' MUHAMMA D BASHIR JEHANGIRI, J.---These two appeals with the leave of this Court are directed against one and the same judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal (The Tribunal) dated 30-6- 1994 whereby Service Appeal No, 178 of 1991 filed by respondent No,1 was allowed and seniority given to the appellants in Civil Appeal No, 162 of 1995 over the said respondent as a result of exercise of powers under section 23 of the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants Act, 1973 was 'declared as null and void' and the Inspector-General of Police (appellant in Civil Appeal No, 163 of 1995) was directed to prepare a new seniority list ignoring the officiating promotion of respondents Nos. 3 to 8 therein on the basis of Standing Order No,II which was also declared to be without lawful authority.
2. Respondent No, 1 who was initially appointed as Constable on 26-8-1971 had passed Lower School Course in 1975, because Head Constable on'15-7-1976 and was confirmed as such on 15-7- 1979. He claimed that he was shown in List 'D' on 22-3-1979 and was promoted as A.S.I. On 1-12-1987.
It is claimed that the appointment promotion/confirmation of the respondent as Constable and also bringing his name in the List ' D' was earlier than those of appellants and, therefore, respondent No,1 was rightly shown senior to the appellants in the earlier seniority list. In the meantime, the Inspector-General of Police, N.-W.F.P., without the approval of the Provincial Government, issued Standing Order No,II on 15-1-1987. Besides the circulation of the impugned seniority list dated 25-4-1991' in which the appellants were wrongly placed at Serial Nos.74 to 79 and respondent No,1 was placed on Serial No, 126, respondent No,1 pleaded that in pursuance of the Standing Order aforementioned, the appellants had been promoted and confirmed as A.S.Is.
Without lawful authority. According to respondent No,1, his seniority has thus been adversely affected and he had been deprived of his due right of seniority over the appellants. The departmental appeal before the I.-G.P., N.-W.F.P. By respondent No,1 on 21-5-1991 was rejected on 20-8-1991 and communicated to respondent No,1 on 15-9-1991. Feeling dissatisfied, respondent No,1 challenged the impugned Standing Order No,II issued by. The Inspector- General of Police, (appellant in Civil Appeal No, 163 of 1995) as violative of section 12 of the Police Act, 1861 (The Act), as also of Police Rules and. Was, therefore, of no legal effect. He had assailed the promotion and confirmation of the appellants earlier than respondent No,1 on the basis of the said seniority list and had sought the annulment thereof.
3. The appellants in both the appeals filed their replies wherein they had raised, inter alia, preliminary bar of limitation against respondent No,1. On factual plane to the claim of respondent No,1 pressed in the memorandum of his appeal before the Tribunal was controverted and the impugned Standing Order No,II was defended to be intra vires the Police Act and the Rules. In this context, it was maintained that the Standing Order was notified for providing incentive to police officials to work in "unattractive position and also to gain experience in training as well". According to them "only confirmation and seniority are not the determining factors for promotion" and that efficiency and honesty were the main factors governing selection as Instructors as provided under Rule 13.1. It was further averred that respondent No,1 refused to avail the concession of Standing Order No,II thereby accepting the lower position and was, therefore, estopped to pfess into service his claim of seniority. The promotion and the confirmation of the appellants were defended to be absolutely in accord with the Rules. It was also submitted that the "appellants who had been promoted on the basis of Standing Order No,II and had remained posted for three years in the Hangu, on the assumption that the Standing Order had been properly passed and: in any case valuable ,rights have now accrued to them which could not be taken away". The pro forma respondents in their joint reply had also challenged the validity of the earlier promotion and confirmation and entry of the names of the appellants in the impugned seniority list on the basis of the impugned Standing Order.
4. The Tribunal in its well-reasoned judgment considered the preliminary objection as to whether the appeal filed by the respondent was or was not within time and found it to be within time as the cause of action to respondent No,1 had accrued from the date of the knowledge of the promotion of the appellants as A.S.Is. And from the date of communication of his representation to the Inspector-General of Police. On merits, the invocation of the provisions of the impugned Standing Order No,II for the officiating promotion and subsequent promotion of the appellants was held to be legally unsound as it was not the proper legislation having not been notified with the approval of the Provincial Government as envisaged under section 12 of the Act and Rule 1.2 of Police Rules, 1934 and as stated earlier, the impugned order was declared to be of no legal effect and would be considered as nullity in the eyes of law. Before taking not of the respective contentions of the parties, we would like to reproduce section 12 of the Act which reads as under:- "Power of Inspector-General to make rules.---The Inspector-General of Police may, from time to time, subject to the approval of the Provincial Government, frame such orders and rules as he shall deem expedient relative to the organization, classification and distribution of the police force, the places at which the members of the force shall reside, and the particular services to be performed by them; their inspection, the description of arms, accoutrements and other necessaries to be furnished to them; the collecting and communicating by them of intelligence and information; and all such other orders and rules relative to the police force as the Inspector-General, shall, from time to time deem expedient for preventing abuse or neglect of duty, and for rendering such force efficient in the discharge of its duties."
It would, thus, be noticed that under section 12 of the Act, the Inspector-General of Police may, from time to time and subject to the approval of the Provincial Government frame such orders and rules as he deems expeditious relating to the organization and classification of distribution or police force and for rendering such force efficient in the discharge of its duty.
