' Dispute, in this revision petition, pertains to agricultural land measuring 23 Kanals, 7 Marlas falling in the area of Chak No,75/22, Tehsil Nankana Sahib, District Sheikhupura. This shall be hereinafter described as "property" or "suit land". The contest is between Abdul Majid and two others/herein petitioners/plaintiffs and Waris Ali/defendant/respondent No,
1. Respondent No,2 Liaqat Ali was/is his real brother and was his duly constituted attorney by means of registered deed dated 3-2-1971 whereby he was authorized to manage and sell the suit land.
2. The facts, briefly stated, giving rise to this petition are that Liaqat Ali/respondent No,2, as his attorney made the sale of property in favour of Abdul Majid and two others/petitioners for a sum of Rs,12,000; received the entire consideration/12,000 and of the mutation of sale No,51 attested on 1- 5-1973. Feeling affected Waris Ali filed appeal before Collector against the foresaid mutation/contending that the deed of attorney in favour of Liaqat Ali was cancelled by him on 24- 5-1972 by means of a registered deed; that on the relevant date Liaqat Ali had no authority, whatsoever, to alienate property to petitioners; that mutation f sale No,51 was, thus, without any lawful authority. The said appeal was allowed on 3-10-1977. Faced with this order, petitioners sued for seeking declarations to e effect that they were owners in possession of the property in dispute; that they had purchased it from Liaqat Ali who was the attorney of Waris Ali vide registered deed, ted 13-2-1971; that they had paid the price of land to him; had obtained its possession d so had.
Become its owners; that order assed by Collector was without jurisdiction d of no lawful consequence upon their rights.
3. Liaqat Ali did not enter appearance and so was proceeded ex parte. The suit was contested by Waris Ali alone. In his defence, the pleaded that he had cancelled the deed of attorney on 24th May, 1972 by means of a registered instrument; that the copy of the same had been sent to him; that on 31-5-1973, Liaqat Ali had no power to make the impugned sale in favour of petitioners and o Mutation No,51, dated 31-5-1973 was of no lawful consequence. Upon the consideration of evidence adduced by the parties, the learned first Court came to the conclusions that the petitioners had purchased the property by paying price to Waris Ali; that the cancellation of deed of attorney by him did not make any difference. On appeal, the learned Appellate Court, however, did not see eye to eye with the findings of first Court and held that the evidence of the petitioners was contrary to their pleadings; that at the time of attestation of mutation Liaqat Ali had no authority to make the sale of property in dispute to petitioners and so the sale incorporated in relied mutation was void ab initio. As regards Liaqat Ali, then learned Appellate Court decreed the suit for the recovery of sum of Rs,12,000 against him. The appeal was so allowed in the following terms:-- "For the foregoing reasons, I hereby accept this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and decree. Subsequently, the suit of the contesting respondents stands dismissed against the appellant. However, the contesting respondents had also sought 'any equitable relief which the Court may deem fit'. The contesting respondents proved payment of Rs,12,000 to respondent/ defendant Liaqat Ali. He did not choose to contest the suit nor he led any evidence in rebuttal. It was held in the judgment repeated at AIR 1951 SC 177 that an alternative relief can be granted to the plaintiff even if he does not specifically pray for the same. I am convinced that Liaqat Ali respondent committed fraud with the contesting respondents by making alienation on behalf of a person who had already cancelled his power of attorney. Liaqat Ali is bound to compensate the plaintiffs for his such mischief. I, therefore, decree the suit of contesting respondents/plaintiffs against respondent/defendant Liaqat Ali for recovery of a sum of Rs,12,000 along with eight per cent. Compound interest with effect from 31-5-1973 till the realization of decretal amount with cost throughout."
' Feeling aggrieved from the above decision, petitioners have preferred the instant revision petition.
