' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal has been directed against the judgment of the High Court, dated 27-6-1997, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant, herein, was dismissed.
2. The brief facts of the case are that Plot No,12, situate in Sector F-3 New Mirpur Town, was allotted to the appellant in the year 1981 which was later on cancelled by respondent No,3 (Chairman, Mirpur Developmen Authority), vide his order, dated 21-1-1985 on the ground that the appellan already had the allotment of Plot No,98, situate in Mirpur Town, which hat been sold by him to one Alif Din and, thus, he was not entitled to any furthe allotment. The appellant challenged the order of the cancellation of his plot b3 filing a writ petition in the High Court. His writ petition was accepted and th( cancellation order was set aside on 20-2-1988. The Mirpur Developmen Authority filed an appeal against the aforesaid judgment of the High Court to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal and remanded the cam to the High Court to decide the same afresh after impleading the Chairman Mirpur Development Authority, as a party in the writ petition. The needful was done and after hearing the parties, the High Court set aside the impugned order of the cancellation of the allotment of the appellant as being violative of rule of 'audi alteram partem' and directed the concerned authorities to reconsider the matter. Consequently, after hearing the appellant, the order of the cancellation of his allotment and the order of the allotment made in favour of Muhammad Amar, respondent, were approved. Subsequently, a Revising Authority was constituted for scrutinising the allotments made during the period falling between 14-12-1988 to 8- 7-1990 so as to ascertain the legality of the same Consequently, the Revising Authority scrutinized the allotments including the allotment of Plot No,12 made in favour of Muhammad Amar, respondent No,4 and affirmed the same vide its order, dated 25-2-1993. The appellant filed a write petition in the High Court challenging the order of Revising Authority, data 25-2-1993 contending that the same was violative of law because it was passed without hearing the appellant as was directed by the High Court vide it judgment, dated 20-2-1990. Subsequently, when respondent No,4 filed the written statement, he contended that as the order of the allotment made by the Chairman on 27-2-1990 in favour of respondent No,4 was not challenged, the writ petition was not competent.
Thereafter, the appellant made a application for the amendment of the writ petition on 13-12-1994 which was allowed by the High Court on 17-12-1995" and the amended writ petitio was filed on 19-2- 1997, wherein the order of the allotment, dated 27-2-199 made in favour of respondent No,4 was also challenged. The High Court after taking necessary proceedings in the matter, dismissed the write petition filed by the appellant, herein. It is against the aforesaid dismissal of the writ petition that the present appeal, by leave, has been preferred to this Court.
3. We have heard the arguments and perused the record. Mr. Riaz Inqalabi, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant, has argued that the appellant was an aggrieved person within the meaning of section 44 of the Interim Constitution Act. He has maintained that his allotment was cancelled by the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, vide his order, dated 21-1-1985 which was challenged by the appellant by filing a writ petition in the High Court. Ultimately, the writ petition was accepted and the matter was remanded to the concerned authorities for reconsideration. Thus, the learned counsel maintained that it cannot be said that the appellant was not an aggrieved person. The learned counsel submitted that it is not necessary for maintaining the writ petition that one must, have a juristic right in the subject-matter of the writ, rather a tangible interest is sufficient to maintain a writ. The learned counsel has referred to the following unreported judgments of this Court in support of his contentions:--- ' In appeal entitled Ghulam Rasool v. Chairman Municipal Committee and others, (Civil Appeal No,24 of 1992, decided on 19-12-1992), the facts were that Ghulam Rasool had applied for the allotment of a plot from Mirpur Town and had also deposited earnest money. Subsequently, a plot marked as 11/D, situate in Sub-sector A-5, was allotted in favour of one Muhammad Nawaz.
Ghulam Rasool challenged the allotment of Muhammad Nawaz which was purported to have been allotted out of the quota reserved for the Prime Minister. The writ petition filed by Ghulam Rasool was dismissed on the ground that he had no locus standi to file the writ petition. The appeal filed by Ghulam Rasool was accepted by this Court observing that there was no proof on the file that the Prime Minister had made any order for the allotment of Muhammad Nawaz out of his quota. It was further observed that even if it is assumed that Ghulam Rasool had not specifically applied for the allotment of Plot No,11/D, he still had the locus standi to maintain the writ petition because had the plot in dispute been included in the general quota, he would have applied for the same. Hence the order of the High Court was set aside and Plot No,11/D was declared as unallotted. It was directed that the same should be disposed of according to the rules.
