' CH. MUHAMMAD ARIF, J.---The background in which the above appeals with leave of this Court have arisen is that respondent No,1 State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as SLIC, filed four Applications bearing Nos. 8 of 1978, 4,23 and 27 of 1979, against the appellant-Cooperative Insurance Society of Pakistan Limited, Lahore hereinafter referred to as CISP, and others under Article 22 of the Life Insurance (Nationalization) Order, 1972, hereinafter referred to as LINO, before the Insurance Appellate Tribunal, Karachi. SLIC is a statutory Corporation constituted under Article 11 (1) of LINO and is registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, hereinafter referred to as 1925-Act, as also under the Insurance Act, 1938, hereinafter referred to as 1938-Act, and a composite insurer carrying on business of more than one class i.e, life insurance, fire insurance, marine insurance, accident and miscellaneous insurance. The private-respondents have, at all material times, been Directors of the appellant CISP. Under Article 4 of LINO, the management of CISP was vested in the Federal Government of Pakistan on 19-3-1972 and the result was that from the appointed date i.e 1st of November, 1972, the assets and liabilities appertaining to life insurance business of cooperatives stood transferred and vested in SLIC under Article 15 of LINO.
As SLIC had the right under Article 22 of LINO to apply for relief against the insurer' for any transaction or act of the insurer' which comes within the purview of any one of clauses (a) to (g) of Article 22 (ibid) and as by amending Act (No,LXXV of) 1975'new clause (g) was inserted in Article 22
(ibid) to read "acted or omitted to act, in violation of Act has thereby caused a loss to or imposed liability on the Insurer" and as SLIC came to know, after examination and inspection of the records of CISP, that they have been guilty of violation of 1938-Act, particularly ections 29 and 408 thereof read with Rule 39 of the Insurance Rules, 1958 resulting in various losses by CISP, SLIC was driven to claiming the amounts specified in the above 4-applications with the following prayer-clauses therein, respectively:-- ' APPLICATION NO.8 OF 1978: "16. It is prayed on behalf of the Applicant Corporation, that the following reliefs may kindly be granted to the applicant Corporation:- "(i) That respondents Nos. 1 to 28 be directed to pay the Applicant Corporation the sum of Rs,7,04,699 on account of excessive management expenses debited to the life Insurance Fund and the sum of Rs,8,06,847.63 by way of interest/damages calculated at 15% per annum up to 31-7-1978 in lieu of that interest/income which would have accrued on the amount of the Life Fund had there been no excess management expenses.
"(ii) Future interest on the sum of Rs,7,04,699 @ 15 per cent per annum from the date of the Application up to the date of payment.
"(iii) The Applicant Corporation may be allowed, if considered necessary by the Applicant Corporation, to adjust/set off an amount out of sum as may be found payable by the respondents to the Applicant Corporation against the compensation payable by the Corporation to the Respondent Company.
"(iv) Cost of the Application.
"(v) Such other relief/reliefs as this Honourable Tribunal deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
APPLICATION NO.27 OF 1979: "(15)It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Tribunal may be pleased to:- "(i) Order and direct the respondents Nos.1 to 17 jointly and severally to pay an amount of Rs,2,20,803 (Rupees two lacs twenty thousand eight hundred and three only (Principal rupees 1,03,628 + interest Rs,1,17,115, together with the interest pendent lite at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of the application till the date of realization and: "(ii) Grant cost of the application and grant such other relief/reliefs as this Hon'ble Tribunal deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
APPLICATION NO.23 OF 1979: "19. It is prayed that the following reliefs may kindly be granted to the Applicant Corporation:- "1-(a) The respondents Nos. 1 to 25 be directed to pay jointly and severally to the Applicant Corporation a sum of Rs,9,22,743.58 (rupees nine lacs twenty-two thousand seven hundred forty- three and paisas .Fifty-eight only) on account of Loans and Advances made in contravention of Law to the Agents/Employers of Agents plus Rs,10,42,238 at the rate of 15% per annum in lieu of the interest/income which would have accrued on the amount of Life Fund had there been no unauthorized/illegal Loans/Advances made to the Employers of Agents and future interest at the same rate from the application till realization as per claim in paragraphs 12 and 13 above.
"(b). Without prejudice to (a) the respondents Nos. 26 to 589 be directed to pay individually various sums of money as shown against their names in Annexure "B' hereto, with proportionate interest upto 30-9-1979 and with future interest on the same rate from the date of application till realization.
