SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.--- This appeal has been directed against the judgment and decree of the High Court, dated 27-3-1998, whereby the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge were set aside and that of the Trial Court were restored.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the suit land measuring 56 Kanals and 5 Marlas situate in village Saliah, Tehsil Bhimber, was transferred through a sale-deed, dated 12-8-1991 for an ostensible consideration of Rupees one lac; the said sale-deed, executed in favour of Asghar Hussain, was presented for registration on the same day but some Commission was appointed to record the statement of the vendor and, thus, the sale-deed was registered on 19-8-1991.'A pre- emption suit was brought against this sale-deed by Muhammad Ghazan, plaintiff-respondent. It was contended by Asghar Hussain, appellant herein, that he had purchased the suit land on 12-8- 1991 but Muhammad Ghazan has filed the pre-emption suit on the basis that he had also purchased the land from the same "Khewat" on 15-8-1991 and, thus, he was entitled to a pre- emption decree as being a co-sharer in the suit land because the vendee-appellant would be deemed to have purchased the land in dispute on 19-8-1991, when the sale-deed was registered and not on 12-8-1991 when it was executed. Thus, as the plaintiff-respondent, was not co-sharer on 12-8-1991, when he had purchased the land, his suit for pre-emption was not sustainable. The Trial Court, after taking necessary proceedings, decreed the suit of the pre-emptor. Asghar Hussain, vendee, filed an appeal before the District Judge who accepted the same holding that although the sale-deed was registered on 19-8-1991, yet in view of the provisions contained in section 47 of the Registration Act, the sale would be operative from the date of the execution of the sale-deed, i.e. From 12-8-1991 and not from 19-8-1991. Thus, the pre-emption suit was dismissed. However, on appeal to the High Court by Muhammad Ghazan, plaintiff/--respondent, the findings of the District Judge were set aside and that of the Trial Court were restored.
3. Mr. Zafar Hussain Mirza, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant, has argued that the High Court has committed an error in setting aside the judgment and decree passed in favour of the appellant by the District Judge. The learned counsel has drawn our attention to section 47 of the Registration Act and has contended that in view of the aforesaid provision, after the registration of a document, it would operate with retrospective effect from the date when it was executed. He has argued that in the instant case, the sale-deed which is subject of pre-emption would be operative from 12-8-1991 and not from 19-8-1991 as has been held by the High Court. The learned counsel has referred to a case reported as Naseer Ahmad v. Asghar Ali 1992 SCM R 2300, wherein it has been held that where a document compulsorily registerable is registered subsequent to the date of its execution, it would operate when the same was executed and not from the date when the same was registered. Tae learned counsel has contended that the High Court has taken a wrong view of the case reported as Fazal Dad v. Muhammad Azim 1980 CLC 1817, because in that case the question of right of prior purchase was not at all involved; the observations were made in altogether a different context. Thus, the learned counsel has strenuously contended that the judgment and decree passed by the High Court in favour of the pre-emptor-respondent was not sustainable and the suit filed by Muhammad Ghazan, plaintiff-respondent, was rightly dismissed by the District Judge.
4. In reply, Raja Hassan Akhtar, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondent, has submitted that the judgment and decree of the High Court does not suffer from any legal infirmity because the same are in consonance with the principle laid down in Fazal Dad's case, referred to above.
5. We have given due consideration to the matter. The- relevant observations made by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the authority cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, referred to above are as under:----- "The High Court, however, excluded from consideration the purchase of 4 Kanals land by the appellants for' different reasons. There is no controversy that the sale-deed in respect of this land was executed in appellant's favour on 8-9-1974 i.e. a day before the institution of the suit. It was presented for registration on 9-9-1974, but registered on 10-9-1974. In the opinion of the High Court, as the document was registered after the institution of the suit, the transaction was of no avail to the appellants. The view taken by the High Court is untenable, Section 47 of the Registration Act seemingly escaped notice of the learned Judges of the High Court, which provides that a document registered on a date subsequent to the date of its execution operates from the date of the execution. Obviously, therefore, the title to the land had passed on to the appellants on 8-9- 1974, and they could justifiably bank on it to oppose the suit filed by the respondent. "
6. It is evident from the observations of the Supreme Court of Pakistan that there is hardly any doubt that after the registration, the document would operate from the date of its execution. Thus, in the instant case, the sale-deed registered on 19-8-1991 would be effective from 12-8-1991.
Consequently, the sale-deed obtained by Muhammad Ghazan, plaintiff-respondent, on 15-8-1991, having not been in existence on 12-8-1991 would not give him any right of prior purchase and, thus, his suit entitled dismissal as was done by the District Judge. <p.m></p.m> revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.