1. ' In 1946 Nisar Ali, the plaintiff before the Court below, purchased 2/13th share of Khasra No, 3974, Khewat No, 1753, Khatuni No, 192, situated in Ward No, 11, can Mir Ahmed Khan Road, Quetta. Tois transaction took place through a registered sale deed dated 20th June, 1946. Total area of this Khasra No, was 43072 Sq. Ft. Share of Nisar All came to 6626 Sq. Ft. Mutation carrying No, 120, was entered in the revenue record of Quetta City on 27th September, 1946 which was attested the next day. Copy of this mutation appears in the record as Exh. P/8. 11/13th share in the same Khasra number was purchased by some Hindus who later became evacuees. So their share was subsequently transferred under the settlement laws to one Ch. Imidad Ali, who is not a party to the present proceedings.
2. ' Acting under a power of attorney which is claimed by the plaintiff to be forged one, respondent Muhammad Aslam sold the share of Nisar Ali to Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi on 17th or 18th of November, 1965. Muhammad Aslam was defendant No, 2 before the Court below while Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi, the appellant in R. F. A. 3 of 197i, was defendant No,
3. The alleged power of attorney was purported to have been executed by Nisar Ali at Karachi on 18th November, 1965 before one Musood Hussain Suri, a Notary public. It is alleged that a forged receipt, showing part payment of Rs, 13,000, was also prepared. This amount was shown to have been received by Capt. Haji Kabir (defendant No, 1 in the Court below) on behalf of Nisar Ali.
3. 'On 11th December, 1965 entry No, 413 was entered in the mutation register of the revenue record of Quetta City. This mutation was attested on 14th December, 1965 in the presence of Muhammad Aslam and Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi. This mutation reflected the sale of the share of Nisar Ali in favor of Mohammad Jan Ghaznavi through the former's alleged attorney. On 4th March, another transaction was shown in the revenue records vide Mutation No, 433 (Exh. W12). According to this mutation the two shares in Khasra No, 3974 (2/13th and 11/13th) were partitioned and new Khasra Nos. 13172/3974 and 13,73/3974 were assigned to the new plots. On the same day another mutation bearing No, 434 (Exh. D/137) was entered in the revenue record whereby 1949 Sq. Ft. Out of Khasra No, 14173/3974, the share of Ch. Imdad Ali, was transferred to Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi by way of sale. These two mutations i,e, 433 and 434 were attested the same day. On 21st March, 1967 another mutation was entered in the revenue record bearing No, 534 (Bah. 0/10). According to this mutation Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi transferred both the areas, i,e, 6626 Sq. Ft. Ostensibly purchased from Nisar Ali, and 1949 Sq. Ft. Purchased from Ch. Imdad Ali, in favor of Asghar Ali Khan defendant No, 4 for a consideration of Rs, 40,C00. This mutation was attested the same day.
4. ' On 27th June, 1967 Nisar Ali brought a suit against Haji Muhammad Kabir, Muhammad Aslam, Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi and Asghar Ali. In his plaint he gave the details of the manner in which he had purchased the land in dispute, and further alleged that defendent No, 1 Haji Kabir in conspiracy with defendant No, 2 Muhammad Asian], had forged the special power of attorney on his behalf in favour of Muhammad Aslam authorizing him to dispose of the land in dispute. It was also alleged that the signatures of Nisar Ali on that special power of attorney were forged. Further on it was stated, that a forged receipt was also prepared in which it was shown that earnest money towards the price of the said plot had been received by Haji Kabir on behalf of Nisar Ali, and that an agreement of sale had taken place between Haji Kabir and Muhammad Aslam on the one hand and Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi on the other. This allegedly fictitious agreement took place on 3rd December, 1965, and according to it the plot was to be sold to Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi at the rate of Rs, 3.50 per Sq. Ft. Plaintiff' contended that he came to know of the fictitious transaction when Mohammad Jan Ghaznavi took some steps to raise construction on the plot in dispute sometimes in April, 1966. He made various representations to District Authorities in Quetta and Karachi and ultimately an F. I. R. Was lodged at City Police Station, Quetta in August, 1966 under section 420/468/471, P. P. C. This report was so entered on the directions of the Deputy Come missioner, Quetta.
