' This revision petition arises out of a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell which was decreed with the consent of the parties by the Trial Court on 4-9-1988. This suit was filed by the petitioner on the basis of an agreement executed on 12-8-1987 with respect to 53 Kanals of land situated in village Khanpur, Tehsil and District Lahore. On 20-7-1988 respondent/defendant appeared before the Court and stated that he was willing to act upon the agreement and had no objection if the decree was passed in terms of the same.
' Acting on the statement of the parties, the suit was decreed on 4th of September, 1988 and the petitioner was directed to deposit the balance amount of Rs,15,43,000 by 15th of October, 1988. This amount was not deposited by the said date but instead an application was filed on 15th of October, 1988 in which a prayer was made for extension of time till 15th of December, 1988 on the grounds mentioned in the petition. This application was resisted by the respondent by filing a reply in which various objections were raised. The learned Civil Judge, however, on 4th of December, 1988 dismissed the appellant solely on the ground that after passing of the decree for specific performance, the Court had become functus officio and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to extend time for deposit. This order has been assailed by the petitioner in this revision petition.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon Nizam-ud-Din and 13 others v. Ch. Muhammad Saeed (1987 CLC 1682) contended that the view taken by the Trial Court was erroneous as in cases of specific performance the Court always retained jurisdiction to extend time notwithstanding the fact that a decree had already been passed. Mr. Hakam Qureshi, Advocate, who has appeared for the respondent, has vehemently opposed this revision petition and has contended that since the time up to which extension was prayed for i.e, 15th of December, 1988, has already expired, the application for extension has become infructuous; that the conduct of the petitioner has been contumacious inasmuch as even uptil now he has not deposited any amount and is, therefore, not entitled to the exercise of any discretion in his favour and that since the time in the decree was fixed with the consent of the parties, it cannot be varied by the Court.
3. As already observed, the Trial Court instead of disposing of the application, dated 15th of October, 1988 on merits dismissed it, by holding that after passing the decree it has become functus officio and had no jurisdiction to extend time. The view taken by the Trial Court is directly opposed to the rule laid down by this Court in Nizam-ud-Din's case (supra) which is on all fours with the present case and is fully applicable. The order of the Trial Court, therefore, cannot be sustained.
4. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent, that the petitioner has not filed any fresh application seeking further extension in time, it is to be observed that the Trial Court had taken the view that it had become functus officio and had no jurisdiction to extend the time. In these circumstances, it was not possible for the petitioner to file a fresh application.
5. I, however, see force in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the conduct of the petitioner should be examined before any relief is granted to him in these proceedings. I had asked the learned counsel, if the petitioner, in order to show his bona fides, was prepared to deposit the amount in question even now. The learned counsel has expressed his willingness to do so and has requested that reasonable time may be allowed. The petitioner may deposit the amount by or before 2nd March, 1989.
' As a consequence of the above, the revision petition is accepted, the order of the Trial Court is set aside and the case is remanded to it for the decision of the application for extension of time afresh on merits. The petitioner shall deposit the balance amount with the Trial Court by or before 2nd of March, 1989. This deposit will be without prejudice to the rights of the parties and will not in any manner effect the decision on merits of the application for extension of time by the Trial Court. The parties are left to bear their own costs.