' This order will dispose of Writ Petition No,906 of 1998 titled as "Sheikh Ahmad Ali v. President of Cantonment Board etc. And Writ Petition No,919 of 1998 titled as "Fakhar Saleem v. President, Cantonment Board. Rawalpindi Cantonment etc. As common questions of law and fact are involved in these two petitions.
2. The facts which are common to both the petitions are that the petitioners filed nomination papers for contesting elections for the membership of Cantonment Board, Rawalpindi under the Cantonments (Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1995. Their respective nomination papers were rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that the same were not accompanied by a declaration as envisaged by rule 10(4) of the aforesaid rules. Feeling aggrieved of the rejection of their nomination papers both the petitioners preferred appeals before the President of the Cantonment Board, Rawalpindi who concurring with the decision of the Returning Officer and affirming the ' Board same dismissed the petitioners' appeals. Consequent upon the aforesaid decision of the Returning Officer and that of the President of Cantonment. Board, Rawalpindi, the petitioners approached this Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction to question the legality and the propriety of the orders of the Tribunals below i,e, the Returning Officer and the President of Cantonment Board, Rawalpindi. The petitions thus instituted by the petitioners came before the Division Bench which recorded an order to the following effect:-- "In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Fazl-e-Haq, Accountant-General, West Pakistan v. The State (PLD 1960 SC page 295) we consider it appropriate to refer the matter to the Full Bench to be constituted by the Hon'ble Chief Justice to hear this and similar petitions tomorrow."
' Accordingly the petitions abovementioned have been laid before us to examine the legality and the propriety of the orders of the Tribunals below with reference to the provisions of Cantonments (Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1995.
3. M/s. Babar Ali and Malik Muhammad Jafar, Advocates, appeared for the petitioners whereas Sardar Muhammad Ghazi, Advocate, appeared for the respondent.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners appearing in support of their respective petitions have raised the following contentions:-
(i) that rule 10(4) of the Cantonments (Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1995 was directory in nature and non-compliance thereof could not invalidate the nomination papers of the petitioners and that viewed in this perspective the Tribunals below acted wholly illegally in rejecting the nomination papers and the orders passed by them merit interference by this Court;
(ii) that the non-filing of the declaration as envisaged by rule 10(4) of the aforesaid rules was at the most an irregularity which could have been cured subsequently by allowing the petitioners to rectify the same by filing the declaration forms in question;
(iii) that rule 12 of the aforesaid rules is the rule which lays down the condition for the rejection of nomination papers of a candidate and that the said rule does not make any provision for the rejection of the nomination papers on account of non-compliance of the provisions as to filing of a declaration in terms of rule 10(4) of the rules in question;
(iv) that this Court should interpret the rules aforementioned in a manner which is conducive to advancement of democratic process for which the election in question was being held.
(v) (v) that the interpretation put on rule 10(4) of the aforesaid rules by the Tribunals below was too technical to be approved.
5. Sardar Muhammad Ghazi, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondents controverted the submissions made on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners and vehemently contended that the requirement of rule 10(4) of the Cantonments (Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1995 was mandatory and non-compliance of the same was rightly made by the Tribunals below as the basis of the rejection of the nomination papers of the petitioners. He maintained that no exception could be taken to the view taken by the Tribunals below and the petitions filed by the petitioners were wholly misconceived and merited out right rejection.
6. We have considered and evaluated the respective submission of the learned counsel for the parties. In order to appreciate their respective contentions in their proper perspective, it appears appropriate to make a reference to rule. 10(4) and rule 12 of the Cantonments (Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1995 which are accordingly reproduced hereunder:- "Rule 10(4): ' Nomination of election.--(1) At least ten voters of a ward may propose or second the name of any duly qualified person to be candidate for the ward.
(2) .
(3)
(4) A nomination paper delivered under sub-rule (3) shall be accompanied by a declaration in writing signed by the candidate that he has appointed or thereby appoints himself or some other voter of that ward as his election agent, and if he appoints some other voter he shall give his name, his father's name or as the case may be, her father's or husband's name and full address of such person and no nomination paper shall be valid without such declaration: ' Provided that if more nomination papers than one are delivered by or on behalf of a candidate, it shall not be necessary for more of such nomination papers than one to be accompanied by such declaration."