"II Cost of application.
"III Such other relief/reliefs as the Honourable Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the Circumstances of the Case."
APPLICATION NO. 4 OF 1979: "15. It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Tribunal may be pleased to:- "(i) Order and direct the respondents Nos. 1 to 16 jointly and severally to pay an amount of Rs,21,040 (Principal Rs,10,000 + Interest Rs 11,040) tegether with the interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of application till the date of realization and: "(ii). Without prejudice to above, the respondents Nos. 17 and 18 be directed to pay individually various sums of money as disclosed in paragraph No,6 above with proportionate interest upto 15- 3-1979 and with future interest on the same amount from the date of this application till realization; "(iii) The Applicant Corporation may be allowed if considered necessary by the applicant to adjust set off any of the sum as may be found to be payable by the respondent No,1 to the Applicant Corporation, against the compensation that it determined as payable by the Corporation to the respondent No 1.
"(iv) Grant costs of the application and, grant such other relief/reliefs as this Hon'ble Tribunal deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
' After receiving written statements from CISP, contents whereof were adopted by other respondents and after framing appropriate issues in line with their pleadings regarding non- maintainability of applications for non-compliance of the provisions of section 70 of 1925-Act, the Insurance Appellate Tribunal dismissed all the applications as not maintainable for want of mandatory notice under section 70 of 1925-Act. This happened on 6-8-1983.
2. Judgment dated 6-8-1983 was challenged by the respondent- CISP in 4-Miscellenious Appeals bearing Nos. 67, 68, 69 and 72 of 1983 before the High Court under section 110 (2) of 1938 Act read with Article 2(h) of LINO. A learned Division Bench of the High Court allowed Appeals Nos. 67, 68, 69 and 72 of 1983 set aside common judgment dated 6-8-1983 of the Insurance Appellate Tribunal and remitted the cases back to the Tribunal for fresh decision on merits. Operative part of the judgment of the High Court makes the following reading: "In Article 22 of 'LINO the legislature has used the Words may apply to the Tribunal" and in sub Article (3) of the said Article the Word 'application' is used and not suit'. In sub Article (4) of the said Article, the provision of a suit has specifically been mentioned and it is in the following terms:-
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article or anything in the Act, the Corporation may bring suit under section 106 of the Act against any person to whom subsection (1) of that section is applicable.'
"The corporation has been empowered to either make application for relief or file a suit. The Corporation commenced proceedings against respondents by way of an application and not by way of a suit as mentioned in subsection (4) of Article 22 of 'LINO' The Tribunal in order to regulate its business framed rules of 1973. Some of the rules are synonymous to the Orders and rules of C.P.C. But that does not mean that an application moved by the corporation would be deemed to be a suit, and therefore, barred by section 70 of Cooperative Societies Act. The proceedings in a suit commenced with presentation of a 'plaint', which is not the case here. For the disposal of such application the Tribunal may apply a procedure laid down in C.P.C., but it cannot be said to be a suit.
' The learned Tribunal observed in the impugned judgment that the proceedings under Article 22 of 'LINO' resemble in every respect to a suit. Mere resemblance would not mean that the same was a suit. To that extent, the findings of the Tribunal are not sustainable.
' The Tribunal is a Court in view of the observation in PLD 1958 Lah. 153 as the person or persons constituting the Tribunal are entrusted with judicial function i.e, of deciding litigated question according to law and they are empowered to pronounce a definitive judgment which is binding and authoritative.
' The provisions of section 70 of Cooperative Societies Act are not applicable to the proceedings commenced with an application under Article 22 of the Order. The proceedings if commenced with a suit, as is provided in sub-Article (4) of the said Article, the applicability of section 70 of Cooperative Societies Act would certainly have been attracted. Flagrant Violation of Insurance Act and Cooperative Societies Act in advancing loans, can also not be said to be acts touching business of Society. However, till such time, as the claim of appellants is properly adjudicated upon, it cannot be held that the respondent No, 1 acted in an unlawful manner or in violation of the provisions of Insurance Act a Cooperative Society in advancing huge sums to other respondents.
This is left to be decided by the Tribunal."