' In appeal entitled Khawaja Muhammad Ayub v. Mirza Tazarrat Hussain and others (Civil Appeal No,9 of 1997, decided on 27-6-1997), the facts were that Mst. Nighat Alam allegedly got the allotment of a plot out of the quota reserved for the Prime Minister. One Mirza Tazarrat Hussain challenged her allotment and subsequent transfer of the .Disputed plot by her by filing a writ petition in the High Court. The High Court came to the conclusion that there was no order of the Prime Minister for the allotment of the plot out of his quota to Mst. Nighat Alam, rather there was an order for the allotment of the plot to Mirza Tazarrat Hussain out of his special quota. Consequently, the allotment of Mst. Nighat Alam and subsequent transfer by her in favour of one Khawaja Muhammad Ayub were cancelled by the High Court and a direction was given to the concerned authority to reconsider the merits of the cases of the contending parties and pass orders afresh.
On appeal to this Court, the order of the High Court was confirmed with the observations that the authorities impleaded in the writ petition were the Chairman, Municipal Committee and Estate Officer etc. And it was for them to decide as to who was competent to reconsider the case of the contending parties and, pass an appropriate order.
' In appeal entitled Muhammad Arshad Khan v. Chairman Mirpur Development Authority and others (1997 M LD 3066), the facts were that one Muhammad Arshad filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the allotment of a plot made in favour of Muhammad Rafique out of the reserved quota of the Prime Minister. The High Court observed that as Muhammad Arshad had applied for the allotment of a plot after the allotment of Muhammad Rafique, he was not an aggrieved person to challenge the allotment of Muhammad Rafique. On appeal to this Court, it was observed that it was not proved that plot in dispute was allotted to Muhammad Rafique out of the quota of Prime Minister because the record showed that the President of Azad Kashmir had desired that the plot should be allotted to Muhammad Rafique but no quota was reserved so far as the President was concerned. It was observed by this Court that mere fact that Muhammad Arshad applied for the allotment of a plot subsequent to the allotment in favour of Muhammad Rafique was not sufficient to hold that he was not an aggrieved person, and that in view of the fact that the allotment in favour of Muhammad Rafique was made secretly, the principle of laches was not attracted in the circumstances of that case. Consequently, the order of the High Courtwas set aside by this Court and the allotment of the plot in dispute was declared to have been of no legal effect.
' In appeal entitled Maqsood Hussain v. Chairman Municipal Committee and others (Civil Appeal No,9 of 1992, decided on 30-5-1992), it was observed that the plot in dispute was included in the general scheme prepared for allotments and it was to be allotted according to rules. But the same was illegally taken out of the general scheme as being an ' awkward place'. Thus, it was observed that the High Court has committed an error in holding that the petitioner was not competent to assail the allotment made in favour of Dr. Zafar Iqbal because he had not applied for the allotment of the disputed plot. It was observed that had the plot been allotted according to rules, Maqsood Hussain, petitioner, could have applied for the same and, thus, he was held to be an aggrieved person for 'invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The allotment of Zafar Iqbal was held to have been made without lawful authority by this Court and the concerned authorities were directed to make the allotment of the plot under rules ' In appeal entitled Shahid Munir v. Mayor/Chairman Municipal Corporation, Mirpur, and others (Civil Appeal No, 50 of 1995, decided on 27-11-1995), the writ petition filed by Shahid Munir was dismissed in limine on the ground that Shahid Munir had no locus standi to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court and the writ also suffered from laches. On appeal, it was observed by this Court that as the appellant was desirous of securing a plot in Sub-setor A-5, in which the plot in dispute was situated, he was an aggrieved person because the plot was allotted without inviting applications, as the petitioner-appellant fell within the category which was entitled to the allotment, he could have applied for the allotment in case the applications were invited. So far as the question of laches was concerned, it was observed that the explanation for filing the writ petition after delay was not adverted to by the High Court, neither the same was accepted nor rejected. Thus, the writ petition filed by the petitioner was admitted for regular hearing and the case was remanded to the High Court for disposing of the same according to law.
