' IRSHAD HASAN KHAN, J.---This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), dated 1-4-1998, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed in limine.
' Brief facts are that the petitioner, Lower Division Clerk, while working in the Finance Section, 502- Central Workshop E.M.E., Rawalpindi during 1997, was not authorised to deal with settlement of pension cases of retired personnel of the Installation but he contacted Auditor Muhammad Attique on 2-8-1997 of Military Pension Office, Lahore, for finalising a pension case with a view to obtain illegal gratification. Accordingly, he was charge-sheeted on 11-8-1997 in the following terms:- "In that while serving in Finance Section 502 Central Workshop E.M.E., Rawalpindi you have been found guilty of the above charges as you demanded Rs,2,000 each from ME-11284L/Fireman Ulfat Hussain on 22nd July, 1997 and ME-9701 HIT Muhammad Hussain on 7th August, 1997 as a illegal gratification for settlement of their pension cases from CMP, Lahore. You directly received their pension settlement ltrs on 2nd August, 1997 but did not inform Pension Section of 502 Central Workshop EME till 7th August, 1997. Whereas you gave pension sanctioned Itrs direct to the indls concerned and demanded the proposed amount."
' In response to the charge-sheet, the petitioner in his reply impliedly conceded that he dealt with the pension cases of many retired officers as well as the two cases mentioned in the charge-sheet but took the plea that he did the same as a goodwill gesture and not for any monetary gain. It would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant passages of his reply which read thus:-- "(a) I am serving in Finance Section for the last two years, Due to dealing with C.M.A., Rawalpindi and Pension Cases with CMP, Lahore I have to establish some contacts with the staff of that Department for early finalization of such cases. It is also evident that I have settled many ' cases of officers as a goodwill gesture by using my own contacts and I never demanded money from officers.
(b) As regards two cases mentioned in the charge-sheet, it is stated that they contacted me by themselves and asked me to settle their pension cases by using my contact with CMP, Lahore as they are poor and in need of money as early as possible and they are not in a position to go to Lahore for settlement of their cases. I have settled these cases only keeping in view their financial problems and I did not demand any gratification from them."
3. The explanation tendered by the petitioner was not found satisfactory. In consequence, a Court of Inquiry was ordered in which the charges levelled against him stood proved. He was, therefore, served with a show-cause notice dated 19-8-1997. His reply to the said show-cause notice was found unsatisfactory. The petitioner was afforded an opportunity of being heard by the competent authority before he was removed from service on 23rd October, 1997. Departmental appeal filed by him was also rejected.
4. Being dissatisfied, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal after scrutiny of the statements of the prosecution witnesses; No,1 Javed Iqbal, No,2 Muhammad Hussain, No,3, Noor Muhammad, No,4 Noor Ahmed and No, 5 Ulfat Hussain, the unanimous findings recorded by the Court of Inquiry and the replies submitted by the petitioner, declined to interfere with the matter, inter alia, with the following observations:- "Keeping in view all the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, the peculiar conduct demonstrated by the appellant by indulging in corrupt practices beyond the scope of his duty as admitted by him and evident from depositions of the witnesses this appeal fails and is dismissed in limine."
5. Hafiz S.A. Rahman, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that the order of removal of the petitioner from service, was violative of rule 6(1) of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), inasmuch as, it was incumbent upon the departmental authority to frame a charge and communicate it to the petitioner together with the statement of allegations explaining the charge and/or any other relevant circumstances, which were proposed to be taken into consideration. In the instant case, it is contended that since the statement of allegations was not supplied alongwith the charge-sheet, the order of removal was, therefore, bad in law.
It is true that a civil servant while proceeded against for misconduct must be provided with charge-sheet/statement of allegations to explain his position. In the instant case, however, the charge-sheet was self-explanatory and embodied reasons which fully satisfied the requirements of law. The petitioner was fully aware of the charges levelled against him, to which he gave his reply and never demanded statement of allegations in support of the charge-sheet. Thus, visualized, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by non-supply of the statement of allegations, in the circumstances of the case.
6. It is next contended that the inquiry proceedings conducted by the Court of Inquiry were sham, inasmuch as, they commenced on 7-8-1997 and completed on 8-8-1997. No opportunity of cross- examining the witnesses was granted to the petitioner. He was not allowed to produce any witness in support of his defence nor was he heard in person either by the departmental authority or by the appellate authority.
There, is no cavil with the proposition of law that under provisions of Government Servants (E & D)
Rules, 1973, major penalty of removal from service cannot be imposed upon a civil servant without following procedure prescribed therein. In the instant case, however, a finding of fact has been recorded by the Tribunal to the following effect:-- ....The appellant was formally charge-sheeted, examined, allowed to cross-examine the P.Ws. Who appeared and deposed against him. The appellant was again served with a show-cause notice as to why a major penalty of removal from service should not be imposed on him after receipt of a report by a Court of Inquiry....'