5. 'Defendant No, 1 who was an accused person in that case had absconded after he was granted bail. The plaintiff alleges that Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi had given an undertaking to the police that he will not raise any construction on the plot in dispute. It was further alleged that he transferred the disputed plot to Asghar Ali in spite of the fact that he had no good title over it, fraudulently and with ulterior motives, in order to harm the interests of the plaintiff. It was also alleged that the construction raised on the plot by defendant No, 4, the minor, through his father Samander Kban, was objected to but to no vail. He therefore prayed that he be granted decree for possession of the disputed property and if necessary after declaring to be the owner of the same. It was further prayed that the transfers by way of sales of the property in favor of defendant No, 3 and then to defendant No, 4 be declared null and void, with a mandatory injunction against defendant No, 4 directing him to stop further construction and to demolish the construction already made.
6. ' Defendant No, 1 Haji Mohammad Kabir never appeared and the proceedings took place ex parte against him. Defendant No, 2 Mohammad Aslam filed his written statement on 14th August, 1957 but thereafter absented himself and he was also proceeded against ex parte. In his written statement he had contended that the sale had taken place on the authority of the regularly executed power of attorney in his favour and that earnest money of Rs, 13,000 was duly paid to Haji Mohammad Kabir.
7. ' Defendant Ne. 3 Mohammad Jan Ghaznavi in his written statement filed on 15th August, 1967 raised certain legal objections. On merits he denied the allegations against him. He contended that sale to defendant No, 4 was by lawful means. Defendant No, 4, in his written statement filed on 15th August, 1967, contended that he had purchased the property from defendant No, 3 who was the ostensible owner of the same, was in possession and had received consideration of Rs, 40,000. It was alleged that the plaintiff had held out defendant No, 3 to be the owner of the property in question, all along he had the knowledge of sale but had taken no steps for the possession of plot or to warn defendant No, 4, and therefore was a party to the alleged fraud or had acquiesced in it.
8. He contended that the construction had been completed and therefore there was no question of demolishing the same. He prayed for dismissal of the suit.
9. ' On these pleadings of the the parties the learned District Judge, framed the following issues :- (1)Whether the suit is properly valued and court-fee paid is sufficient ?
10. (2)Whether the power of attorney dated 18-11-1965 was forged by defendant No, 1 in conspiracy with defendant No, 2 and its effect on subsequent transactions ?
11. (3)Whether the defendants 1 and 2 forged the receipt dated 17/18th November, 1955 ?
12. (4)Whether the defendant No, 4 has completed the construction ? If so, to what effect ? (0. P. D. 4)
13. (5)Whether the plaintiff acquiesced in the alleged fraud and if so, is the plaintiff not entitled to injunction pm; ed for ?
14. (6)Whether the plaintiff had approached the Police in April, 1966, after being aware of the alleged sale and defendant No, 3 had given an undertaking that he would not construct ? If so, to what effect ?
15. (7)Whether the defendants 3 and 4 acted in good faith ? If so, to what effect ? t8) Relief ?
16. ' The plaintiff examined as many as 8 witnesses in Court while four were examined on Commission.
17. Defendant No, 3 examined only one witness.
18. ' The learned Additional District Judge, Quetta who ultimately decided the suit partly granted the relief. He in bis judgment dated 13th May 1971 held that the suit was properly valued ; that no power of attorney has been executed by plaintiff Nisar All in favour of Muhammad Aslam, and that if any was executed it must be held to be forged one. As no receipt was brought on record and the onus to prove the alleged forgery lay on the plaintiff, which was not discharged, the learned Additional District Judge decided Issue No, 3 against him. The learned trial Judge also held that construction on the plot had been completed but the plaintiff's prayer for demolishing the same could not be granted. This was so held because the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the purchase by defendant No, 4 was protected under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). However the contention of Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi defendant No, 3, that he was a bona fide purchaser with consideration, did not find favor with the learned trial Judge and he held that thin defendant had failed to produce the alleged power of attorney much less to prove it, that he had failed to prove the payment of any amount to the actual owner who is admitted by him to be the plaintiff, and the purchase of the disputed plot by him is found by the trial Judge to be mala fide.