4. The only substantial question, that falls for consideration is whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, Waris Ali/respondent No,1 had ratified the sale made by Liaqat Ali as attorney of Waris Ali in favour of petitioners. It was represented by learned counsel for petitioners that Waris Ali entered into witness-box as D.W.5 and admitted that Liaqat Ali had made the sale of various pieces of land of Waris Ali to different persons namely Malkaiara, Aziz and others after 24th May, 1972; that he adopted the above transaction of sale and had only singled out sale in favour of petitioners; that the aforesaid act of Waris Ali amounted to ratification within the meaning of section 197 of the Contract Act. It was further contended that the petitioners had took the possession of the land on 31-5-1973; that Waris Ali challenged the mutation before Collector on 24- 12-1975; that he remained silent for a period of more than one year and so was estopped by the principle of acquiescence to challenge the transaction of sale in their favour. Strength was sought from Ramaswa my Chetty Srmar v, ALKR Algappa Chetty and another (AIR 1915 Mad. 859), Lakshumaan Chetty v. Chidambaram Chetty (AIR 1919 Mad. 343) and Madura Municipality v. K.
Alagirisami Naidu (AIR 1939 Mad. 957).
5. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon Madura Municipality v.
Chidambaraam Chetty (AIR 1939 Mad. 957 and East and West Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mr. Kamala Jayantilal Mehta (AIR 1956 Bom. 537) to contend that Liaqat Ali, at relevant time, was no longer his attorney; that by a registered sale-deed his power had been revoked and he had been forbidden to alienate his land, in any manner. On the strength of these circumstances, it was submitted that the transaction of sale made by Liaqat Ali in favour of petitioners was coram non judice and could not be ratified. As regards the contention of acquiescence, it was suggested that the suit land had not been cultivated by the petitioners up to 1975; that the moment it was put under the plough, he challenged it before the Collector of competent jurisdiction. The doctrine of ratification, as embodied in section 196 to section 200 of Contract Act is not applicable. Section 194 of Contract Act lays that where an act is done by a person for another who has no authority to do so and who does so without his knowledge, the aforesaid person may elect to ratify or to disown such act. This doctrine is expounded by Chitty in his well-known treatise Contract as follows:-- "It is an established rule that an act done for another by a person not assuming to act for himself, but for such other person, though without any precedent authority, may become the act of the principal if subsequently ratified by him, and this is sometimes expressed in the Maxim 'omnis ratihabitio retrostrahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur'. Views vary as to whether or not the doctrine is anomalous. It is certainly often convenient; but it requires safeguards to prevent unfair results." (See 31-024 of Contract Act by Chitty).
From the above it is clear that the doctrine of ratification is built up two constituents: Firstly, that an act is done by someone/agent on behalf of someone/principal, without his authority or knowledge; secondly, that the principal has an option to ratify or disown it; thirdly, where the act is ratified, effect of such ratification is that act will be deemed to have been same as performed by principal with necessary consequences. This principal is subject to limitations that a person ratifying a contract must, at least in order to be bound, know fully of all the material circumstances on which the act is so done, and that act which is sought to be ratified must not be void act. See paras.
31.024, 31.025, 31.027 Id 31.028. At this stage, I am inclined to quote the above passages: "General Rule.---It is an established rule that an act done for another by a person not assuming to act for himself, but for such other person, though without any precedent authority, may become the act of the principle if subsequently ratified by him, and this is sometimes expressed in the maxim omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et priori aequiparatur. Views vary as to whether or not the doctrine is anomalous. It certainly often convenient; but it requires safeguards to prevent unfair results.
' Proof of ratification.---Ratification will be implied from any act showing an intention to adopt the transaction, including commencement of or pleading in an action at law on the transaction in question. It may be inferred in appropriate cases even from silence or mere acquiescence; and it seems clear that, like the grant of authority, it need not be communicated to the third party. But if an act is adopted at all, it will be held to have been adopted throughout. Ratification of a contract required to be in writing need not be in writing, but ratification of a contract required to be made by deed must be by deed.
