M|AN NAWAZ, J.- This petition, under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan/defendant, seeks revision of the order passed by leaned Senior Civil Judge, Mianwali dated 23.11.1994/ rejecting a prayer for treating objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction of the Court as "preliminary one".
2. The facts, according to the plaint, are that Haji Sultan Mahmood and Sons/partnership/respondent/plaintiff/ was the owner of D.I Mills situated in Liaquatabad; that it had entered into an agreement with petitioner on 17.7.1991 for the lease of its D.I Mills and godown from 15.4.1991 to 15.3.1995; that it had supplied D.I Moon to petitioner but the same was refused to be received by the petitioner/resulting into a loss of Rs. -12,73,482/40. On these facts, a prayer for rendition of accounts and alternative for the recovery of Rs. 12,73,482/40 was made in the suit. The suit was contested by the petitioner, who in written statement, contended that the petitioner was a Public Corporation with its head office at Islamabad; that the agreement between the parties was executed at Islamabad; that the cheques were issued in Islamabad and so the learned Senior Civil Judge at Mianwali had no jurisdiction to bear the suit. The allegations on facts, embodies in the plaint, were also controverted. A request was made for rejection of the plaint under Order VII rule 11 CPC on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction and alternatively treating the said issue as "preliminary one".
3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial Judge vide order dated 23.11.1995 declined the request, framed necessary issues and fixed the case for evidence of the plaintiff. This is how, this revision petition has come to this Court.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon Explanation-II to Section 20 of Civil Procedure Code, to contend that the Head Office of petitioner- corporation was situated in Islamabad; that the agreements were executed over there; that money was given to respondent in Islamabad and so the Court at Mianwali had no territorial jurisdiction to hear the suit. No other point was urged.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at a considerable length and attended to his contentions with great cart The point urged by him has not impressed me. This question came up for const ceration before Supreme Court in Messrs Brady & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Messrs Sayed Saigol Industries Ltd. (1981 SCMK 494) in almost similar factual background. Dealing with this point, his lordship Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah (as he then was) said: "It would appear from the case-law cited at the bar that the consensus of authority is that Explanation II to section 20, CPC does not control clause (c) thereof and is relatable to clauses (a) and (b) only. Learned counsel for the appellant was unable to cite any case other than that of Registered Firm Sheikjhan Industries Quetta in support of his contention that clause (c) also is subject to the said explanation. We regret that the view taken in the said case, on property analysis of section 20, CPC, cannot be upheld. The conjunction 'or' separates all the three clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 20. Subject to limitations, pecuniary or otherwise, referred in the earlier provisions of the CPC section 20 contains a general provision embracing all personal actions. The plaintiff has three options thereunder to sue: where the defendant or each of the defendants actually resides, carries on business or personally works for gain (clause 'a'); Or, in case there are more than one defendants, any of them besides, carries on business or personally works for gain (clause 'b' or, at the place where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises (clause 'c'). If the situation in a particular case is not covered by clauses (a) and (b), the suit can be instituted by virtue of clause (c), at the place where cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. Explanation I is not relevant for consideration in the present case."
Applying this rule to facts and circumstance of this case, ft is clear that the Mills, leased out by the respondent, were situated in Liaquatabad (Piplan' Thai District Mianwali); that the respondent did sent the consignment of D.I Moong from over there. So it can be safely said that the cause of action partly arose in Mandi Liaquatabad, Piplan Thai Tehsil Piplan District Mianwali which was within the territorial jurisdiction of Senior Civil Judge Mianwali. Guided by the rule laid down by the Supreme Court, it is thus clear that the learned Senior Civil Judge Mianwali had territorial jurisdiction to hear the suit. Even otherwise, the issues pertaining to territorial jurisdiction was framed and the learned trial Court directed the parlies to produce evidence in support of their respective pleas including the plea of territorial jurisdiction. On the material available on record and discernible from the pleadings of the parties, the Learned trial judge had passed eminently correct, just and legal order which does not suffer from any jurisdictional or legal defect calling for interference in provisional jurisdiction of this Court. For the above reasons, this revision petition is found to be wholly meritless and is, accordingly, dismissed in limine.