19. 'As to relief the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that as defendant No, 4 being entitled to the protection of section 41, the relief of possession could not be granted. He abserved that as defendant No, 3 was found to be a mala fide purchaser, who had paid no consideration for the plot in dispute he was not entitled to the same protection. The plaintiff was therefore granted a money decree in the amount of Rs, 23,191 as against defendant No, 3.
20. ' Regular First Appeal No, 3 of 1971 is filed by Mohammad Jan Ghaznavi defendant No, 3 challenging the decree passed against him. At the same time plaintiff Nisar AU has filed cross-objections claiming that he is entitled to the original relief prayed for by him in his suit. In the alternative he Maims be be granted decree equivalent to the price received by Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi from Asghar Ali.
21. ' Mr. W. N. Kohli has appeared for the appellant while cross-objector respondent Nisar All is represented by Mr. Moquim Ansari, and respondent Asghar Ali is represented by Mr. Basharatullah.
22. Respondents 1 and 2 have not appeared inspite of service.
23. ' Mr. Kohli contends that appellant Mohammad Jan Ghaznavi is equally entitled to the protection afforded by section 41 of the Act. His grounds are that an attested power of attorney was produced before him, that the alleged attorney was a permanent resident of Quetta, while the executor used to stay permanently in Karachi, that part payment was made at the time the agreement to sell was entered into, and that full payment was made at the time of mutation entry on 11th December, 1965.
24. He further contends that physical possession was delivered and he raised Kacha construction on it soon after. It is also asserted by Mr. Kohli that till the filing of the suit about one and a half year after the purchase of land by the appellant, the plaintiff had raised no objections.
25. ' Section 41 of the Act is based on the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in the famous case of Ramcoomar Koondoo v. Macqueen (1). This principle of law appears in the following passage :- "It is a principle of natural equity which must be universally applicable (1) 52 I A 40 (Suppl.) that where one man allows another to hold himself out as the owner of an estate, and a third person purchases it for value from the apparent owner in the belief that he is the real owner, the man who so allows the other to hold himself out shall not be permitted to recover upon his secret title, unless he can overthrow that of the purchaser by sewing either that be had direct notice, or something which amounts to constructive notice, of the real title, or that there existed circumstances which ought to have put him upon an inquiry that, if prosecuted, would have led to a discovery of it."
26. ' These principles were later incorporated in section 41 of the Act, which was subsequently enacted.
27. The section is reproduced below for facility sake t- "S. 41.-Where with consent, express or implied, of the persons interested in immovable property, a person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorized to make it ; provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, has acted in good faith."
28. Generally a purchaser cannot take more than vendor has to sell. But the rule as contained in section 41 of the Act provides an exception to the general rule. It is based on the principle that where one of the two innocent persons must suffer from the fraud of a third party, the loss should fall on him who has created, or could have prevented, the opportunity for fraud and that in such cases hardship is caused by the strict enforcement of the general rule that no one can confer a higher title on property than he himself possesses.
29. ' The rule, as an exception to that general principle, is a deduction from the law of estoppel. An estoppel has always to be pleaded clearly witiuA specific facts to be relied upon in this behalf. And the onus to prove that a person is entitled to the benefits of saction 41 always lies on the person who pleads such protection. One Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi admitted' Nisar Ali to be the real owner, as be did in his written statement, it was for him firstly to spec fiscally plead the protection under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act together with the facts on which such protection is claimed. And secondly the onus lay entirely upon him to prove all the facts in support of such a plea. He did not take any such plea in Kist written statement.
30. 'If from the facts pleaded it could be reasonably inferred that a plea of protection under section 41 of the Act could be extended to the appellant, then it was for him to discharge the onus that the law lays upon him to prove the elements of such a protection. This is the principle enunciated in Hargovind Prasad v. Ambika Dutt Ram (1) and Barn Sarup v. Maya Shankar (2).
31. The elements of section 41 of the Act, are s- (1)The transferor is the ostensible owner, (2)he is so by consent, express or implied of the real owner, (3)the transfer is for consideration, and (4)the transferee has acted in good faith, taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had the power to transfer.
