KARAMAT NAZIR BHANDARI, J.- In dispute, is the land originally owned by Sardar Khan, who died in the year 1915 leaving behind Ahmad Din and Abdul Latif, the two sons, Allah Rakhi, the widow and Charagh Bibi (appellant- plaintiff), as daughter. On 25.6.1915, the land left behind by Sardar Khan was mutated in the names of his two sons, under custom. Ahmad Din, the son, died somewhere in 1921-22 and 0n 26.2.1922 Mutation No. 120 in respect of his share of land was entered in favour of Abdul Latif on 26.2.1922. Abdul Latif also died and consequently Mutation No. 181, dated 3.7.1924 in respect of the land held by him was sanctioned in favour of Allah Rakhi, the widow. This was under the custom and Allah Rakhi was holding the land as a limited estate. Allah Rakhi died on 11.1.1951 and in accordance with section 3 of the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, Mutation No. 497 was sanctioned on 11.8.1951 as follows:-
(i) 1/2 share in favour of Mst. Charagh Bibi, appellant-plaintiff;
(ii) 1/2 share in favour of Tajdar, predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 22 as brother of Sardar Khan; and
(iii) 1/4 share in favour of Fazal Din, predecessor-in-interest of respondents Nos. 1 to 21, as the other brother of Sardar Khan.
2. Later on a dispute arose as to whether Fazal Din/has heirs were entitled to. Any share in the land and to resolve the same Tajdar filed a suit in which the present appellant-plaintiff was also impleaded as pro forma defendant. The suit was dismissed on 12.4.1955. As stated in para 5 of the plaint, another suit was filed by one Allah Rakhi in respect of the same land against the appellant as well as others which was dismissed under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, on 13.4.1964. A further application to restore the suit was dismissed on 12.1.1965. It was thereafter on 4.4.1966 that the present appellant brought a suit initially for a declaration and later on for possession of land also. It was claimed that Mutation No. 497, dated 11.8.1951 entered after the death of Allah Rakhi showing the share of appellant-plaintiff as 1/2, was invalid, illegal and ineffective against her rights. The declaration was sought that the appellant-plaintiff was entitled to 5/6 share in the land. A decree for possession and recovery of excess land against the defendants was also claimed.
3. The suit was contested by different sets of defendants by filing separate written statements.
Keeping in view the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court trained certain preliminary issues, including issue No. 3 regarding the suit being within time. On 16.5.1967, the trial Court directed the hearing of the preliminary issues Nos. 3, 5 and 6 only. After receiving the evidence of the parties, it found that the suit was filed beyond time and dismissed it. On appeal, the finding was upheld and so was the decree.
4. In this second appeal under section I0O of Civil Procedure Code, the only issue upon which the learned counsel for the parties have accessed and which requires determination is the findings of the two Courts as regards the suit being beyond time (Issue No. 3). The two Courts have concurrently found that the appellant-plaintiff was present on 11.8.1951 at the time of sanction of impugned Mutation No. 497; that she was a party according to her plaint in the suit filed by tajdar.
Which was dismissed on 12.5.1995 and, therefore, it was incorrect on her part to assert in the plaint that it was only two years before the filing of the suit that the appellant learnt that her share in the suit land was 5/6 and Mutation No. 497 to the contrary was illegal.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sanvar Naqvi (PLD 1990 S.C. 1); Mst. Fazal Jan v. Roshan Din and others (PLD 1992 S.C. 811) and Muhammad Hussain alias Muhammad Yar v. Sardar Khan and others (PLD 1993 Lah. 575) to contend that no question of limitation arises in cases of inheritance as the parties are co-sharers. It is urged that in such a case the suit can be brought at-any time to have the revenue record corrected. On the other hand, it has been contended that the heirs of Fazal Din were holding the land as trespassers are as illegal occupants and not as co-sharers and,, therefore, the principle contained in the cited judgments is not applicable.
6. It is correct that in the two Supreme Court judgments the rigour of law of limitation has been reduced so as to discourage the practice of excluding from inheritance sisters and other females by male members of the family. It was held that in such a case because the female daughter or sister is a co-sharer, she can at tiny time approach the Court for grant of her share and no question of limitation would arise. This principle, in my view, is not applicable in the present case. It has been concurrently held by the two Courts, and this has not been challenged, that appellant- plaintiff was present at the time of sanction of impugned mutation. The statement of Patwari (DW 3) and Raja Azizur Rehman, Naib Tehsildar (DW.5) is to this effect. In her plaint, the plaintiff also states that she was a party to the suit brought by Tajdar challenging the same mutation. There is, therefore, no truth in her claim that she learnt of the mutations or her actual share in the land only about two years prior to filing of the suit.
7. The question, therefore, arises as to whether the suit brought by her on 4.4.1966, in these circumstances, claiming declaration and possession is within time. It certainly is beyond time, whether a period of one year under Article 14 of six years under Article 122 or a period of twelve years under Articles 122/144 to the Schedule of Limitation Act is applied, from the date of mutation dated 11.8.1951. The facts of the cases relied upon by the appellant were different and, as observed above, in the cited judgments the Court has endeavoured to reduce the rigours of law of limitation in favour of-the female daughters and sisters excluded from inheritance by the male members.
The facts of this case are different. Here the appellant-plaintiff has got her share sanctioned to her in the mutation and, if she thought that she has not been given the legal share, she had t6 sue within time. The findings of the two Courts under issue No. 3 are hereby affirmed.
8. No other point was urged.
This appeal is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their on costs.