' MAMOON KAZI, J.---The respondent instituted ejectment proceedings in the Court of 1st Rent Controller, Mirpurkhas, seeking ejectment of the petitioners from the demised premises, bearing No,293/1-294, situated in Kunari Town. The said premises had been rented out to the petitioners on a rental of Rs,650 per month. The ejectment was sought on the ground of commission of default in payment of rent by the petitioners, subletting and using the premises as a hotel in the name and, style of 'Cafe Iran' by allowing different persons to pass night on roof top of the premises in violation of the terms of tenancy.
2. The application was resisted by the petitioners. The jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to try the case was also disputed as admittedly, the premises in dispute were being utilized as a hotel which according to the petitioners, barred the jurisdiction of the Controller to hear the case under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1079 3, The learned Controller, after recording evidence adduced on behalf of the parties, however, held that, the premises in dispute consisted of two rooms where only refreshments were served and, therefore, the said premises did not fall within the definition of the terms 'hotel', Although, the said term was not defined in the Rent Ordinance, but the same according to him, had been defined in section 2(g) of Pakistan Hotels and Restaurants Act, 1976 as follows:-- "2(g) 'hotel' means a lodging, or boarding and lodging, establishment with a minimum of ten lettable bed-rooms, provided for tourists on monetary consideration, which conforms to any of the prescribed minimum criteria, but does not include---
(i) a home or hostel which is exclusively or mainly used for the aged or invalid persons or students and is run by or under the control of a charitable or educational institution; or
(ii) any rest house, hostel or circuit house exclusively meant for visiting Government officials or officials of other organizations, though run on a commercial basis."
4. Reliance was also placed by the Controller on Zafar Ali v. Allah Bachayo (PLD 1989 SC 294) wherein the word 'hotel' occurring in the definition of 'premises' in section 2(h) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance was held not to extend to premises where only refreshments are offered for sale, but it only referred to a place or building which offers lodging accommodation to travellers and guests who wish to utilize the same. The preliminary objection being thus disposed of, the ejectment application was allowed by the Rent. Controller and the petitioners were directed to hand over vacant possession to the respondent within sixty days from the date of passing of the said order.
5. In the first appeal before the High Court, an objection was taken on behalf of the respondent that the appeal filed by the petitioners was time-barred. It was pointed out that the appeal against the order, dated 29-7-1989 had been filed, on 4-9-1989. Its copy had been applied for on 9-8-1989 and it was delivered to the petitioners the same day. Therefore, the appeal was clearly time-barred.
Although, the fact that the appeal was time-barred was not disputed on behalf of the petitioners, but an application had been filed seeking condonation of delay and the only ground urged before the High Court was that, the order of the Rent Controller had been passed without jurisdiction and was, thus, a nullity in law. Therefore, the question of limitation for setting aside of such order did hardly arise. However, the learned Judge in Chambers, who heard the said appeal, was not impressed and the appeal has been dismissed as barred by time.
6. Before this Court, Mr, Ahamdullah Faruqi, learned counsel for the petitioners has once again raised the same contention. The learned counsel has emphasised that the premises were admittedly being used by the petitioners as a hotel and, therefore, the learned Controller had no Jurisdiction to entertain the ejectment application. Thus, the order passed by him directing the petitioners to vacate the premises was a nullity in law,
7. We are, however, of the view that the contention of Mr. Faruqi is completely devoid of force. Even if it is assumed that the premises in dispute were described as a hotel by the respondent himself in his application before the Rent Controller, the findings arrived at by the Rent Controller, which are based on the evidence recorded by him, indicate that the premises had been utilised only for serving refreshments, and thus, it was not a hotel. Even otherwise, as is clearly suggested by the definition of 'premises' in section 2(h) of the Rent Ordinance, to exclude the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller, the premises must be shown to have been let out as a hotel. The mere fact that the premises have been converted into a hotel by the tenant though, not initially let out as such, would not be sufficient to exclude the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller in the matter. In the present case, one of the grounds urged by the landlord in the ejectment application itself being that the petitioners had used the premises for purpose other than for which it had been let out to them, and thus, they had violated the terms of tenancy, the contention of Mr. Faruqi appears to be untenable on the face thereof. However, the question whether the premises were being run as a hotel by the petitioners had been determined by the Rent Controller upon evidence recorded by him and his findings appear to have been based on such enquiry. The findings arrived at by the learned Controller being findings of fact, therefore, would prevail unless they are reversed in appeal. Under such circumstances, the order passed by him cannot be construed as a finality in law, as contended by Mr. Ahmadullah Faruqi. This leads one to a clear conclusion that the appeal filed by the petitioners before the High Court was time-barred and the judgment of the learned Judge, in the High Court is not open to exception.
8. In the result, the petition is dismissed and leave is refused.