' NASIR ASLAM ZAHID, J.---Against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 13-10-1993 allowing the appeal of respondent Karamat Ali Bajwa an employee of appellants WAPDA, leave was granted by this Court by order dated 11-4-1995 which is reproduced here:- "Karamat Ali Bajwa respondent, a WAPDA employee, was dismissed from service by the competent Authority on 24-10-1988 as a result of disciplinary proceedings initiated against him for having remained absent without leave since 14-4-1988. After availing, the remedy of departmental appeal, the respondent preferred an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal. It appears that during the course of hearing of the appeal, the respondent's counsel submitted that the case may be examined only in respect of quantum of punishment as in his view, the penalty of dismissal was disproportionate to the guilt of the respondent employee. Reliance in this behalf was placed on Rule 5-A of the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978 which reads as follows:- ' If an employee does not perform his duties diligently or is an inefficient worker, or is a habitual malingerer, that, is a late comer, a willful absence from duty, or avoids his duties on false pretence a written warning shall be given to him by his immediate superior and if he fails to reform himself a report shall be made within a period of two months from the date of the notice of warning to the officer named below, who may, without prejudice to the provisions of Rules 5 and 6 after obtaining his explanation, impose on him the penalty of stoppage of increment, for a period of one year, without cumulative effect.'
2. The Tribunal allowing the request made on behalf of the respondent did not examine the merits of the case and proceeded to hold that keeping in view the charge against the respondent viz. That he remained absent from duty without sanction of leave and failed to respond to the explanation letter the notice got published in 'WAPDA KHABARNAMA', 'the penalty of dismissal from service was rather harsh and that a lesser punishment would have been sufficient to meet the ends of justice'.
Order of dismissal from service was accordingly modified and substituted 'by an order of reduction to the lowest stage in the time scale for a period of three years without future effect'. This was viding order of the Tribunal dated 13-10-1993 which the petitioners have sought to assail through this petition for leave to appeal.
3. In support of this petition, it is contended that the respondent had remained absent without leave for more than six months which constitutes misconduct. He was, therefore, rightly punished with dismissal from service which is a lawful penalty for misconduct. According to the petitioners, Rule 5-A relied upon by the learned Tribunal is not attracted to the present case. Contention raised needs consideration. Leave to appeal against the impugned judgment of the Service Tribunal is accordingly granted."
' We have heard Ch. Ghulam Hasan Gulshan, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the appellants/WAPDA and Hafiz Tariq Naseem, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the, respondent.
2. Relevant facts for decision of this appeal are given in the leave granting order, reproduced hereinabove. The only point for consideration which arises in this appeal is whether the order of the Federal Service Tribunal converting the penalty of dismissal awarded to the respondent by the Department into stoppage of one year's increment without cumulative effect is sustainable in law.
The admitted position is that the respondent remained absent without leave for period of about 6 months and, after fulfillment of the required formalities and procedure, penalty of dismissal from service was imposed upon the respondent. It appears that the Tribunal was under the impression that for willful absence for any period an employee of WAPDA could only be imposed the penalty of stoppage of increment for a period of one year in view of Rule 5-A of the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978 (reproduced hereinabove in the leave granting order). This follows from the observations of the Tribunal in para. 8 of its judgment to the effect that the arguments of employee's counsel which were mainly based on Rule 5-A were not wholly without substance. The other reasons given by the Tribunal are that the penalty of dismissal from service was rather harsh and that a lesser punishment would have been sufficient to meet the ends of justice taking into consideration the nature of the offence and also the fact that the respondent was only a low-paid employee.
3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for WAPDA that Rule 5-A was not attracted in the present case and that the punishment of dismissal from service for willful absence for a period of 6 months was proper and the decision of the Tribunal in converting the penalty to stoppage of increment for one year was not only unreasonable but also arbitrary.
' On the other hand, Hafiz Tariq Naseem, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the respondent/employee argued that the' case in question which involves willful absence for 6 months squarely fell within Rule 5-A of the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978 and, even otherwise, the Tribunal had discretion to reduce the punishment as has been done in the present case. According to learned counsel, no illegality has been committed by the Tribunal calling for interference by this Court.
4. After hearing learned counsel and perusing the relevant WAPDA Rules, we are of the view that Rule 5-A of the said Rules was not attracted in the instant case where there was willful absence for a continued period of about 6 months. Rule 5-A is, inter alia, applicable to a malingerer who is a late comer or some time he is absent from duty for which the penalty is stoppage of increment for one year only without cumulative effect. If the argument of learned counsel for the respondent/employee is accepted then in all cases of willful absence from duty however long the absence may be, Rule 5-A will be attracted and the penalty could only be stoppage of increment for one year. It would follow that an employee of WAPDA would then get the right to remain absent willfully for years together and then could report for duty claiming his services could not be terminated and that at the most, under Rule 5-A, the penalty of stoppage of increment for one year could be imposed. The view taken by the Federal Service Tribunal that in the case of respondent, who was willfully absent from duty for 6 months, Rule 5-A was attracted and the penalty of stoppage of increment for one year only could be imposed is not correct.