3. Leave Grant Order dated 20-4-1992 reads thus: "In these four petitions (Nos. 109, 110,111 and 112, all of 1992), leave to appeal is sought from the High Court's order dated 11-12-1991 which arose out of proceedings commenced by the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, under Article 22(1)(g) of the Life Insurance (Nationalization)
Order, 1972 against the respondents on the plea that in violation of the provisions of Insurance Act, 1978, they misused the assets and income of the life insurance business of the Cooperative Insurance Society of Pakistan Limited, petitioner No, 1 herein.
2. The respondents objected to the maintainability of these proceedings on the grounds that requirements of section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 had not been complied with. This section ordains: 'No suit shall be instituted against a society or any of its officers in respect of any act touching the business of the society until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar, or left at his office, stating the cause of action the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notices has been so delivered or left.'
' The .Tribunal` seized of the proceedings, as defined in section 2 (h) of the Order was the one set up under section 110 of the Insurance Act, 1938. The contention of the respondents before the Tribunal was that an application under Article 22 fulfills the requisites of a suit, which term is not defined in the Order or the General Clause Act, and even in the Civil Procedure Code; section 26 whereof lays down: 'every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed' For connotation of the words in such other manner as may be prescribed' appearing in section aforesaid, reliance was placed on Bulram Singh v. Dudh Nath and others) AIR 194)
Allahabad 100). In that case it was maintained that a restricted meaning should not be given to the word 'suit and accordingly an application under section 12 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act for the purposes of applicability of section 21 of the Arbitration Act treated as a suit. Rule 21 of the Insurance Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1973 was also pressed into service, which lays down that in hearing of an application under Article 22 as closely as possible, the procedure laid down for suit in C.P.0 shall be followed by the Tribunal. These arguments prevailed with the Tribunal and have been repeated before us and are further supported by some case law on the subject. The Tribunal held that the Provisions of section 70 (ibid) were applicable to an application under Article 22, and as these provisions were not complied with the applications were not minatainable.
3. In appeal the High Court reversed these findings. It held that the Tribunal is a Court but noticed that sub-para. (3) of Article 22 makes mention of 'application' and in sub-para. (4) the term 'suit' figures; under the latter provision, the State Life Insurance Corporation is empowered to file a suit under section 106 of the Insurance Act, 1938, Seemingly, the user in the same section of two different expression i.e, 'application' and 'suit' susceptible of different meaning, in no small measure, led the High Court to hold that the applications filed by the Corporation could not he treated as a suit. The Tribunal's order was, thus, set aside. It is interesting to note that the proceedings before the Court envisaged by section 106, described as suit under Article 2 (4) are not initiated by presenting a plaint but through an application.
4. Since the question as to whether or not section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 is attracted to an application moved under Article 22 (ibid), is of first impression and there is no reported case law on this point, the leave prayed for is granted. Security Rs,5,000 in each case."
4. Hence these appeals.
5 It appears that the parties are one on the points (I) that the term 'suit' has not been defined (a) either in 1938-Act or (b) in C.P.C. Or even (c) in General Clauses Act, 1958 and that (II) the Tribunal could commence proceedings under Article 22 of LINO (a) either by an 'application or; (b) a suit;
(III) the Tribunal dismissed all the applications as not maintainable for want of mandatory notices under section 70 of 1925-Act and that (IV) the High Court reversed the findings of the Tribunal to the effect that the proceedings under Article 22 of LINO resemble a 'suit' in every aspect with the observations that (i) resemblance simplicitor would not mean that the proceedings were a suit; (ii)
Tribunal is entrusted with judicial functions of deciding litigious questions according to law leading to pronouncing a definitive judgment (iii) section 70 of 1925 Act does not apply to proceedings commenced with an application under Article 22 (ibid) (iv) had proceedings before the Tribunal commenced with suit' under sub-Article (4) of Article 22 of LINO, only then the provisions of section 70 of 1925-Act would he allocated and that (v) alleged flagrant violation of 1938 Act and 1925 Act in the matter of advancing loan is to be resolved one way or the other by the Tribunal in proceedings before it. However, the parties are at variance with each other on the point of applicability or otherwise of the constraints of section 70 of 1925 Act to proceedings before the Tribunal. Put differently, the case of CISP is that section 70 of 1925-Act does apply to the proceedings initiated by the respondents whether by an 'application or by a suit, and that of SLIC is that section 70 (ibid) applies only if the proceedings have commenced before the Tribunal by instituting suit' under sub- Article (4) of Article 22 (ibid).