4. In reply, Mr. Sher Zaman Chaudhry, Advocate, the learned counsel for respondent No,4, has maintained that when the matter was remanded by the High Court to the Mirpur Development Authority for reconsideration vide its judgment, dated 20-2-1990, the appellant was heard by the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, before whom the appellant admitted that previously he had obtained the allotment of Plot No,98. Thus, his allotment was cancelled in view of the amendment brought in Regulation 8 of the Regulations known as Regulations for Development and Disposal of plots/estate, 1977 (hereinafter shall be called the Regulations), which bars the allotment of more than one plots etc. In Mirpur Town. However, when the appellant filed subsequent writ petition in the High Court, he did not challenge the order of cancellation of his allotment but merely challenged the allotment of Muhammad Amar, respondent No,4. The learned counsel has maintained that as the appellant did not challenge the cancellation of his allotment of Plot No,12, he has no locus standi to challenge the allotment of respondent No,4. The learned counsel has further submitted that if the appellant is not eligible for any further allotment in view of the fact that he had previously got the allotment of Plot No,98, how he can be regarded as an aggrieved person when the plot in dispute is allotted to respondent No,4. The learned counsel has submitted following authorities in support of his contentions:--- ' In case reported as Muhammad Hand v. Chairman MDA 1998 CLC 672, the appeal was dismissed, inter alia, on the ground that as the appellant had already allotment of a plot in his favour, he was not entitled to any further allotment.
' In case reported as Rehana Mahmood v. Azad Government 1997 M LD 2874, it was held that the writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised for perpetuating injustice or retaining the ill-gotten gain. It was opined that although the principle of audi alteram partem is universally accepted, yet the allotment of a plot obtained illegally, would not create a right of hearing in favour of the appellants.
It was further observed that the writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised in favour of a person who does not come to the Court with clean hands.
' In appeal entitled Professor Mirza Sher Baz Khan v. Chairman, M.D.A., and others (Civil Appeal No,19 of 1989, decided on 26-11-1990), the facts were that Mirza Sher Baz, appellant, sought the allotment of a plot measuring one Kanal contending that he had applied for the allotment of the said plot; the same was not only in his possession but he had also raised construction over it. It was alleged that the concerned authorities illegally refused the allotment to him. Consequently, he filed a writ petition in the High Court wherein it was contended by the opposite party that as Mirza Sher Baz, appellant, had already got the allotment of WAPDA built bungalow, he was not entitled to any further allotment in view of the amendment brought in Regulation 8 of the Regulations. The High Court dismissed the writ petition observing that in view of the said amendment, the appellant was not eligible for any further allotment and, thus, he was not an aggrieved person. On appeal to this Court, the findings of the High Court were affirmed and it was further observed that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the appellant was an aggrieved person as envisaged under section 44 of the Interim Constitution Act, the fact remained that he being ineligible for any further allotment, was not entitled to any relief in exercise of writ jurisdiction. It was further opined that the question as to whether the Chairman was authorised to make the allotment in question in favour of respondent No,2 was also irrelevant because such question would arise only if the appellant crosses the bar contained in Regulation 8 of the Regulations which renders him ineligible for the allotment.
5. We have given due consideration to the question as to whether the appellant was an aggrieved person and was legally competent to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It may be stated here that the perusal of the amended writ petition, filed by the appellant in the High Court, shows that initially he challenged only the order of the Revising Authority, dated 25-2-1993 whereby plot allotted to respondent No,4 was confirmed after scrutiny; thereafter he amended the writ petition and also challenged the basic order of allotment, dated 27-2-1990 which was made in favour of respondent No,4; no averment has been made in the writ petition that the order of cancellation of allotment of Plot No,12 made in his favour was illegal or that the allegation of double allotment, on which his allotment was cancelled, was factually or legally incorrect. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant on the point, referred to above, are distinguishable. In all those authorities, the concerned petitioners were held to be aggrieved persons on the ground that had the plots in dispute in those cases been not allotted illegally, the persons who filed writ petitions would have applied for the allotments of the same, as they were eligible for the allotments.