5. The other reason given by the Tribunal in converting the penalty of dismissal from service to stoppage of increment for one year was that the penalty of dismissal was rather harsh and that a lesser punishment would have been sufficient to meet the ends taking into consideration the nature of the offence and also the fact that the respondent was only a low-paid employee is, in our view, not reasonable and can be termed as arbitrary. If an employee remained absent from duty wilfully for 6 months, the penalty of dismissal from service by the Department to such employee is an appropriate punishment and is not a punishment that the same should be described as "rather harsh and that the lesser punishment would have been sufficient to meet the ends of justice".
6. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to the decision of this Court in the case of WAPDA v.
Muhammad Yousaf (PLD 1996 SC 840) in which it was held that under section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, the Service Tribunal has the power to confirm, set aside, vary or modify the sentence or decision so given in a particular case. According to learned counsel, the Tribunal having such powers, there was no illegality or irregularity committed by it in the present case by converting the penalty of dismissal from service to stoppage of increment for one year and as such no case for interference was made out. In the said judgment reference was made to the case of M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1980 SC 22) where also it was held that the Tribunal under the Act had wide powers under section 5 thereof to confirm, set aside, vary or modify order appealed against. However, neither of the said two judgments have laid down any principle that the Service Tribunal has absolute powers in this regard. In the case of WAPDA v.
Muhammad Yousaf it was observed that it is well-settled that the quantum of sentence to be given to a person had to be determined on the circumstances of each case by the Tribunal to meet the ends of justice and in that case, the Court was of the view that the lenient view taken by the .Tribunal was supported by reasons by the Tribunal and that no illegality had been committed by the Tribunal in giving lesser punishment to the employee in that case and the impugned order of the Tribunal was just and proper and did not warrant interference in the circumstances of the case.
In a recent case of Pakistan Railways v. Ghulam Rasul (1997 SCM R 1581) this Court had occasion to deal with the scope of appeals of the Service Tribunal under section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. It was held that the scope of appeal before Service Tribunal against the order of the departmental authority under section 5 was very wide and all questions of law and facts arising therein are open to be gone into by the Tribunal. It was, however, observed that the Service Tribunal while hearing such an appeal has full powers to confirm, alter, set aside or modify the order of departmental' authority keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and to meet the ends of justice and while the scope of appeal before Supreme Court is very limited, the only limitation on the finding on a question of fact by Service Tribunal is that it should_ satisfy the test of reasonableness. It was further held that so long the order passed by the Service Tribunal in appeal against the order of departmental authority shows application of mind by the Tribunal and reasons given by the Tribunal. satisfied the test of reasonableness and do not suffer from arbitrariness, this Court will not interfere with such an order of the Tribunal. In the said judgment reference was made to an earlier judgment of this Court in the case of WAPDA v. Zulfiqar Ali (PLD 1988 SC 693) in which judgment it was observed as follows:-- "It is now well-settled that the Service Tribunals are forums of appeal on questions of law as also facts; with all the necessary powers to uphold, set aside or vary the orders, impugned before them.
It is subject to limitations imposed by any law-like section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958 as interpreted by this Court. That being so, the powers to alter the punishment in appropriate cases has also been conceded to the Tribunal in a number of judgments by this Court. We, therefore, do not agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that they have no such power.
' It is now to be seen whether there is any limitation on this power particularly in cases dealt under section 17(1-A) of WAPDA Act. One limitation is that the decisions of Tribunals being subject to appeal to this Court it is proper that, as on other questions, cogent reasons should be given for altering the punishment. This is also necessary so as to avoid criticism of arbitrariness on the part of the Tribunal itself.
' The other obvious limitation is that in fact also it should not be arbitrary. The reasons to be stated in the order should satisfy the standards of reasonableness. Guidance in this behalf can be sought from the cases of similar nature decided by the superior Courts. For example, in matters of corruption and/or bribe the recent judgments by this Court on quantum of punishment in criminal cases, can be kept in mind. See also the same case on review, reheard and decided on 10-5-1988."
7. We have already held that Rule 5-A of WAPDA Rules was not attracted. Other reasons given by the Service Tribunal in its impugned judgment for converting the penalty of dismissal of service for 6 months' willful absence to stoppage of increment for one year are not reasonable and, in our view, the said reasons. Can also be termed as arbitrary.
8. As a result, Civil Appeal No, 346 of 1995 is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 13-10-1993 of the Federal Service Tribunal passed in Appeal No, 137(L) of 1991 is set aside.
' There shall be no order as to costs.