(1) AIR 1934 Oudh 165 (2) 33 P W R 1918'
32. ' In order to show that Muhammad Aslam was the ostensible owner Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi took the plea that Aslam was the regularly constituted attorney of Nisar Ali. No power of attorney has been produced. Mr. Kohli has felt aggrieved at the lower Court's decision when it lay the onus to produce and prove the power of attorney on the appellant. He contends that as the Photostat copy of that power of attorney has come from the possession of Nisar All therefore it should be presumed that the original would also be with him. This is one of the strangest arguments one can hear in Court. There is no principle of law according to which such a presumption could be drawn.
33. No independent evidence has been brought on record to show if the power of attorney was not with the alleged attorney but with the principal. It may however, be mentioned that photostat copy was refused to be admitted in evidence by the learned trial Judge.
34. However the onus to show that Mohammad Aslam was the regularly constitued attorney of Nisar All lay squarely upon the shoulders of Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi ; firstly because Nisar Ali, was, admittedly the owner of the plot Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi, wanted to purchase, and secondly because, it is contended that Aslam had the power to sell the same. He made no efforts at the discovery of the alleged power of attorney, much less to prove if any was executed. On the other hand Nisar All examined Mascod Ahmed Ansari, Clerk of a Notary Public in Karachi, to show that N it was not Nisar Ali, but somebody else who posed as Nisar Ali, when a power-of-attorney was brought to him sometimes in November, 1965. He categorically stated that power of attorney, which was purported to have been executed by one Haji Nisar All was not brought by the Nisar Ali of the present proceedings ; and that the efforts to get that power-of attorney registered did not succeed. Although Nisar All was under no obligation to prove a negative fact but still in view of this evidence there are no grounds to interfere with findings of the learned trial Judge that Nisar All had not executed any power of attorney, and that if any executed it should be held to be a forged one.
35. That being the case it does not lie with the appellant to claim that Muhammad Aslam WAS the ostensible owner of the disputed v piece of land or had the power to sell it.
36. 'This finding alone is enough to repel the contention of the appellant as regards the extention of the principle underlying section 41 of the Act to his case. But he has also failed if be paid any consideration either to thelv real owner or to Muhammad Aslam. In his statement before the Court Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi contended that the earnest money was paid through a cheque and that the balance was paid before the Tehsildar at the time of attestation of the mutation. No counterfoil of the cheque has been pi oduced nor is there any other proof of the payment of earnest money. Mutation No, 413 (Exh. DM states that the sale price had been paid outside the Court. This recital in the mutation belies the second contention of the appellant. The Tehsildar has also not been examined in this behalf. In these circumstances the payment of consideration by Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi to Nisar Ali, or even to his alleged attorney is not proved. Thus it two of the important elements of section 41 of the Act are wanting in th case of Muhammad Jan Cbaznavi and be is therefore not entitled, to the protection afforded by this section.
37. ' As far as the case of Asghar All is concerned he purchased the disputed plot, along with the additional area of 1949 sq. Ft. From Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi, who was the ostensible owner, and the payment of consideration is duly proved. But Mr. Moquim Ansari, the learned counsel for Nisar Ali, contends that element of reasonable care on the part of Asghar Ali to ascertain if Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi bad the power to transfer is conspicuously missing His contentions are that according to section 54 of the Act any transfer of a tangible immovable property of the value of Rs, 100 and upwards could only be made through a registered instrument and because no such instrument had been executed between Muhammad /1 A slam and Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi therefore the title for the property had not passed. In the absence of a registered sale Asghar Ali should have been thrown on his guards to inquire if Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi had the power to sell. This is a weighty objection to which Mr. Basbaratullah could not provide any answer.
38. ' The expression 'reasonable care' as used in section 41 of the Act means such care as an ordinary man of business or a man of ordinary prudence would take. As observed by the Privy Council in Ram Commar Kundoo's case, referred to abos e, that it is not enough generally to assert that inquiries G should be made by the prospective purchaser, but that the circumstances should he of "such a specific character that the Court can place its finger upon them and say that upon such facts some particular inquiry ought to have been made".