However, in the instant case, the findings of the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, as well as of the High Court are that the appellant was not eligible for any allotment because double allotment is prohibited in view of the amendment brought in Regulation 8, referred to above. The authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, one reported as Muhammad Hanif v. Chairman MDA (1998 CLC 672) and the other unreported entitled Professor Mirza Sher Baz Khan v. Chairman, M.D.A., and others (Civil Appeal No,19 of 1989 decided on 26-11-1990), clearly show that a person who is not eligible for the allotment of a plot at all is not competent to assail an allotment because such a person cannot be said to have locus standi to challenge the allotment of a plot which he cannot claim for himself.
6. The next question which falls for determination is as to whether the writ petition filed by the appellant, herein, suffered from laches. It may be stated that initially, the appellant only challenged the order of the Revising Authority, dated 25-2-1993, whereby the allotment order made in favour of respondent No,4 on 27-2-1990 was confirmed, he did not challenge the basic order of allotment, dated 27-2-1990 made in favour of respondent No,4 in the first instance. He made an application on 13-12-1994 for the amendment of his writ petition so as to challenge the basic order of allotment, dated 27-2-1990; the amendment was allowed by the High Court vide its order, dated 17-12-1995.
However, it was contended that the appellant came to know about the basic order, dated 27-2- 1990 when the respondent filed the written statement to the writ petition. A perusal of the record reveals that the written statement in the case was filed by respondent No,4 on 15-9-1993. Thus, the application for amendment of the writ petition was filed about 15 months after the filing of the written statement by respondent No,4. Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant had no knowledge of the order, dated 27-2-1990 prior to filing of the written statement by respondent No,4, the order, dated 27-2-1990 was challenged after 15 months of the knowledge for which no explanation whatsoever was given. Thus, the challenge made to the order, dated 27-2-1990 badly suffered from laches. A reference may be made to a case reported as Azad Government of the State of J & K v. Haji Summandar Khan (1995 M LD 1350), in support of the view that the writ petition which suffers from laches even in case of a void order is liable to dismissal on this sole ground. The dictum of this Court in Muhammad Arshad Khan v. Chairman Mirpur Development Authority and others (Civil Appeal No,26 of 1996, decided on 22-12-1996) and Shahid Munir v. Mayor/Chairman Municipal Corporation, Mirpur, and others (Civil Appeal No,50 of 1995, decided on 27-11-1995), referred to above and relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinguishable, as is evident from the facts of the said cases narrated in the earlier part of this judgment. Thus, we are of the view that the High Court did not commit an error while observing that the writ petition filed by the appellant, herein, suffered from laches on the ground that the order, dated 27-2-1990 was challenged almost three years of the order and about 15 months of the knowledge of the same according to appellant's own case.
7. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant was legally not debarred from having the allotment of more than two plots. He has referred to a judgment of this Court in appeal entitled Mst. Sairan Bibi v. Mirpur Development Authority and others (Civil Appeal No,28 of 1989, decided on 4-2-1990), wherein the facts were that one Muhammad Malik got the allotment of a plot which was challenged by Mst. Sairan Bibi through a writ petition in the High Court contending that she was in possession of the plot and that Muhammad Malik was allotted the plot without following the relevant rules; besides, he had already a plot allotted in his favour.
Muhammad Malik contended that he was allotted the plot out of the quota reserved for the President of Azad Kashmir and the relevant rules governing the allotments did not apply to the allotments made out of the special quota. The High Court upheld the contention of Muhammad Malik that the allotment made out of the special quota was not governed by the rules and, thus, the writ petition was not competent. So far as the allegation with regard to the double allotment was concerned, no finding was given by the High Court. On appeal to this Court, the finding of the High Court with regard to the non-application of the rules to the allotments made out of the special quota was upheld, so far as the allegation with regard to the double allotment was concerned, it was observed that no rule was cited in support of the contention that double allotment was not legal and that in any case the allotments out of reserved quota was not shown to have governed by any such restriction. It may be stated that this has never been the case of the appellant in the High Court that he was entitled to the double allotment. His case was that he did not have the allotment of Plot No,98 as was alleged by the respondent. This point was not even agitated in the memorandum of appeal filed in this Court or in the concise statement filed by the appellant; this point was only raised during the course of arguments in this Court. The view of this Court has been that a point which has not been taken in the High Court or in the ( memorandum of appeal or in the concise statement filed in this Court, cannot be raised at the time of addressing arguments. A reference may be made to the cases reported as Muhammad Azad Khan v. The Secretary AJ&K Council (1993 SCR 387) and Deputy Collector Excise and Taxation v. Abdul Hamid (1993 SCR 363), wherein the aforesaid principle has been laid down. It may be also observed that as the case of the appellant was that he did not get the allotment of Plot No,98, the stand that he is not debarred from having double allotment is contradictory which even otherwise cannot be permitted in writ proceedings. However, it has already been pointed out that the dictum of this Court given in the authorities reported as Muhammad Hanif v. Chairman MDA 1998 CLC 672 and Professor Mirza Sher Baz Khan v. Chairman, MDA and others (Civil Appeal No,19 of 1989 decided on 26-11-1990) is that double allotment is not permissible after the amendment in regulation 8 of the Regulations. The casual observation of this Court given in Mst. Sairan Bibi v. Mirpur Development Authority and others (Civil Appeal No,28 of 1989, decided on 4-24990), relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, emanated from the fact that the relevant amendment was not brought to the notice of this Court. Thus, even if the point is permitted to be raised at this stage, the aforesaid authority does not help the case of the appellant.