"Rule 12: ' Scrutiny.--The candidates, their election agents, their proposers and seconders may attend the scrutiny and the Returning Officer shall give them all reasonable facilities for the examination of all nomination papers.
(2) On the scrutiny day and at the time and place appointed by him, the Returning Officer shall, in the presence of the persons attending the scrutiny under sub-rule (1) undertake scrutiny of the nomination papers and decide any objection raised by any such person to any nomination;
(3) The Returning Officer shall decide all objections which may be oral or in writing and which may relate not only to the form of the nomination but also to the violation or non-observance of any provision of the act or these rules and, after making such summary enquiry for the purpose as he may think necessary, shall reject a nomination if he is satisfied:-
(i) That the candidate is ineligible for election under the provisions of the Act;
(ii) that the proposer or seconder is disqualified from being a voter in the same ward as that of the candidate;
(iii) that the signature of the candidate or of the proposer or seconder is not genuine or has been obtained by fraud: Provided that no objection to a candidate or to a nomination which relates to his registration in the electoral roll shall be considered;
(4) The decision taken on each objection shall be endorsed on the nomination paper, and if any nomination paper is rejected, a brief statement of the reasons for rejection shall be recorded thereon and signed by the person hearing the objection;
(5) Where the nomination paper or papers of a candidate have been rejected, the Returning Officer shall on request, supply to such candidate on the same day certified copies of such orders free of cost;
(6) The Returning Officer shall immediately send to the President the rejected nomination papers alongwith his orders thereon."
7. A perusal of rule 10(4) of the aforesaid rules reproduced hereinabove shows that it provides that a nomination paper delivered under sub-rule (3) shall be accompanied by a declaration in writing signed by the candidate that he has appointed or thereby appoints himself or some other voter of that ward as his election agent and that no nomination paper shall be valid without such declaration. The rule as enacted in unequivocal terms makes it obligatory for a candidate to enclose a declaration to the aforesaid effect and quite unambiguously also provides that a nomination paper not accompanied by the declaration aforementioned shall be rendered invalid by the said omission. Rule 10(4) as reproduced hereinabove ordains that a nomination paper shall be accompanied by a declaration in writing signed by a candidate that he has appointed or thereby appoints himself or some other voter of that ward as his election agent. Now, two words used in this rule are of paramount importance for the purpose of gathering the intention of the law-maker behind the enactment of the rule. The first is "accompanied by" and the second is "thereby appoints himself or some other voter of that ward as his election agent". The use of the word accompanied by cannot but connote that there shall be something in addition to the nomination paper whereby the candidate would manifest his intention as to whether he has appointed himself or somebody else as his election agent. Again the words "thereby appoints himself or some other voter of the ward as his, election agent" refer to the declaration to be appended to the nomination paper whereby he appoints either himself or somebody else as his election agent. It shall, thus, be seen that the requirement of rule 10(4) cannot be said to have been complied with unless, in addition to the nomination paper, he has appended therewith a declaration to the effect that he has thereby either appointed himself or any other voter of the ward as his election agent. The language of rule 10(4) of the aforesaid rules is plain and admits of no other interpretation but the one put on it by the Tribunals below.
8. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners to the effect that rule 12 of the aforesaid rules reproduced hereinabove was the one which made provisions for the contingencies which rendered the nomination papers of a candidate as invalid and that rule 10(4) of the aforesaid rules does not fit in with the contingencies referred to in rule 12 has not impressed us either. Rule 12 aforementioned it may be pointed out is not exhaustive of the circumstances which rendered the nomination papers of a candidate as invalid. The said papers could be rejected for a reason other than the one prescribed in rule 12. This is manifest from a perusal of the provisions of sub-rules (5) and (6) of rule 10 which provide that even a candidate shall deposit into the Cantonment Fund a sum specified in rule 5 in cash and attach to the nomination paper an official receipt granted in token of the deposit having been credited to the Cantonment Fund. Sub-rule (6) provides that the nomination of a candidate not accompanied by the deposit referred to in sub-rule (5) shall be rejected. Now, if the reasoning and the logic advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted as correct then the provisions of sub-rule (5) and sub-rule (6) shall be rendered redundant and no nomination papers shall be liable to rejection for the noncompliance of the requirement as to deposit .Of the aforesaid sum. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that rule 12 alone provides for the circumstances which rendered the nomination papers of a candidate as valid or otherwise is, thus, not correct. The said papers can also be rejected if other mandatory provisions like the one provided for by rules 10(4), 10(5) and (6) are not complied with.
