' Brief facts out of which the present writ petition arises are that the petitioner and respondent No,2 sole mnised marriage on 17-4-1987. Out of the wedlock 2 daughters were born who are with respondent No,2. Thereafter the relationship of the petitioner and respondent No,2 became restrained. Petitioner divorced respondent No,2 vide divorce deed. Dated 8-9-1997 and sent notice thereof to respondent No,1 along with copy of divorce deed but subsequently petitioner withdrew the aforesaid divorce deed before the expiry of 90 days on 2-12-1997 and also sent copy of the same to respondent No,2. Respondent No,1 after receiving the letter, dated 2-12-1997 summoned the previous record and sent notice to respondent No,2 for 13-12-1997. Petitioner appeared before respondent No,1 on 13-12-1997 but he refused to take any action on his notice on the ground that he has already issued divorce certificate in favour of respondent No,2 on 29-9-1997 on the basis of divorce deed, dated 29-6-1997. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner neither divorced respondent No,2 on 29-6-1997 nor sent any notice of Talaq as prescribed by section 7(1) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Hence divorce certificate issued by respondent No,1 in favour of respondent No,2 is violative of the mandatory provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and law laid down by the superior Courts. He further urged that divorce certificate issued by respondent No,1 is based upon bogus and fictitious and manoeuvre divorce deed. He further stated that he served notice to respondent No,2 on 8-9-1997 and the notice was withdrawn by him on 2-12-1997 before 90 days. Notices were issued by the respondent No,1 to respondent No,2 on the address of the petitioner which were received by the respondent No,2 which shows that all the proceedings are manipulated as the divorce deed, dated 29-6-1997 is photocopy on the record of the respondent No,1. He further urged that since the notice was not sent by the petitioner along with the divorce deed on 29-6-1997. Therefore, proceedings are in violation of the law laid down by the superior Courts. He relied upon the following judgments:
(i) PLD 1963 SC 51.
(ii) 1970 SCM R 51.
' PLD 1981 SC 460. 1984 SCMR 593. 1986 SCM R 1350.
(vi) PLD 1981 SC 460.
(vii) 1987 SCM R 518.
2. Learned counsel for the respondent No,1 stated that respondent No,1 did not receive any letter, dated 2-12-1997 regarding withdrawal of the divorce deed, dated 29-6-1997. He further stated that this letter was never received by the respondent No,1 and is not available in the record of the respondent No, 1 . He further stated that respondent No,1 received photocopy of divorce deed, dated 29-6-1997 from either of the party. He further stated that petitioner has submitted application for obtaining copies of the documents in which these facts are not mentioned at all that he has withdrawn the divorce deed, dated 29-6-1997 or that he has sent a letter to withdraw the divorce notice, dated 8-9-1997. Learned counsel for the respondent No,2 raised the following preliminary objections which are as follows:-
(1) Question involved in the writ petition requires inquiry into the facts which cannot be done in Constitutional jurisdiction.
(ii) Petitioner has alternative remedy by way of filing a revision petition before District Collector under section 16 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961.
(iii) Respondent No,2 has solemnised second marriage on 7-12-1997 and a add has also been born out of the second wedlock.
' He further stated that Talaq is effective even without notice sent by the petitioner. He relied upon the following judgments:
(i) 1992 SCM R 1273.
(ii) 1993 CLC 219.
(iii) PLD 1985 Lah.
319.
' He further stated that the petitioner approached this Court with unclean hands as the petitioner himself admitted in ground A as the petitioner had only written the word "I divorce" you without address anything to respondent No,2 and petitioner is not entitled to any discretionary relief. He relied upon the following judgments: 1988 CLC 1872. PLD 1990 SC 504. 1986 SCM R 1561. PLD 1982 SC 413.
' He summed up his arguments that the petitioner has two alternative remedies either to agitate the matter before the Collector or to file a civil suit.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner in rebuttal stated that petitioner has no alternative remedy as the petitioner has challenged only vires of the notice and wrongful assumption of jurisdiction by respondent No,1. He relied upon PLD 1972 Lah.
694. He further stated that no disputed question of fact arises as the petitioner has not sent any divorce deed to respondent No,1 or send notice to respondent No,2. He further stated that this fact is fully borne out from the record of the respondent No,1 as the divorce deed, dated 29-6-1997 is a photocopy.
4. I have given my anxious consideration to the contention of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record myself. It is admitted fact that according to the petitioner he has sent or served notice to respondent No,2 on 8-9-1997 and he has withdrawn the same on 2-12-1997 before expiry of 90 days whereas according to the respondents Nos.1 and 2, petitioner has sent divorce deed on 29-6-1997 and proceedings were continued in accordance with the law for some time and finally after the expiry of the 90 days respondent No,1 has issued divorce certificate to respondent No,2 on 29-9-1997. The nature of controversy between the parties ;, to the petition by itself for factual controversy which cannot be resolved in Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. 1 am fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Muhammad Yunas's case 1993 SCM R 618. It is a consistent view of the Supreme Court that in cases where factual controversies are involved, Constitutional petition is not proper remedy. Petitioner has alternative remedy under the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Therefore, this writ petition is not maintainable as is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case reported as Ch. Muhammad lsmaeel's case PLD 1966 SC 246. My learned brother Ihsan-ul-Haque Chaudhry, J., has considered this aspect of the case in Writ Petition No,4174 of 1998 and laid down the following principle: "There is recent tendency to file Constitution petition without exhausting remedies under the statute. This recent trend is dangerous. Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly held in case reported as Pir Sabir Shah's case PLD 1995 SC 66."
The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he has challenged the vires of the notice, the writ petition is not maintainable as the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shugufta Begum's case PLD 1989 SC 360 and 1993 SCM R 29.
' In view of what has been discussed above without pre-judging the issues on facts, the petitioner is directed to avail alternate adequate remedies in accordance with law. Therefore', I am of the view that the petition lacks merits which is dismissed in limine.