' This order shall dispose of aforesaid two criminal miscellaneous applications filed under the provisions of section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Seeking abashment of F.I.R. In Crime No,1 of 1995 registered by Anti-Corruption Establishment Hyderabad and F.I.R. No,33 of 1997 registered by Anticorruption Establishment Dadu against the applicants on a charge under section 409, P.P.C. Read with section 5(2) Act II of 1947.
2. Applicants are employed at Sub-Sale Centre Saidabad and Piyaro Goth respectively in the Organization established as Sindh Agriculture Supplies Organization under the provisions of SASO Act X of 1973.
3, In fact only F.I.Rs, have been registered against the applicants employed in SASO and deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code, by reason of section 20 of SASO Act, 1973. In F.I.R. No,1 of 1995 applicant Ali Akbar was arrested by Anti-Corruption Establishment and released by the Court of Special Judge Anti-Corruption Hyderabad with regard to applicant Muhammad Azam, it is averred that Anti-Corruption police Dadu was making efforts for his arrest on the charge of criminal misappropriation and defalcation. Indeed prayer in both the applications is for abashment of proceedings arising out of above said F.I.Rs, but the learned counsel at the hearing consumed lot of valuable Court time on the premises that cases had been sent up before the Special Court which has no jurisdiction to proceed against the applicants for the reasons inter alia that the applicants are employed in an organization set up administered and controlled by the Provincial Government and not by Central Government. It is equally a matter of great regret that even the learned counsel for SASO as well as the State did not point out this fact during the course of hearing and the arguments proceeded on the misconceived notion that the prayers were directed against 'the proceedings pending before a Court having no jurisdiction to proceed against the applicants.
4. After having examined the R & Ps and the prayer clause in both the applications I have arrived at a conclusion that in fact the applicants desire interference of this Court in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction with the investigation of the crime allegedly committed by them. Jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code is of an extraordinary nature intended to be used only in extraordinary cases where there is no other remedy. In law it is a jurisdiction of limited scope and cannot be utilized where there is other express remedy provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is well-settled that in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under this section, the High A Court can neither exercise the powers of a Court of appeal nor can it interfere with the process of investigation in relation to a cognizable offence committed by an accused. View expressed in Malik Salman Khalid v. Shabbier Ahmed 1993 SCMR 1873 is that inherent power under section 561-A should be rarely and sparingly invoked only in interest of justice so as to redress grievances for which no other procedure or remedy is available. Jurisdiction under section 561-A is an extraordinary jurisdiction which cannot override the provisions of the Code but cases may arise where demand of justice requires immediate, real and substantial justice. Only in such circumstances the Court would be justified to exercise this jurisdiction to save a party from harassm ent and abuse of the process of Court.
5. In the present case only F.I.Rs, have been lodged against the applicants which would be duly investigated strictly according to law and the procedure provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure read with the provisions of Act II of 1947. In case there is no evidence against the applicants connecting them with the commission of the crime alleged against them or Investigating Agency comes to a conclusion that it is not a fit case for prosecution against the applicants under the special law the things shall come to an end. This is neither a case of abuse of process of Court nor a case where the High Court should intervene to secure the ends of justice.
Any interference with the process of-investigation at this stage may itself amount to abuse of process of Court which must be avoided at all costs. There is a direct case on the point i,e, Shahnaz Begum v. Honorable Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Baluchistan PLD 1971 SC 677 in which a Full Bench of the apex Court deprecated the action of this Court interfering with the process of investigation undertaken by the police. Referring to earlier decisions in the case of Sher Khan and others v. The State 1968 SCMR 62 and Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan PLD 1967 SC 317 Supreme Court reiterated the principle of law that the power given by section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Can certainly not be so utilized as to interrupt or divert the ordinary course of criminal procedure as laid down in the procedural statute. Indeed the power vested in the High Court can be invoked to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The ends of justice necessarily means justice as administered by the Courts and not justice in the abstract sense or justice administered by agencies other than Courts.
6. Ordinarily every case should be allowed to proceed according to law and resort to inherent powers of High Court should not be lightly made as this would also circumvent due process of law.
It is not the intention of law that in exercise of power under section 561-A the normal course of trial before a Court of law should be diverted or the process of investigation hampered which would defeat the spirit of law. I do not think, there is necessity to refer to precedent cases yet for the sake of guidance, reference may be made to the cases reported as State v. Asif Ali Zardari 1994 SCMR 798; Muhammad Khalid Mehta v. The State PLD 1997 SC 275; Irshad Elahi v. Bashir Ahmed PLD 1997 Lah. 554; Yasin Wattoo v. Government of Punjab 1997 PCr.LJ 836; Abida Parveen v. State 1997 PCr.LJ 880 and Murid Hussain v. State. 1997 PCr.LJ 124.
7. For the aforesaid facts and reasons, I see no merit in both the miscellaneous applications which are devoid of any force and liable to dismissal.
' In view of misconception of facts as observed in the narrative of this judgment I do not feel inclined to refer to the cases cited by the learned counsel for the applicants. Accordingly both the applications are dismissed.