9. The other submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners to the effect that even if the requirement as to the filing of declaration in terms of rule 10(4) was held to be mandatory, the same nontheless should not be construed strictly and the nomination papers may be considered to have been validly filed even without appending therewith a declaration within the meaning of rule 10(4). For, such an interpretation of the rules would be in consonance ' Board ' with the advancement of the cause of democratic process in the country. We are constrained to observe that this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is wholly fallacious. For, thereby the learned counsel for the petitioners want us to give an interpretation which is extraneous and runs counter to the express language of the Statute. We cannot help observing that it is not the job of this Court to interpret the law by ignoring the express provisions thereof and by importing therein extraneous considerations like the one advocated by the learned counsel for the petitioners of advancing the cause of the democratic process in the country. The duty of the Court is to enforce the law as enacted and not to import therein any notions of what is right or what is wrong. The observations made by his Lordship late Mr.Justice Hamoodur Rahman former Chief Justice of Pakistan in case titled as Brig. F.B. Ali (Retd.) Col.Abdul Alim Afridi (Retd.) v. State reported as PLD 1975 SC 506 at page 528 are very apt to explain the point as to the scope of interpretation of Statute by a Court and are, therefore, reproduced hereunder:- "There is no such condition that a law must in order to qualify as a law also be based on reason or morality. The Courts cannot strike down a law on any such higher ethical notions nor can Courts act on the basis of philosophical concepts of law as pointed out by me in the case of Asma Jilani PLD 1972 SC 139. This claim was abandoned even in England as long ago as 1871 when Willes, J., in the case of Loe v. Bude and Terrington Junction Railway Co, 1871 L.R.C.P.576/582 said:-- 'We sit here as servants of the Queen and the Legislature. Are we to act as regents over what is done by parliament with the consent of the Queen, Lords, and Commons. I deny that any such authority exists.... ... The proceedings here are judicial, not autocratic, which they would be if we could make laws instead of administering them' ."
' The observations made by his Lordship Mr.Justice Hamoodur Rahman as he then was with reference to what was said by Willes, J., as long ago as 1871 beautifully explain the limitations on the powers of the Court while interpreting a particular law. The learned Judge described himself as a servant of the Queen, Lords and Commons (three organs of the British Parliament) and said with reference to the jurisdiction of the Court that the proceedings in the Court are judicial and not autocratic which they would be if the Judges could make laws instead of administering them. It is plain, therefore, that we cannot put the interpretation on rule 10(4) of the aforesaid rules on the basis of any philosophical notion of advancing the cause of democratic process in the country as has been pleaded before us by the learned counsel for the petitioners by making a departure from the express language of the Statute.
10. Since the question under examination relates to the interpretation of Statute it can also be examined with reference to the Book, Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition by P.St. J. Langan. At page 28 of Chapter 2, the learned Author with a view to discovering the intention of the Legislature behind the enactment of a law says as follows:-- "The rule of construction is to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used, for it is well-excepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law.
' Again at page 29, the Author says:-- 'Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the Legislature, it must be enforced, however, harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of a Statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the Court as to what is just and expedient. Words are not to be cortrued, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they snould not be embraced or excluded. The duty of the Court is to expound the law as it stands, and to leave the remedy kif one be resolved upon) to others' . "
11. As a natural corollary to the aforesaid discussion, it shall be seen; firstly, that the requirement of filing a declaration with the nomination paper under rule 10(4) is mandatory and must of necessity result in rejection of the nomination papers should the same be found not to have been complied with. Secondly, in the face of the clear, express and unambiguous language of the rule, no interpretation can be put on it which may though advance the cause of democratic process yet is against the clear legislative intent.
12. The interpretation of rule 10(4) as also rule 12 fell for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in case reported as Ch. Khalid Hussain v. The President of Cantonment Board and another (1984 CLC page 237) which was also cited before us. We have examined the enunciation of law therein made and find no justification to interfere therewith. The decisions of the Tribunals below of rejecting the nomination papers of the petitioners on account of noncompliance of the requirement of rule 10(4) as to the filing of a declaration form not having been complied with by the petitioners are declared to have been validly made calling for no interference by this Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction. The same are upheld and the instant Constitution petitions are dismissed in limine as being without any merit and wholly misconceived. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.