' The respondent filed an application, being Rent Case No, 3721 of 1975, under section 13 of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) against the appellant before Civil Judge, III Class and Controller, Karachi for his eviction from two fiats bearing Nos. 26 and 827, Central Commercial Area, Pakistan Employees Co-operative Housing Society, Karacbi on the ground of non-payment of rent. The Controller on 31-5-1976 passed an ex parte order of eviction of the appellant from the aforesaid premises.
2. Aggrieved by this order the appellant preferred an appeal, being Rent Appeal No, 318 of 1976 to V Additional District Judge, Karachi who by the order dated 24-7-1976 holding it to be barred by time dismissed it in Whine.
3 Therefore, the appellant has come up to this Court against the order of the Additional District Judge, Karachi.
4. I have heard Mr. Ahmad Saeed Qureshi, Advocate for the appellant and Mr. M. Idris Qureshi, Advocate for the respondent.
5. Mr. Ahmad Saeed Qureshi, Advocate for the appellant has contended that the appeal was not barred by time and therefore the order or dismissal of appeal in limine on the ground of limitation is liable to be set aside.
6. In order to appreciate the contention it is necessary to state certain material dates. The Controller had passed the order granting the application for eviction of the appellant on 31-5-1976.
The appellant applied for certified copy of the order on 30-6-1976 I e. On the last date of the period of limitation provided under section 15(4) of the Ordinance. The copy was made ready on 2-7-1976, certified on 2-7-1976 and was delivered on 7-7-1976. The appellant filed the First Appeal on 9-7- 1976 i,e, on 39th day after the day of passing cf the order. It is claimed by Mr. Ahmad Saeed that since the Court was closed from 1-6-1976 to 30-6-1976 for Summer Vacation and since the copy was applied on 30-6-1976 and was delivered` on 7-7-1976 therefore the entire period of vacation as well as the period from 30-6-1976 to the date of delivery of the copy has to be excluded under subsection (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act, being the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order and if this period of 37 days is excluded from the period of 39 dais within which the appeal was filed, the appeal was well within time. In support of the contention the learned counsel relied upon Debi Charan La! And others v. Mehdi Hussain and others (1).
8. On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that the time requisite for obtaining copy was tie period of 4 days from 30.6-1976, when the application was made on 3-7- 1976, when the copy was certified, therefore, if this period is excluded the appeal was barred by 5 days time. In support of the submission the learned Advocate relied upon Bawa Singh and others v.
Thakur Singh and others (2) wherein it was held that only the time from the date of the application up to the date on which the copy was ready for delivery could be excluded.
9. It is now well settled that the time "requisite" for obtaining copy which can be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act, is the time which is taken between the date of application and the date when the copy is ready. If necessary, reference may be had to West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi v. Aziz Qureshi (3).
10. However, in the present case it is pointed out by the learead counsel for the appellant that notice of the copy being made ready as required by rule 331(1) of the Sind Civil Courts Rules was not posted on the notice board and the appellant came to know of it only on 7-7-1976 when he took its delivery. It is, therefore, submitted the requisite time would include also the time till the appellant had notice or information that the copy was ready. Mr. Qureshi does not deny that rule 331(1) of the Sind Civil Courts Rules was not complied with. The submission of Mr. Saeed finds support from the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi v. Ariz Qureshi: ' but it can be further extended if further delay takes place by reason of the carelessness of the office in giving wrong information to the applicant as to the date on which the copies would be ready, or in giving no information at all."
' Therefore, the time for 30-6-1976 to 7-7-1976 was required to be excluded
(1) AIR 1916 Pat. 317 (2) AIR 1922 Lah. 423
(3) 1973 SCMR 555 ' as being the requisite time. However, even if time up to 7-7-1976 is excluded, the appeal which was filed on 9-7-1976 was still beyond time by one day for the application for the copy was made on the last day of the limitation period and only one day was available after obtaining the copy for filing the appeal.
11. The learned Advocate further submitted that time from 1-6.1976 to 30-6-1976 for which period the District Court remained closed on account B of summer vacation is also to be excluded as no application for copy could be filed or entertained during this period. However, the submission factually As incorrect as the application for copy was in fact filed and entertained on 30-6-1976 the last day of the vacation. Since the copy was delivered on 7th July, 1976 time up to that date could be excluded under subsection (2) . Of section 12 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the appeal in this case, ought to have been filed on 8th July, 1976. Since however, the appeal was filed on 9th July.
1976 it was clearly barred by one day time.
12. With regard to the submission that the time during which the Court was closed should be treated as part of the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order, the learned Advocate for the appellant simply relied upon Debi Charan Ltd and others v. Mehdi Hassan (1). However, the facts of the present case are different from the facts of Patna case. In the present care 29 days out of 30 days which is the period of limitation provided for filing the appeal had already expired when the appellant applied for certified copy of the order on 30-6-1976. Therefore, only one day was available for filing the appeal after obtaining the copy of the order on '1-7-1976. But the appeal was filed on 9-7-1976, therefore it was clearly barred by time. Further, the learned Judges in Patna case have themselves referred to the JaVore Palace Estate v. Andi Ramiah Chetty and others (2) wherein a Division Bench of the Madras High Court declined to hold that vacation was part of the time requisite for obtaining copy of the judgment.
13. I therefore, hold that the appeal was rightly dismissed as time-barred.
14. The above are the reasons for the short order passed on 16-3-1977 by which this appeal was dismissed.
(1) AIR 1916 Pat. 317 (2) (1911) 11 I C 330