6. Mr. Muhammad Hanif Niazi, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing on behalf of the appellants, had referred to the definitions of the words/terms suit' and application in (i) Black's Law Dictionary, (ii) Prems Judicial Dictionary as also (iii) Words and Phrases Second Edition Vol .5 for the proposition that nothing will turn on the absence of definition of the above words/terms in C.P.C., 1938-Act or in General Clauses Act and that it will be the nature of proceedings before the Tribunal within the contemplation of Article 22 ibid that will determine such nature. According to him, the Tribunal was quite right in dismissing all the 4-applications. He has relied upon the following case- law in support of his clients' case:
(1) Govt. Of Pakistan v. Wali Muhammad Habib (PLD 1961 SC 215),
2. Din Muhammad v. Abdul Aziz (PLD 1967 Lahore 653),
3. Muhammad Ali Memorial v. Sibtey Hassan Kazmi (PLD 1975 Karachi 428),
4. Mulla Dad Khan v. West Pakistan Bar Council (PLD 1975 SC 469),
5. Rehman Khan v. Asad Ullah Khan (PLD 1983 Karachi 52),
6. Farida v. Prince Apartment Cooperative Housing Society (1984 CLC 2914),
7. Supreme Court Cases Digest by Malik,
8. Hurro Chunder Roy v. Shoorodhonee Debia (1868) 9WR Civil 402 at 406),
9. M. Badrabhat v. Venkates Govind (ILR 6 Bombay 54),
10. P.C. Secretary of State of India v. Chelli Kani Rama Rao (ILR 39 Madras 617),
11. Govind v. Venkates (AIR 1927 Bombay 259),
12. Selvarayan Samson v. Amalorpayanadani (AIR 1928 Madras 269),
13. The Damodaral v. Board of Commissioner (1929 ILR 53 Madras 266 at 269),
14. Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao (1931 ILR 45 Madras 320 P.0 ),
15. Mahalinga Kudumbam v. Theetharappa Mudaliar (56 MU 387),
16. Lokumal v. Dilsher (AIR 1935 Sindh 208),
17. Harikishan Lal v. People Bank of Nortern Indial (AIR 1936 Lahore 608),
18. Balral Singh v. Dudhnath (AIR 1949 Allahabad 100),
19. Hayat Khan v. Mangilal (AIR 1971 MP 140).
7. Contrarily, Mr. Fazle Ghani Khan, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court appearing on behalf of SLIC, has supported the impugned judgment of the High Court with the assertion that in terms of Article 3 (ibid), LINO, is to override other laws. He has referred to Messrs Cooperative Milk Society v.
State West Bengal (AIR 1958 Calcutta 373), South Arcot Cooperative Motor Transport v. Syed Batcha (AIR 1961 Madras 217), Deccon Marchant Cooperative Bank v. Dalichand Jugraj Jian (AIR 1969 SC 1320), Cooperative Central Bank v. Additional Industrial Tribunal (AIR 1970 SC 245), Muzaffar Hussain v. Yousaf (PLD 1976 Karachi 1107), Muhammad Azim v. Pakistan Employees Cooperative Housing Society (PLD 1985 Karachi 481) and Nazir Ali v. Noorabad Cooperative Housing Society (PLD 1987 Karachi 676) to contend that words 'suit' and 'application' have to be given such meanings thereto which advance the cause of justice rather than thwart the same. His precise plea was that the use of the above words in Article 22 (ibid) are, ex facie, capable of different connotations and the intention of the legislature is not to put them in one bucket for the purposes of determining the nature of the proceedings before the tribunal to attract the constraints of section 70 of 1925 Act whole hogg as such course will tantamount to denying the power to the Tribunal to resolve the controversy brought before it through 'application'/s as well.
8. While exercising his right of reply, Mr. Niazi referred to Hussain Bukhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others (PLD 1970 SC 1) to contend that the dismissal of the applications by the Tribunal did not suffer from any infirmity in law and, therefore, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.