8. It has also been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the photostat copy of the impugned order, dated 27-2-1990 passed by the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, was forged and fabricated, because the original file of the allotment in favour of respondent No,4 was not traceable in the Mirpur Development Authority's record; the photostat copy of the order, dated 27-2-1990 does not prove that any allotment of the plot in dispute was made in favour of Muhammad Amar, respondent No,4, and, thus, subsequently, the record was validly reconstructed by the Mirpur Development Authority on his application. The learned counsel has submitted that as the destruction of the earlier record has not been proved, the reconstruction of the record is merely a fabrication and device to show the existence of previous allotment in favour of Muhammad Amar, respondent.
9. In reply, Mr. Sher Zaman Chaudhry, Advocate, the learned counsel for respondent No,4, has maintained that originally the appellant wilfully avoided to challenge the order of allotment, dated 27-2-1990 because the said order shows that the appellant was heard by the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, in the matter; it is recorded in the said order that the appellant had admitted that he had previous allotment of Plot No,98 in his favour. It was contended that subsequently, when the appellant realized that the challenge to the order of the Revising Authority without challenging the basic allotment order, dated 27-2-1990 would be fatal to his case, he filed an amendment application to challenge the said order. In the amendment application, the appellant averred that he could not challenge the said order earlier due to mistake {{URDU TEXT}} ( iyer ); he has not averred in the amendment application that the said order was passed in his absence without hearing him and it was wrongly recorded that he was heard, he also did not challenge the order as being forged and fabricated. He has challenged the order only on the ground that the same was illegal as being violative of law. Thus, the learned counsel maintained that it is not open for the appellant to assail the order, dated 27-2-1990 on the grounds which were not pleaded and are inconsistent with the stand taken in the amended writ petition. The learned counsel has further submitted that the facts enumerated by the High Court in paragraphs 10 and 11 of its judgment clearly establish that the part file or in other words reconstruction of record was made by the concerned authorities on the application of Muhammad Amar, respondent, because the original file was not traceable. The learned counsel also argued that the application by the respondent for reconstruction of the record; his depositing of the earnest money; and taking of the possession of the disputed plot are established from the reconstructed record. Thus, there is no substance in the argument that in fact no allotment previous to the order, dated 27-2-1990 existed in favour of Muhammad Amar, respondent, and the record was fabricated.
10. We have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties on the point reflected in the above paragraph. It may be stated that the case set up by the appellant after the amendment does not assail the order, dated 27-2-1990 as being forged or that the appellant had no knowledge of the order, dated 27-2-1990. The said order is self-explanatory which shows that the appellant was heard before passing the said order. It has been clearly mentioned in the aforesaid order that the cancellation order of allotment from the name of the appellant was passed vide order, dated 21-1-1985 on the ground that the appellant had previously got the allotment of Plot No,98. There is always a presumption of genuineness in favour of an official document until and unless it is otherwise proved. As has been stated earlier, the appellant would be competent to challenge the allotment of respondent No,4 only if he shows that he could seek the allotment of disputed plot despite the bar contained in regulation 8 as amended which is not so. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant was entitled to double allotment or that the allotment order in favour of respondent No,4 was forged and fabricated is without any substance and is hereby repelled.