5. Leave to appeal in both the appeals was granted in the following terms:-- "It was further stated that the Standing Order No,II of 1987 was published in the Official Gazette providing incentive that Head Constable who qualified and stands at first 5 positions in the class will be qualified to serve as instructor provided they volunteer to work there for 3 years and earn 'A' report. They would be confirmed in the rank of Head Constable and their names will be brought on promotion list ' E'. That accordingly with such incentive the private petitioner qualified, volunteered and completed 3 years with ' A' report in preference to respondents, therefore, they would be promoted as A.S.I. This order was never challenged. The learned Tribunal was, therefore, not competent to interfere indirectly with the order of promotion of the petitioners on the ground stated above."
6. Mr. Abdul Samad Khan, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeal No, 162 of 1995 and Mr. Muhammad Azam Khan, learned Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P.
In support of Civil Appeal No, 163 of 1995 contended that the Tribunal had erred to reach the conclusion that the Standing Order No,II having been notified without the approval of the Provincial Government was not warranted. According to them the Provincial Government of N.-W.F.P. Would be deemed to have accorded ' implied approval' otherwise it would have declared to have not been approved. In this context, it was pointed out that this Standing Order had been issued in January, 1987 and had held the ground for over ten years having not been questioned from any quarter and was thus deemed to be issued with the 'approval of the Provincial Government'. In this context Mr. Abdul Samad Khan invited our attention to 'Interpretation of Statutes' Chapter XXXIII, page 1038, 7th Edn. (1984) by N.S. Bindra wherein the word 'Approval' had been construed in the following terms:-- "Ordinarily, the difference between approval and permission is that the first the Act holds good until disapproved, while in the other case it does not become effective until permission is obtained. But permission subsequently obtained may all the same validate the previous Act."
' The bare perusal of the above noted interpretation of ' approval' derived from the case of Shakir Husain v. Chandoo (AIR 1913 All. 567) is not extensive. On the contrary, it has brought out a difference between ' approval' and 'permission'.
7. In the Treatise 'Words and Phrases' Permanent Edition, Volume 3-A at page 502, ordinarily the term 'approval' in its most obvious meaning has been taken--- "to commend, confirm, ratify, sanction, or to consent to some act or thing done by another. As used in some statutes or texts, the act of 'approval' implies the act of passing judgment, the use of discretion, and a determination as a deduction therefrom, unless limited by the statute. As used in other statutes, the term implies the exercise of sound judgment, practical sagacity, wise discretion, and final direct affirmative action. In some cases the term implies the exercise of judicial action or discretion, while in other cases the exercise of only an administrative function or capacity and not in a judicial sense.",
8. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that word ' approval' occurring in section 12 of the Act implies the act of passing judgment, the use of discretion, and a determination as a deduction therefrom, to confirm, ratify, sanction or to consent to some act or thing done by the Inspector- General of Police. The word 'approval' implies exercise of sound judgment, practical sagacity, wise discretion and final direct affirmative action. Merely because the impugned Standing Order has held the ground for a number of years is not sufficient to assume the grant of 'approval' of the issuance of the Standing Order by the Provincial Government.
9. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the Standing Order No,II issued by the Inspector- General of Police having not been approved by the Provincial Government is devoid of its legal status and is, therefore, of no legal authority. We are, therefore, inclined to uphold the findings of the C Tribunal that the impugned Standing Order is without any lawful authority and of no legal effect.
10. Mr. Abdul Samad Khan, learned Advocate Supreme Court and Mr. Muhammad Azam Khan, learned Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P. Have attempted to emphasize that the Standing Order was issued with a view to bringing about efficiency in the police force and also to provide incentive to the outstanding officer of the police to serve in the Police Training School and invited our attention to item No,2 of the Standing Order which provides that Head Constables undergoing the Intermediate School Course who qualify amongst the first 5 in the Class, were qualified to serve as Inspectors provided they volunteer to work there for three years and earn category ' A' reports and were eligible for confirmation in the rank of Head Constable and their names to be brought on Promotion List. We are indeed conscious of the reluctance of the Police Officers serving in the Police Station on account of other "consideration" but that itself would not absolve the Inspector-General of Police from getting the approval of the Provincial Government for the issuance of a Standing Order with a view to bringing about 'efficiency and honesty' in the police force. In the alternative, both Mr. Abdul Samad Khan, learned Advocate Supreme Court and Mr. Muhammad Azam Khan, learned Advocate-General invoked the Police Rules, 1934 where under the Inspector-General of Police or Superintendent of Police is empowered to make promotions. This contention is equally fallacious inasmuch as the Inspector-General of Police or for that matter the Superintendent of Police did not invoke any such rules to ignore the earlier seniority list in which respondent No,!, has been admittedly shown senior to the appellants before us in Civil Appeal No, 162 of 1995. The preparation of seniority list of civil servants is a very responsible act calling for the-exercise of judicial discretion besides invoking the provisions of the rules governing the matters of seniority and promotion of civil servants. All administrative acts including the service matters governing the seniority and promotion is solemn duty cast upon the officers empowered to exercise those powers and cannot be allowed to operate without the test of legality by mere reference to implied exercise to certain Rules and Regulations which have not been invoked in issuance of any such order.
11. As a sequel of what has been discussed above, we find no substance in these appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed with order as to costs.