39. ' Now in the present case a question can be asked if on the basis of entry in the revenue record in favor of Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi was it enough for Asghar Ali or his guardian, to have felt satisfied as to the title of Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi to sell the property ? Toe purchase by Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi was through a mutation, while the law required that all such transfers could only be made through a registered document. Secondly is a mutation proper proof of the title of the person shown therein? Was it not necessary for Asgbar Alt's guardian, if he were a man of business or of ordinary prudence to go behind the mutation entries and make further inquiries as to the title of Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi.
40. ' Mr. Basharatullah relies upon section 52 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 to claim that a presumption of truth is attached to an entry in the record of rights. But the question is if an entry in a mutation forms part of the record of rights. The Punjab Land Record Manual in its para. 7.1 clearly states that it does not. Punjab Settlement Manual in its para 270 lists the documents which form part of record-of-rights. But a register of mutations is conspicuously absent. Not being a part of the record-of-rights, the provisions of section 52 of the Land Revenue Act do not apply and therefore no presumption of truth can be attached to it. As it is, an entry in the register of mutations has, at best, an evidentiary value. It neither creates nor extinguishes a title. This is the principle laid down in Allah Buz v. Ghulam Hussain (1) which observes that a revenue officer is not an Authority inve-ted with power to decide civil rights of persons. The Privy Council as far back as 1926 observed in Nirman Singh v. La! Rudra Pariah (2), AS follows I- ' The perusal by their Lordships of the Judgment of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, at page 482 of the record, leads their Lordships to think that its judgment is to a great degree based on the mischievous but persistent error that the proceedings for the mutation of names is a judicial proceeding, in which the title to and L D 1975 Lah. 1349 (2) AIR 1926 P C 100 ' the proprietary rights in immovable property are determined. They are nothing of the kind as has been pointed out times innumerable by the Judicial Committee. They are much more in the nature of fiscal inquiries instituted in the interest of the State for the purpose of ascertaining which of the several claimants for the occupation of certain denominations of immovable property may be put into occupation of it with greater confidence that the revenue for it will be paid.
41. ' After this authoritative pronouncement there is no room left to contend that an entry in a register of mutations reflects the title of the person shown therein as owner.
42. Time and again, the Courts have held that a purchaser who relies merely upon an entry in the revenue records and makes no further inquiry int j the title of the seller cannot be held to have acted with reasonable care. In Pratab Chand v. Saiyida Bibi (1), a Government official bad got certain property entered in the names of his minor sons in the destrict where be was serving The sons sold portions of the property and mortgaged others. The vendee and the mortgagee satisfied himself that the property had been recorded for some years in the name of the sons, but there he stopped and made no further inquiries as to whether the property really belonged to the sons, who were the ostensible owners, or not. It was held that the transferor had not taken reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had the power to make the transfer. In Khatoon Fatima v. Shib Singh
(2) it was held that the fact that transferor's names stood recorded in the Khewat and defendant accepted the entry as correct did not afford him protection under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. In Thungarella Cheety v. Mangatkaye (3) it was observed that a man who chooses to act on a Collector's certificate as to title does so at his own risk, Muhammad Sujat v. Mst. Chandbi
(4) is a case for the proposition that mutation of names by itself creates no proprietary title, and that a purchaser who acts on a mutation only, or on any entry in the record of rights does so at his own risk, as neither of the entries can supply the place of a title deed, and that the burden of proof that he acted in good faith is consequently enhanced in such oases. To the same effect are the rulings reported as Nageshar Prasad v. Raja Pateshai (5) and Ram Challtra v. Shivnandan (6).
43. ' Here Asghar All accepted the entries in the mutation register as evidence of title of Muhammad Jan Ginsznavi and evidently he did so at his own risk. He did not care to look into the title of Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi, and did not care to ascertain if he had the power to transfer the same.
44. If he had made further inquiries he must have become aware of the shadows oat on his title by the persistent and repeated efforts made by Nisar All to get the mutation cancelled.
