' MUHAMMAD BASHIR JEHANGIRI, J.---This appeal through leave of the Court is directed against the judgment dated 7-7-1993 of the Lahore High Court Lahore whereby Criminal Revision No,167 of 1985 upholding the acquittal of the respondents who were accused under sections 467, 468, 471 and 420, P.P.C., read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was maintained.
2. The background of the case is that Haji Ahmad Din who was owner of 68 Kanals 14 Marlas and 180 sft of land situate on the North of Sanda Road, Lahore applied in the year 1943 for approval of a Town Planning Scheme under Section 260 of the City of Lahore Corporation Act, 1941. A part of the area in the Scheme was reserved for the purpose of streets, open space on which building operations were to be permanently prohibited. The Corporation had to pay compensation for the area reserved for public service. An area of 6 Kanals, 12 Marlas and 110 sft. Was reserved on which building operations were permanently prohibited and for which no compensation was to be paid by the Corporation. It is said that this Scheme was approved by the Punjab Government on 23-6- 1943.
3. Respondents Nos.2, 3 and 4 were making efforts since 1947 to convert this open space into residential plots and to bring it into their own use. A forewall and some super-structure initially constructed was pulled down by the corporation. Civil litigation was initiated by them but it proved abortive. In 1974, as a result of negotiations held by the owners with the Corporation into a compromise was reached and it was agreed by the owners that they were prepared to surrender 3 Kanals, 1 Marla and 49 sft. Area of land in favour of Lahore Municipal Corporation without any costs.
The Scheme again had been amended by the Corporation without the approval of the Provincial Government. In anticipation of the approval, respondents Nos.2 to 4 sold an area of 2 Kanals of land in favour of respondents Nos.5 and 6 by virtue of two registered sale deeds in the year 1976.
The mutations were also attested by the Revenue Officer concerned. Again the Corporation attempted to demolish the super-structure which gave rise to another round of civil litigation which again failed and the accused-respondents could not succeed in their design. The proposal of the Corporation to amend the Scheme was ultimately rejected by the Provincial government on 19-4-1979 in the light of the judgment of the Lahore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos.1079 and 1783 of 1972. In this case some land was reserved as open space by the conversion into residential plots in variance of the provisions of the Town Planning Scheme which had been finalized and executed under Section 260 of the City of Lahore Corporation Act, 1941. Under section 260 of the Act, 1941 the area proposed to be transferred to the Corporation on payment of compensation under clause (g) was earmarked for the purpose of constructing public streets on payment of compensation. The Corporation became its exclusive owner and in consequence the owners of the land were left with no proprietary rights therein.
4. As stated earlier, an area of 2 Kanals out of reserved place, has been sold by respondents Nos.2 to 4 in favour of respondents Nos.5 and 6. The learned Senior Civil Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Punjab, who was trying the accused held the view that if the sale had been made and any building had been erected on it, the Corporation has the right to pull down the building and as a legal consequence nobody would not stand cheated, therefore, if the area has been sold, it did not make any difference so far as the criminal liability of cheating was concerned. According to the learned Special Judge, the vendees shall eventually step into the shoes of the owners and vested with the proprietary rights on the land subject to the restriction imposed under clause (b) having no right to erect any building on it, inasmuch as in the building operations in the second round had been permanently prohibited.
5. In this view of the matter, the learned Special Judge opined that "by making a sale no offence of cheating is made out; that the corporation has to seek its remedy under Section 274 of the Act if any building had been reacted on the area; that the Chief Executive Officer has the power to as the owner to demolish the building and in case he refuses to do so the building can be demolished by the Corporation".
6. On the question as to whether any forgery had been committed at the time of sale, the learned Special Judge was of the view that it was not the case of the prosecution that the relevant Revenue Record had been altered. The objection that respondent No,1 being a Patwari had issued a copy of the Jamabandi in which he did not indicate that the area was reserved as Children Park whereby respondents Nos.2 to 4 were able to make a sale in favour of respondent Nos.5 and 6 was held to be of no consequence and that extract from the Jamabandi was neither placed on the record nor it was made available at any stage. According to the learned Judge, all the extracts from the previous Jamabandi recorded that the respondents Nos.2 to 4 were the owners of the land and as they had a right to sell this land subject to the restriction laid down in the Scheme, no question of any forgery arose in the case. The accused-respondents were, thus, acquitted on 18-12-1984, Feeling aggrieved, the appellant challenged the acquittal of the accused-respondents before the High Court by filing Criminal Revision No,467 of 1985.
7. A learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court, who was seized of the criminal revision giving rise to this appeal held the view that the reasons that weighed with the learned trial court while recording the acquittal of the respondents were "legal, logical and based on the evidence on the record and as such call for no interference". The learned Judge affirmed the view of the learned Special Judge that mere sale of the land owned by the respondents could not make out a criminal case against them or that in the absence of Jamabandi said to have been altered by respondent No,1, namely, Khushi Muhammad Patwari, can call for an order other than acquittal. The law laid down by this court on the point of acquittal of the accused-respondents in the case of Ghulam Sikandar and another v. Mamaraz Khan and others (PLD 1985 SC 11) was relied upon and was held that no interference was called for with an order of acquittal even if a different reasonable conclusion is possible on the basis of the evidence on the record and that the finding of acquittal can only be interfered with if it is found wholly artificial, shocking and ridiculous or it is such a conclusion, which no reasonable person would conceivably arrive at. On this reasoning, the revision petition was found to be devoid of merit and was accordingly dismissed.