' It is specifically stated in paragraph 5 of the impugned order that the Brig. Commandant had given audience to the accused in presence of all the witnesses. The petitioner, therefore, could not be allowed to the factual controversy in these proceedings.
7. Hafiz S.A. Rahman next contended that the appellate authority failed to assign reasons for rejecting the appeal in violation of the law declared by this Court in the case of Aslam Warraich v.
Secretary, Planning and Development Division (1991 SCM R 2330), wherein it was observed:-- "Even if it is not a mandate by any law that the officer concerned should be informed about the reasons which prevailed with the authority concerned, it would not be illegal either to give reasons; at least, from now onward. It being the judgment of this Court on this legal Question, the same would be observed as declared law." (Underlining is ours by way of emphasis).
' We have gone through the order dated 22-12-1997 passed by the departmental appellate authority. It merely says that the case of the petitioner regarding reinstatement into service has been considered but the competent appellate authority has rejected his appeal for reinstatement into service. It is C true that the departmental appellate authority should have assigned reasons which prevailed with it while rejecting the appeal but failure to do so has not rendered the impugned order of the Tribunal illegal, inasmuch as, the Tribunal has itself scrutinized the whole material on record and found no substance in the appeal filed by the petitioner. We, however, reiterate for further guidance that the departmental appellate authority shall assign reasons which prevail with it while rejecting/accepting the departmental appeal as observed by this Court in the case of Aslam Warraich (supra).
8. Hafiz S.A. Rehman next relied on Ali Muhammad v. Commissioner Afghan Refugees, N.-W.F.P.
(1995 SCM R 1675), wherein one of us (Muhammad Bashir Jehangiri, J.), was a party, to contend that the appeal filed before the Tribunal is in the nature of first appeal as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure and it will be proper if principles governing such appeal are kept in view. We reiterate the rule laid down in the case of Ali Muhammad (supra). The petitioner, however, cannot take benefit of the same, inasmuch as, the facts in the present case were simple and undisputed. The Tribunal called for the comments of the respondent-department and after giving proper hearing to the petitioner and appreciating the material on record, recorded a finding of fact that the charges of corruption levelled against the petitioner stood proved on record. Thus, visualized, in the facts of the present case no exception could be taken to the dismissal of appeal in limine.
' The rule laid down in the case of Abid Hussain v. Mst. Afsar Jehan Begum (PLD 1973 Supreme Court 1), is attracted in this case. The observations made in the above case were also reiterated in the case of Ali Muhammad (supra), which read thus:- "As has been observed by this Court in the decision cited above,. Dismissal in limine of a first appeal is not the general rule but is resorted to only in those cases which are of such a simple nature that no question of law or fact arises for consideration. In such cases rule 11 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure does certainly give the Appellate Court the power to dismiss an appeal in limine." (Underlining is ours by way of emphasis).
' The same view was earlier taken in the case of Humayun Zulfiqar Ismail v. Hamida Sadat Ali (1968 SCM R 828), while dealing with the Order XLI, Rule 11 of the C.P.C., which empowers the Court to dismiss first appeal in limine. We are, therefore, of the considered view that this is not a fit case for remanding the case to the Tribunal for hearing the appeal on merits afresh after hearing the parties.
9. Hafiz S.A. Rehman next argued that the inquiry proceedings were conducted by way of questionnaire and were, therefore, not sustainable in view of the requirements of Rule 6 of the Rules. It is true that where inquiry proceedings are conducted by way of questionnaire without examination of witnesses in support of charge or the defence, such inquiry proceedings are not sustainable in view of rule 6 (ibid). In the instant case, however, a bare perusal of the testimony of witnesses as well as the statement of the petitioner available at pages 43 to 55 of the Paper Book, would show that the Court of Inquiry duly recorded the statement of the petitioner as well as the witnesses. Thereafter, Court question were asked, which were recorded in form of question and answer. The petitioner also put cross questions to Muhammad Hussain witness No,2 and Ulfat Hussain witness No,5 but failed to avail the opportunity of cross-examining the other witnesses. It was, therefore, not a case wherein inquiry proceedings were conducted by way of questionnaire without examination of witnesses in support of charge/defence.
10. It is next contended that the departmental authority/appellate authority was wrong in not adhering to the recommendations made by the Court of Inquiry wherein it was observed that the petitioner should be removed from the post he was presently holding and not from service. The contention is devoid of any force. It is not a case where the Authority has acted arbitrarily or in capricious manner in imposing penalty upon the petitioner in view of unanimous findings of the Court of Inquiry adjudging him guilty of the misconduct charged.
11. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner at some length, perusing the material available on record and the caselaw cited by him, we do not find any legal infirmity in the order of the Tribunal to warrant interference in these proceedings. The departmental authority has acted fairly, justly and in consonance with the principles of natural justice while imposing penalty of removal upon the petitioner. Even otherwise, the dispute raised herein relates to an individual grievance and no question of law of public importance is involved to warrant interference under Article 212 of the Constitution.
12. Resultantly, the petition is dismissed and leave refused.