11. Next, it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, was not legally competent to make the allotment of the plot in favour of respondent No,4; only Allotment Committee could make such an allotment.
12. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondent, has contended that the powers of the Mirpur Development Authority, or for that matter the Allotment Committee, were delegated to the Chairman and the said delegated powers remained with the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, till 27-7-1990, . Whereas initially the allotment in favour of Muhammad Amar, respondent, was made on 4-6-1989 and subsequently after the direction of the High Court, fresh order was passed on 27-2-1990 when the Chairman enjoyed the powers of the allotment.
13. In our .Opinion the question whether the Chairman alone was competent to make the allotment need not be decided in this case in view of the conclusion reached by us that the appellant had no locus standi to challenge the allotment made in favour of respondent No,4. It is provided in section 44 of the Interim Constitution Act that an action taken by a public functionary can only be challenged by an aggrieved party, but the appellant is not aggrieved because the disputed plot cannot be allotted to him.
14. Next, it was contended that as the Government had prohibited the allotments in Mirpur Town vide its notification, dated 8-8-1989, the allotment made in favour of Muhammad Amar was illegal in view of the aforesaid notification. The perusal of the record shows that the restrictions on allotments were imposed by the Government vide notification, dated 8-8-1989 but the same were withdrawn on the basis of letter written by the Deputy Secretary in the Prime Minister's Secretariat. It is mentioned in paragraph 4 of the Notification, dated 15-11-1992 that the restriction imposed by the Government could not be withdrawn on the basis of the letter written by the Deputy Secretary of the Prime Minister's Secretariat because the same were imposed through Government Order. It was one of the reasons which obliged the Government to constitute the Revising Authority to Scrutinize the allotments of plots made during the period falling between 14-12-1988 to 8-7-1990 as evident from the aforesaid notification. Thus, the allotments including the disputed plot in the present case were revised by the Revising Authority. Therefore, it is not correct to suggest that as the allotment of the plot was made during the period when there was restriction on the allotments, the allotment was non-existent, especially so when the rights of allotees were suspended and not set at naught vide notification, dated 3-10-1992 till the allotments were scrutinised by the Revising Authority. It may also be observed here that this point was also not taken in the High Court or in the memorandum of appeal or in the concise statement filed in this Court. Thus, even otherwise, the point cannot be taken in this Court for the first time during the course of the arguments.
15. Next, it has been contended that Tariq Ismail, one of the members of the Revising Authority, did not sign the order, dated 27-2-1990 and, thus, the order is of no legal consequence. This point was not agitated in the High Court or even in the memorandum of appeal or in the concise statement filed in this Court. Thus, the same cannot be raised in this Court for the first time. However, until and unless it is shown that it was a condition precedent for the validity of the order of the Revising Authority to have signed by all the members, the said F order cannot be held violative of law and would be governed by the 'principle of majority'. The order, on the face of it, appears to have been signed by two members out of three and, thus, the same cannot be held inoperative.
16. The learned counsel for the appellant has also contended that the Revising Authority has acted beyond its competence while passing the impugned order of confirmation of the allotment made in favour of respondent No,4, the Authority has passed the order without hearing the appellant and has failed to apply its mind to the overall circumstances of the case which culminated in the cancellation of the allotment of the appellant and subsequent allotment in favour of respondent No,4. It may be stated that this point was also not raised in the High Court. However, a perusal of section 48-A of the Mirpur Development Authority Act would reveal that the Government has given wide powers to deal G with any case falling within the ambit of the Act in such a manner as it deems proper. Thus, the Revising Authority was constituted to probe into the legality of the allotments made during the period falling between 14-12-1988 to 8-7-1990. The allotments which had to be scrutinised were not cancelled; only the rights of allottees were suspended till the scrutiny of the allotments; no procedure or conditions were laid down in the relevant notification which were to be followed by the Authority. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant was not heard by the Revising Authority is also without any force because the Authority has to scrutinise the existing allotments whereas the allotment made in favour of the appellant had already been cancelled and the plot in dispute had been allotted to respondent No,4. Thus, we are unable to subscribe to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Revising Authority has acted beyond its jurisdiction or failed to complied with any rule while scrutinising the allotment in question.
' In the light of what has been stated above, finding no force in this appeal, it is hereby dismissed with costs.