8. Leave to appeal was granted to consider the question whether this is a fit case where Trial Court should have acquitted the accused under section 249- A A, Cr.P.C., without recording any evidence at all.
9. Ch. Inayat Ullah, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing on behalf of the complainant/appellant, has reiterated the contention that the learned Special Judge having framed the charge against the respondents could not validly pass an order of acquittal on the same material without recording any evidence. It was, therefore, submitted that the High Court having ignored this aspect of the case had also erred to uphold the acquittal under section 249-A, Cr.P.C.,
10. Mr. M. Iqbal, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing on behalf of respondents Nos.1 to 6 had urged that the learned trial Judge has rightly acquitted the respondents.
' In view of the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, the interpretation of section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Is involved in this appeal, therefore, it is reproduced hereunder:-- "249-A. Power of Magistrate to acquit accused at any stage.--Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from acquitting an accused at any stage of the case if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, he considers that the charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence."
' A bare reading of the law re-produced above shows that a Magistrate may deal with the case under this section at any time irrespective of whether the charge has been framed or not. On the contrary, nothing in the section will prevent a Magistrate, where a charge has not been framed by him or a charge has been framed but no material evidence has been recorded, from acquitting the accused, if after hearing arguments and examining all the relevant material before him, he considers that there is no prima facie case against the accused or there is one even if it is put to trial, will certainly fail. The only pre-condition for exercise of powers under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. As held by this Court in Syed Shakir Hussain v. State and others (1986 SCMR 1645) in that by its own force section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Empowers the trial Court if necessary conditions are present in the case to acquit the accused at any stage of the case.
12. To our knowledge this Court has not so far dealt with this aspect of the case which has been agitated by the learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, a brief survey of case law so far propounded by the High Courts of the country would be warranted. In Din Muhammad v.
Muhammad Sharif and another (PLD 1979 Baghdad-ul-Jadid 12) Late Rustam S. Sidhawa J., as his Lordship then was, examined in para.6 of the report, the scope of section 249-A, Cr.P.C. And observed as under:-- "Under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. The learned trial Magistrate has powers, notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter XX of the Criminal Procedure Code, to acquit an accused at any stage of the case if, after giving notice of the said application to the counsel for the State or the complainant or any particular person concerned and securing his reply (if needs be on affidavit) and after hearing the parties, he considers that the charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the petitioner being convicted of any offence before him. The words of the section enable the Magistrate to deal with such an application at any time, irrespective of whether the charge has been framed or not. Nothing in the section will prevent the magistrate, where a charge has not been framed by him or where a charge has been framed but no material evidence recorded, from acquitting the accused, if, after hearing arguments and examining all relevant material before him, he considers that there is no prima facie case against the accused or one which, even if it is put to trial, will certainly fail."
' In a case from Balochistan High Court's jurisdiction reported as State v. Muhammad Rafiq and another (PLD 1983 Quetta 122), a learned Division Bench comprising Abdul Qadeer Chaudhary, Actg., CJ. And Muftakhiruddin J. Discussed the scope of section 249-A, Cr.P.C. And held as under:- "This section 249-A was inserted by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 and by this section statutory recognition to the inherent powers in a trial Court has been recognized, a power which was exercised only by the High Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. So far. From the bare reading of section 249-A it is clear that the Magistrate has powers to acquit the accused under section 249-A at any stage if after giving notice to the other party and hearing them, he considers charge to be groundless irrespective of whether charge has or has not been framed. The section recognizes the powers possessed by the criminal Courts to do right and rid an accused from every groundless charge."
' And in Syed Anwar Ali Shah v. Yar Muhammad and 3 others (1986 PCr.LJ. 1278) a learned Single Judge in Chambers of the Sindh High Court after reproducing section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Held as under:- "Reading of the above section leaves no doubt in my mind that the Magistrate has unrestricted powers to acquit the accused at ' any stage' of the case. The question that arises here is whether the words 'any stage' can be construed to mean even the stage prior to framing of formal charge against the accused and recording of any evidence in support of the case. No doubt the Magistrate becomes seized of the case as soon as he takes cognizance of the same. In police case the cognizance is taken, when challan is produced by police and the same is accepted by the Court. After taking cognizance of the case, the Magistrate can exercise his powers including the powers vested in him under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Thus, after he has taken cognizance of the case, he is obviously free to acquit the accused, at ' any stage' which can even be the stage before framing of charge and recording of evidence."
13. We approve the views taken by the various High Courts on the true scope of Section 249-A, Cr.P.C., that there is no impediment in the way of the Trial Court to acquit the accused at any stage of the case after or prior to the framing of charge. Towards this end, the Trial Court is free to look into the police papers, other material and the legal aspect of the case as is the case in hand. The exercise of this power is, however, subject to the conditions (i) that the Trial Court should afford an opportunity to the Prosecutor, and in a complaint case, to the complainant, before recording an order of acquittal (ii) that the Magistrate, for reasons to be recorded, considers that "the charge against the accused is groundless" or that "there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence". The learned trial Judge in the instant case has being of the opinion that by making a sale, offence of cheating is not made out and that the Corporation has to seek its remedy of demolition under-section 274 of the Act if any building has been erected on the area. The learned trial Judge further held in paras. 18 and 19 that on the basis of facts no offence of cheating or forgery has been made out and that there is no "probability of the accused being convicted of any offence". The other conditions laid down above were also satisfied before recording the order of acquittal of the respondents under sections 249-A (ibid).
14. For the reasons stated above, we find no substance in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. . revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.