Knowledge of circumstances.--- It is often said that a person ratifying a contract must, at least in order to be bound, know fully of all the material circumstances in which the act is done; so a principal does not ratify a wrongful distress by receiving the proceeds of it unless he has full knowledge of the wrongful act, and will not be deemed to have ratified a voidable transaction if he did not know that it was voidable. But the principal will be bound if he intends to ratify the act in any event; thus, where an agent had wrongfully signed a distress warrant and levied distress, and the principal when informed, had said that he would leave the matter in the agent's hands, the principal was held to have ratified the agent's act and to be responsible for irregularities in the levying of the distress. And the principal may be liable even though he has no knowledge of the legal effect of the act ratified or of collateral matters affecting its nature, i,e, that a purchase amounted to a conversion.
Capacity: void and voidable acts. --- ' The doctrine of ratification presupposes that the principal could validly have done the act at the time it was done. Thus, a company not formed at the time of the act, but formed before the time of purported ratification, cannot ratify; and a person in some other way lacking capacity at the time of the original act cannot ratify. Beyond this, it is. Sometimes said that whereas a voidable act can be ratified, a void one cannot, and this idea can be used to justify the proposition that a forgery cannot be ratified. But the word 'void' is not helpful; almost any unauthorised act on behalf of another could be called void, yet it is precisely such acts which are the subject-matter of the doctrine of ratification. The capacity cases can be explained as a separate category, and in the central case of forgery the forger does not profess to act for but as another."
' The afore stated rules were followed in Monahar Dan Mohania v. Tarini Charan Nandi (AIR 1929 Cal.
612), Ali Muhammad and 2 others v. Gulfam and another (PLD 1983 Kar. 99), Mrs. Aloo Minocher Dinshaw and others v. National Bank of Pakistan (PLD 1974 Note 71 at page 111) and Muhammad Riaz Khan v. Sardar Rahim Dad Khan and 12 others (PLD '1990 SC (AJ&K) 13).
6. Applying these principles to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, it is quite clear that Liaqat Ali was brother of Waris Ali principal; that he did not enter appearance and was proceeded ex parte. From the record, it is further clear that deed of attorney, dated 3-2-1971, executed by Waris Ali in favour of 1 Liqat Ali was cancelled by him by a registered instrument on 24-5-1973 and revocation deed was sent to Liaqat Ali. It is also crystal clear that the mutation of sale No,51 was attested on 31-5-1973. Clearly, at the relevant time, Liaqat Ali had been denuded of his authority to make sale of property on behalf of Waris Ali. This being the position, it is quite clear that on the relevant date sale transaction had been made by a person who completely lacked authority to do so and furthermore was forbidden to exercise that authority. The petitioners had relied upon the statement of Waris Ali D.W.5/respondent No, 1 . No doubt, he admitted in his cross-examination that he had not challenged the transaction of sale in favour of Malkaira and Aziz etc. And had ratified the aforesaid sales. On the basis of this confessional statement it was canvassed that the aforesaid circumstance be treated to be applicable to sale in their favour. I am afraid, this contention cannot be accepted. This simply will amount to straining the doctrine of ratification for number of reasons. In the first place, this plea was not taken in the plaint wherein it was averred that Liaqat Ali had made a sale of property in dispute to petitioners as a validly constituted attorney and that he had received the entire price of land and delivered its possession to them.
Abdul Majid had also entered in witness-box and gave totally different version. He stated that transaction of sale had been negotiated by Waris Ali who had received the price of the land and Mutation No,51 was got attested by Liaqat Ali as an attorney. This version is totally inconsistent with the plea of ratification being raised before me. The learned Appellate Court very correctly found that case of the petitioners, as set out in the plaint, was wholly different from the case put up in evidence before the Court. On these circumstances, I have no difficulty in concluding that the plea of ratification was not taken in plaint and was taken half-heartedly in revisional jurisdiction, was of no avail to the petitioners. The authorities cited by learned counsel for the petitioners proceed on distinguishable facts and are not applicable to the circumstances of the case in hand. On the above analysis, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the decision rendered by the learned Appellate Court is eminently correct, just and does not suffer from any jurisdictional or legal error or misreading or non-reading warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
7. For the afore-stated reasons, this revision petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The petitioners shall bear the costs of the proceedings.