9. There is no cavil with the proposition that the contentious matters brought before a Court and/or Tribunal are to be resolved by applying the principles applicable to all the causes in line with the relevant law on the subject. The distinction made between the proceedings in (i) application and
(ii) 'suit' gains greater importance when it is noticed that these terms find separate mention in sub- Articles (3) and (4) of Article 22 (ibid). The twin plea being raised on behalf of the appellants that
(i) the requirements of section 70 of 1925 Act, was admittedly not complied with and (ii) the Tribunal was set up under section 110 of 1938 Act with the result that requisites of a 'suit' were discernible in the proceedings before it which were rightly dismissed, loses sight of the fact that the learned Judge in Chambers did attend to the above plea before reaching the conclusion, that an 'application' before the Tribunal cannot be transferred into a 'suit' within the contemplation of sub- Article (4) of Article 22 (ibid). " The Corporation has been empowered to either make application for relief or file a suit. The Corporation commenced proceedings against respondents by way of an application and not by way of a suit as mentioned in subsection (4) of Article 22 of 'LINO' The Tribunal in order to re late its business framed rules of 1973. Some of the rules are synonymous to the orders and rules of C.P.C. But that does not mean that an application moved by the Corporation would be deemed to be a suit, and therefore, barred by section 70 of Cooperative Societies Act. The proceedings in a suit commenced with presentation of a 'plaint', which is not the case here. For the disposal of such application, the Tribunal may apply a procedure laid down in C.P.C., but it cannot be said to be a suit." (Underlining is for emphasis). The learned Judge in Chambers was quite right in observing that the Legislature has used the word 'may apply to the Tribunal' in Article 22 (ibid) and in sub-Article (3) thereof, the word 'application' is used and not 'suit'. It is sub-Article (4) of Article 22 (ibid) that a reference to 'suit' has been made and for the said reason the order of the Tribunal was rightly set aside by making a reference to Sahibzada Masud Ahmad, P.C.S. Additional Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur v. Mian Muhammad Saeed Sehgal, Chairman, Daily 'Afaq' Lyallpur and 6 others (PLD 1958 Lahore 153).
10. The criticism levelled against the judgment in appeal on behalf of Mr. Niazi that it is not the use of either one of the terms 'application' and 'suit' which should rule the lis but that it is the gravamen of the 'proceedings' brought before the Tribunal which is to be taken into consideration, is of little help to his clients in that redundancy cannot be imputed to the legislature. All the 4 applications filed by SLIC before the Tribunal securely answered the description of the word/term 'application' used in sub-Article (3) of Article 22 (ibid). If a choice is given to a litigant to commence his cause in accord with the letter as well as the spirit of words/terms 'application' and 'suit' and such choice is made accordingly, he can't be made to suffer on that account and that too to the advantage of his adversary. Put differently, the appellants have neither the law nor equity on their side in asking for treatment of 'applications' as 'suits' to attract the constraints provided in section 70 of 1925 Act. It has already been observed ,above that the intention of legislature can best be gathered from the words used in the piece of legislation itself. It is trite law that use of 2 terms/words separately in a provision of the concerned enactment cannot but be given full effect to for the simple reason that redundancy in that behalf cannot be presumed/countenanced see Mulla Dad Khan (supra). If 'SLIC' had filed 'suits' within the contemplation of sub-Article (4) of Article 22 (ibid) only then the constraints of section 70 of 1925 Act would, have applied to proceedings before the Tribunal.
11. The learned Judge in Chambers did consider the import of sub-Article (4) of Article 22 (ibid) i.e, Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article or anything in the Act, the Corporation may bring suit under section 106 of the Act against any person to whom subsection (1) of that section is applicable." And came to the right conclusion that the choice given to SLIC to file a 'suit' or an 'application' under sub-Article (3) of Article 22 (ibid) clearly brought it to the' fore that the proceedings in these cases commenced with the making of 'application' and not 'plaint' and that: "... For the disposal of such application, the Tribunal may apply a procedure laid down in C.P.C. But it cannot be said to be a suit." (Underlining is for emphasis).
12. The matter does not end here. The learned Judge in Chambers was cognizant of the fact that mere allegations regarding violation of 1938 Act and 1925 Act in the matter of advancing loan; "...
Can also not be said to be acts touching business of Society. However till such time as the claim of appellants (respondent No,1 herein) is properly adjudicated upon, it cannot be held that the respondent No,1 (appellant No,1 herein) acted in an unlawful manner or in violation of the provisions of Insurance Act a Cooperative Society in advancing huge sums to other respondents. This is left to be decided by the Tribunal" (Underlining is for emphasis).
13. As the learned Judge in Chambers has remitted the case back to the Tribunal for decision on merits, the judgment in appeal cannot but be upheld. So, be it. The appeals are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.