45. ' Now I come to the question of acquiscence pleaded by Asghar All and vehemently contended in arguments on behalf of Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi. According to the statement in Court made by Nisar Ali, he, for the first time came to know of the transaction between Haji Kabir and Muhammad Aslam and Muhammad Jan Ghazaavi sometimes in March, 1966. The F. I. R. (Cr. P/3)
(1) I L R 23. All, 442 (2) 147 I C 840,
(3) 21 I C 21 (4) 97 I C 988 -
(5) 34 I C 673 (6) 150 I C 922 ' is based on letter addressed by Nisar Ali to Tehsildar Quetta, on 30th April, 1966. This letter has a reference to an earlier written on 1st April. 1966 by the advocate of Nisar Ali to the Tehsildar. In this letter after recounting the details of forgery and fraud a prayer was made for the cancellation of the disputed mutation. Tbis letter of Nisar All ultimately found its way to the Deputy Commissioner, Quetta, who, through a D.
46. 0., requested the Superintendent of Police to take legal action in the matter of forgery committed in this behalf. This D. 0 appears on record as Exh. P/6. During the course of investigation the Inspector, C. I. A. Through a Robkar (Exh. P/5) asked Muhammad Jan Ghaanavi to stop construction on the disputed plot. This must have been done at the instance of Nisar Ali. Independently however Nisar Ali moved the Deputy Commissioner on 14th September, 1966, (Bab. Mark E) alleging that Muhammad Jan Ghaznavi was raising construction on the disputed plot and that he be restrained from doing so. On 13th July, 1966 Nisar All addressed a direct application (Exh. Mark 'C') to C'eputy Commissioner Quetta, in which he recounted the events of fraud and prayed for cancellation of the mutation entered in revenue records, which was adverse to his interest. Subsequently on 13th October, 1966 he addressed another detailed application (Exh. Mark D) to the Deputy Commissioner repeating the same prayer. All these documents clearly speak of the repeated and persistent efforts on the part of Nisar Ali to challenge the fraudulent entry against him in the register of mutations. It therefore does not lie either with Muhammad Jan Obaznavi or Asghar Ali to contend that Nisar All did not object to the wrong entries appearing against him in register of mutations or acquiesced in it. Mr. Basharatullah hawse contends that Nisar All did not take steps as the law enjoined upon him for the cancellation of the disputed mutation and in this regard he particularly refers to the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Land Revenue Act, But even this argument is not available to him. The applications of Nisar All dated 30th April, 1966, addressed to Tehsildar was nothing but a review application under section 163 of the Land Revenue Act, It is a different matter that the learned Tehsiidar, who is the Assistant Collector under that Act, did not care to take action required of him in this behalf. Similarly Nisar Ali's subsequent two applications of 13th July, 1966 and 13th October, 1966, were by way of appeals. It, therefore, cannot be claimed that Nisar All did not take the steps required under the law. It is a different matter that the functionaries of the State, including the Collector, did not move according to law. For that Nisar All cannot be blamed.
47. ' Finally Mr. Basharatullah contends that Asghar All is a minor and therefore his interest is to be protected by the Court. Mr. Moquim Ansari on the other hand contends that the transaction in favour of Asghar All is benami and that the real owner of the property is his father Samandar Khan.
48. In this behalf he has referred me to the cross-examination of Samandar Khan wherein he has admitted that Asghar All does not pay any income-tax. If that were so, it is contended by Mr. Ansari, how was he able to accumulate funds enough to spend about three to four lacs of rupees on the construction of the house. Otherwise also there is no evidence to indicate if Asghar All had any independent source of income. Bald statement of Samandar Khan that the purchase of plot and construction of the house took place with the money of Asghar All is not acceptable.
49. ' In view of the above discussion I have come to the conclusion that the principles of section 41 of the Act are not attracted either in the case of Muhammad Ian Ohaznavi or Asgbar Mi. The appeal of Muhammad Ian Ghaznavi is therefore dismissed with costs. Cross objections of Nisar Ali are accepted and the prayers made by him in the suh are granted. It is declared that he is owner of 2/13th Share of Plot No, 3974, now bearing 13172/3974 of Khewat No, 1753 of Khatuni No, 192, situated in Ward No, 11 on Mir Ahmed Khan Road, Quetta. He be put in possession of the same. Respondent Asghar Ali, who had completed the construction of the house during the pendency of the suit at his own risk and cost may remove the superstructure within a period of one month from today.