' The facts forming the background of the instant second appeal are that the appellant is a tenant under the respondent in the premises in dispute. The respondent instituted an ejectment petition against the appellant which has been accepted by the learned Rent Controller, Rawalpindi vide his order dated 5-12-1995. Feeling aggrieved of the said order of ejectment, the appellant preferred an appeal there against which having come before Mr.Pervez Ali Chawla, learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi was dismissed by the said Court on 28-2-1998. Hence the instant second appeal before this Court.
2. Mr.Khan Baig Janjua, learned counsel for the appellant appearing in support of the instant second appeal has raised the following contentions:--
(a) that all the issues framed by the learned Rent Controller have been found against the respondent and that it was only Issue No,2 relating to the bona fide personal requirement of the respondent which has been decided by the Courts below against the appellant;
(b) that the judgments of the Courts below, the learned Rent Controller and that of the learned Additional District Judge are vitiated by the misreading and non-reading of the evidence on the record:
(c) that the appellant had denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that the learned Rent Controller did not frame any issue, so as to reflect this denial of relationship of landlord and tenant by the appellant in his written statement; and
(d) that the appellant had moved an application for production of additional evidence to the effect that the Cement Agency allotted to the respondent which allegedly necessitated the vacation of the shop in dispute was for an area near and around the territory of the Committee Chowk and that on the basis of the allotment of the said Cement Agency, the respondent could not require the vacation of the shop in dispute which was situated in an area away from the said area, for which, the Cement Agency was allotted to the respondent and that the said application moved by the appellant for the additional evidence was not attended to and decided by the learned Appellate Court.
3. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his submissions hereinabove reproduced, I do not feel pursuaded to interfere with the findings recorded by the two Courts below culminating in the order of ejectment against the appellant. Issue No,2 which has been decided by both the Courts below against the appellant was as to the bona fide personal requirement of the respondent. Needless to say that the question of bona fide personal requirement of the respondent was a question of fact. having been found as such by the Courts below, the findings recorded by the Courts cannot be upset in this second appeal, the said findings being findings of fact. Learned counsel for the appellant though pleaded misreading and non-reading of the evidence yet could not establish and substantiate his objection as to this submission of his. The interpretation sought to be put by the learned counsel for the appellant on the pleadings of the parties was wholly uncalled for. It was pointed out to the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Rent Controller, Rawalpindi as also the learned Appellate Court were hearing an ejectment application.
The technicalities which are necessary to be observed while drafting the plaint in a civil suit need not be observed while putting in an application for ejectment under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. The position of the learned Rent Controller and that of the Appellate Court above him is not that of a Court in the strict sense of the world. Their position is that of persona designata. They are not Courts in the strict sense of the world, so as to construe the pleadings of the parties before them with that strictness and meticulousness as is the hallmark of a plaint in a civil suit. Adverting to the ejectment petition subject-matter of the instant appeal, suffice it to say, that the respondent had alleged in the ejectment petition that he required the shop in dispute for his bona fide personal use. This was all he was required to show and to plead. Having done that nothing more could be expected of him. In support of his averments to that effect, he appeared in the witness- box himself and produced another witness also. There is a wealth of case-law on the point that the bare statement of a landlord in the witness-box if the same is consistent with his averment in the ejectment- petition and if the same is not shaken in cross examination is enough to prove his bona fide requirement. Tested on this touchstone, the appellant apart from himself examined another witness also. Their statements were consistent with the averments of the respondent in the ejectment application and the same also could not be shaken in the cross-examination. Learned counsel for the appellant therefore, cannot find fault with the acceptance of the requirement of the respondent/landlord as being bona fide and in good faith. There is no merit in the assertion of the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that the appellant having denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the Courts below did not frame any issue, so as to reflect this denial on the part of the appellant. The arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant based on his this submission merits rejection on twin grounds. Firstly, if the issue had not been framed by the learned Rent Controller, so as to reflect the denial of relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellant and the respondent, the appellant should have insisted upon the framing of an additional issue. The hard fact however, is that the appellant made no agitation for framing of such an issue either before the learned Rent Controller or before the learned Appellate Court. It was too late in the day for him to raise an objection as to this at the stage of this second appeal. Secondly, it was the admitted position that the appellant had been inducted into the shop in dispute by none else but the respondent. This being so, it could not lie in the mouth of the appellant to deny the title of the respondent. Viewed in this perspective the objection of the learned counsel for the appellant pales into insignificance. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant based on the plea of the additional evidence as hereinabove reflected has not impressed me in any measure either. The appellant did not and could not deny that the respondent had been allotted a Cement Agency for the territory around Committee Chowk. It was not necessary for the landlord to stock his Cement in that very area, for which, he has been allotted a Cement Agency. He could ask for the vacation of his own shop in occupation of the appellant for stocking the Cement. The fact that the shop in occupation of the appellant was slightly away from the area, for which, the Cement Agency had been allotted to the respondent could not be urged as a ground for refusing the requirement of the respondent for the shop in dispute. Viewed thus, from any angle, the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant are not such as are sufficient in law to upset the concurrent findings of the Courts below. There is no merit in this second appeal which in the circmstances, is dismissed in limine. Since the premises in occupation of the appellant are commercial premises, the appellant is allowed four months' time for vacating the shop in dispute.