' This appeal under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) is directed against the eviction order, dated 15-11-1994 passed by the learned Controller, Karachi (Central) directing the ejectment of the appellant from shop premises situated on a portion of Plot No,R-1832/2, Azizabad, Federal 'B' Area, Karachi on the ground of personal requirement for the use and occupation of two sons of the respondent.
2. Appellant is the tenant of the respondent in the demised shop premises by virtue of a tenancy agreement, dated 2-12-1986 w,e,f,, 1-1-1987 at a monthly rent of Rs,400 in which he is running the business of selling milk. His ejectment was sought on the ground that the respondent's sons Taqi Ahmed Khan and Wasi Ahmed Khan have grown up and were unemployed. It was urged that the respondent's family was large and it was not possible to meet both ends by employment alone of the respondent as Assistant in K.D.A.
3. The appellant resisted his eviction and filed a parawise written statement denying the bona fide requirement of the premises by the respondent in good faith. He pleaded that the respondent had already got vacated Shop No,1 which is lying vacant and no business was started in the said shop.
He further pleaded that the shop premises were not required by respondent for the reason that his both sons are already employed with M/s. Tawakkal Garments and Universal Company. Saddar. He further added that the respondent had moved an application before the Area Councillor seeking eviction on the ground of reconstruction whereas he has disclosed the ground of personal bona fide requirement in the present proceedings.
4. Both the parties adduced evidence. While the respondent examined himself and his sons Taqi Ahmed Khan and Wasi Ahmed Khan, the appellant besides examining himself adduced the evidence of Farid Ahmed and Ahmed Shah. Sole issue before the Controller was whether the respondent bona fidely required the demised shop premises in good faith for the use and occupation of his sons. Upon consideration of the evidence on record, the learned Controller accepted the prayer for ejectment and passed the impugned order, which has been challenged in this appeal.
5. Both the learned counsel have addressed this Court and taken me through the relevant evidence on record.
6. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the application for eviction of the shop before the Area Councillor, respondent had urged the ground of reconstruction of the house, whereas, in the present proceedings he has advanced the ground of personal requirement for use and occupation of his two sons who, in fact, are already employed. No doubt, respondent in his evidence had admitted that in the application before the Area Councilors he had urged the ground of reconstruction. In law to my mind, he is not disqualified from seeking ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement provided he is able to establish that his need was bona fide and in good faith.
7. It was next contended that both the sons of the respondent are actually employed but there is hardly any evidence in support of this contention. The respondent as well as both his sons has categorically denied their employment with M/s. Tawakkal Garments and Universal Company respectively. Their evidence has not been shattered during the cross-examination and there is no strong reason to disbelieve their version. In fact the appellant failed to show that both the sons of the respondent are gainfully employed as pleaded by him.
8. The third contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the respondent failed to disclose his personal requirement providing him a valid cause of action to invoke the jurisdiction of the Controller in seeking the ejectment of the appellant. There is no merit and substance in this contention as well as a glance at the eviction application clearly tends to show that the respondent has specifically pleaded his bona fide requirement of the rented shop premises in good faith for use and occupation of both of his sons.
9. It was lastly and earnestly argued by Mr. Raja M. Aslam Kiyani, learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent did not approach the Controller with clean hands insomuch so that at earlier occasion, he had been able to get vacated Shop No,1 from other tenant which was not utilised for starting the General Store as urged in the evidence. The respondent and both of his sons have fairly conceded that the said shop was got vacated with the good offices of the Area Councillor but it was annexed to the residential portion on account of large family of the respondent. It has not been denied that the respondent has four grown up sons of whom two are married and living together with him on the plot in dispute measuring only 120 square yards. On a portion of the said plot the shop in dispute is situated. By annexing the other shop got vacated to his residence, the respondent neither acted mala fide nor dishonestly. In case he earnestly needed the shop premises for residential purpose and by opening a door in the said shop utilised the said premises it cannot be held by any stretch of reasoning that he invoked the jurisdiction of the Controller, with unclean hands. As a lawful owner and landlord, he is entitled under the law to avail of the best possible use of his property which is even otherwise guaranteed under the Constitution and no restriction can be placed on the authority and right of a landlord to use his property in the manner best suited to his requirements. It is not the case of the appellant if the respondent owns or occupies any other shop in the same vicinity suited for his business to be utilised by his sons. In the absence of any strong circumstantial evidence to indicate that the requirement of the respondent was prompted by ulterior motive or motivated by an evil design to uproot the appellant, I am inclined to hold that learned Controller rightly came to the conclusion that the requirement of the respondent was genuine and in good faith.
10. No other ground was urged in support of this appeal which is without any substance. It is accordingly dismissed. The appellant is directed to vacate the shop premises within 60 days from the date of the judgment subject of course to the payment of usual monthly rent.