had attained the status of a permanent workman, as provided under Schedule 1 of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Merely stating in the appointment letter, that the appointment was for 60 days and extending the said period for 60 days, several times, in continuity, will not come in the way of the respondent to attain the status of a permanent workman as the total period exceeded 90 days, whereas the respondent's work was of a permanent nature. The respondent having satisfactorily completed the probationary period of three months of 1999, in the same work as Conductor, has attained the status of permanent workman. He, therefore, was entitled to a notice under Standing Officer 12(3) as has been rightly held by the learned Presiding Officer.
13. The submission of the learned counsel for the applicant that the provisions of Standing. Order 12(3) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 will not be attracted to this case as every appointment was temporary in nature indicating the time as and when the said temporary appointment was to expire, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is not tenable. Had there been initial appointment only for 60 days or even for 89 days, not to attain the limit of 90 days, the arguments would have some force, but merely appointing the respondent initially for 60 days and, thereafter, extending the said period by issuance of separate office orders, will not take away the right of a workman to attain the status of a permanent workman. The moment, the respondent attained the status of permanent workman, he became entitled to a notice of termination in accordance with Standing Order 12(3) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Admittedly, no termination letter had been issued. The law provides that the services of a permanent workman shall not be terminated, nor shall a workman be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service, except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken.
14. Mr. Devdas, in support of his submission, however, placed his reliance on a case reported as Qareebur Rehman, v. Mehram Bottlers 1993 PLC 154 wherein it was held by a learned Chairman of this Tribunal, "where appointment of an employee was for a specified period, service of a separate letter of termination was not at all necessary on such employee". The case, cited by the counsel, is distinguishable inasmuch as there was only one letter of appointment for a specified period of 89 days and, thereafter, his employment stood terminated and, as such, he being a temporary workman, could not claim notice of termination of his service under Standing Order 12(3), whereas in the instant case, there are four appointment letters extending to eight months in all and in continuity, without any break.
15. He also placed his reliance on a case, reported as Munir Khan v. Presiding Officer, Vth Sindh Labour Court, Karachi 1998 PLC 192. This case is also distinguishable inasmuch as in the said case there was also temporary appointment for 89 days only.
16. For the above discussion, I find no illegality, incorrectness even impropriety in the decision, given by the learned Presiding Officer, impugned in the above revision.
17. In result, the revision application is dismissed. Announced in open Court, this the 30th day of April, 1999.