This order shall dispose of the aforementioned five consolidated cases as in all these cases common questions of law and facts are involved and the respondent is the same viz. M/s. Shahi Bottlers.
2. The services of the petitioners in these cages were terminated on 12th December 1973 by way of retrenchment.
3. The petitioners filed applications under section 25-A of the Industrial Relation Ordinance, 1969 on 13March 1975, seeking re-instatement with back benefits. The petitioners contended that they were terminated illegally on the basis of settlement dated 10December 1973 which was void and collusive.
4. All the petitions were resisted by the respondent who in all the cases raised the following preliminary objections :-
(i) That the petitioner has not followed the procedure under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 nor he has approached the Court within two months of his termination and as such the application is barred by time.
(ii) That the services of the petitioner were terminated in accordance with the agreement dated 10th December 1973 entered between the C. B. A. Union and the management as such the petitioner is not an aggrieved person and is debarred from seeking redress under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
(iii) That the application has not been signed by the petitioner himself as such the application is not maintainable.
5. Parties evidence has been recorded on preliminary objections.th th
6. Petitioners have appeared as their own witnesses in their respective cases whereas statement of Ejaz Ahmed, General Manager, Shahi Bottlers has been recorded after consolidating these cases in the file relating to the cases of Khushi Muhammad Shahi others.
7. As already stated the services of the petitioners were terminated on 12th December 1973 whereas they have filed applications under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 can 13th March 1975. Alongwith applications the petitioners have filed applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. In the applications for condona--tion of delay it has been maintained that Coca Cola and Hico Employees Union filed application in Punjab Labour Court No. 1, Lahore under sections 34/45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, on 22nd December 1973 challenging the illegal terminations of the petitioners and other workers. The status of Muhammad Afzal the General Secretary of the Union who filed the said application was challenged by way of writ petition in the High Court and the High Court issued the stay order. The High Court has ultimately accepted the writ petition and therefore, application filed under sections 34/45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, could not be re--started. Therefore, the petitioners filed the present petitions and in these circumstances they were entitled to the condonation of delay. The circum--stances stated in the application under section 5 of the Limitation are not entirely correct.
After the decision of the High Court application was filed in this Court for re-starting the proceedings in the application under section 34/45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, but that application was ultimately dismissed in default. Anyhow the point for determination is as to whether in view of the circumstances stated in the application for condonation of delay the petitioners are entitled to the condonation of delay or not. Admittedly application under section 34/45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, was field before the Labour Court by the Union and not by the petitioners. The Union legally could file an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 to enforce any right guaranteed or secured to the Union as C.B.A by or under any law, award or settlement. The Union could not espouse the cause of individual workman. It cannot therefore, be said that the petitioners have previously been litigating in a bona fide manner before a wrong Court. The petitioners are therefore not entitled to condonation of delay for the reasons stated in their applications fled under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Their petitions are otherwise grossly barred by time. All these applications are accordingly dismissed as being time-barred.