' IRSHAD HASAN KHAN, J.---Leave to appeal is sought against the judgment, dated 15-10-1996, passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, in Civil Revision No,426-D of 1996.
2. The brief facts are that the respondents/plaintiffs filed a suit on 13-5-1986 fora declaration to the effect that they were owners in possession of the suit land measuring 43 Kanals and 6 Marlas.
Bearing Khasra No,192, situated in the revenue estate of village Baghsawa, Tehsil Gujjar Khan, District Rawalpindi. The suit was contested by the petitioner/defendants.
3. In view of the pleadings of the parties, issues struck thereon and evidence led by them and after hearing the parties, the trial court vide judgment dated 24-4-1989 decreed the suit. The appeal preferred by the petitioners was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 11-12-1995 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi. The revision petition filed by them was also dismissed in limine vide impugned order dated 15-10-1996. Hence, this petition.
4. Mr. Altaf Elahi Sheikh, learned Additional Advocate-General, Punjab vehemently argued that the notification dated 21-3-1950 issued by the Governor Punjab, whereby he declared under section 30 of the Forest Act, 1927, the land specified in the schedule as closed for the purposes of regeneration for a period of 20 years, does not preclude the concerned authorities from alloting the land in question to any person before the expiry of 20 years period. The same point was urged in the High Court and rightly repelled vide paragraph 6 of the impugned judgment which reads thus:-- "I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel and perused the evidence available on record.
The main document relied upon by the learned counsel is the notification dated 21-3-1950 Exh.D.4, whereby the Governor Punjab was pleased to declare under section 30 of the. Forest Act, 1927 that the land specified in the schedule shall be closed for the purposes of regeneration for a period of 20 years and the rights of the private person in or over the said land shall be suspended during the said period. D.W.2 Ghulam Sarwar admitted in cross-examination that after 1970 the lease regarding the land in question is not extended and he also admitted that the suit land is evacuee.
He showed his ignorance regarding the allotment of the land to Muhammad Ismail. The petitioners have failed to place on record any document showing the cancellation of allotment in favour of Muhammad Ismail. No evidence has been produced in support of the claim of the petitioner that the property in dispute was ever acquired or any compensation was paid to the allottee. It is also evident from the record that property in dispute was allotted to Muhammad Ismail on 23-12-1963 and later on transferred vide mutation No,116 dated 14-7-1964. The subsequent allottee sold the land in question including the other land to Allah Ditta son of Sher Khan, which is evident from mutation No,181 dated 31-5-1973, thereafter the said land was mutated in favour of the legal heirs of Allah Ditta. The entries with regard to the above said mutations are admitted by the petitioners.
Since the petitioners have failed to produce documents showing cancellation of allotment to Muhammad Ismail and also has not placed any order showing acquisition of the land by the department: The claim of the respondents almost stands admitted by the statement of Ghulam Sarwar D.W.2. The findings of the Courts below are based on cogent reasons and call for no interference. The revision petition is dismissed in limine accordingly."
' The learned Additional Advocate General also conceded that cancellation of allotment of Muhammad Ismail was never sought.
5. Furthermore, minutes of the meeting held on 30-10-1968 between the Deputy Secretary (Rural) to the Chief Settlement Commissioner and the officers of the Forest Department, show that an application under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, was filed by the Forest Department, seeking cancellation of the land in dispute. A copy of the said Minutes has been placed on record by the petitioners. The learned Additional Advocate-Gengal was unable to state the ultimate fate of the said application. Probably the said application was also dismissed.
That is why the orders passed therein have not been placed on record in the Courts below.
6. Reference may also be made to paragraph-OV of the aforesaid Minutes of the Meeting, wherein it was stated that:- "It was pointed out by Mr. Khanzada that in some cases land which is with the Forest Department since 1948 and is at the same time in temporary allotment of Displaced persons being verified claims, now when it is having transferred to the Forest Department permanently the temporary allottes will have to abandon the land and seek allotment elsewhere. It may be difficult for them to obtain allotment of land at this late stage of Settlement Operations. To facilitate their allotments against claims elsewhere it was suggested by the Deputy Secretary (Rural) that such claimants may be treated as sitting allottees in the revenue estate in which they seek allotment in the same district. Separate instructions will be issued in this behalf after obtaining the orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner."
7. The concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below are based on proper appraisal of evidence. Learned Additional Advocate-General has not been able to point out any misreading or non-reading of evidence on record. The unreported judgment of this Court in Civil Appeal No,269 of 1983 (Muhammad Yaqub and others v. Punjab Province and others), decided on 27-2-1991, is distinguishable, inasmuch as, the aforesaid judgment relates to allotment made after 1965, whereas in the instant case, the allotment was admittedly made in favour of Muhammad Ismail before the said date. Furthermore, the petitioner therein had not paid the settlement fee prescribed under rule 10 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Rules, 1959. On these basis, it was held that the land was not permanently settled on him and had formed part of the compensation pool, therefore, there was nothing wrong with the cancellation of allotment under section 11.
8. For the foregoing reasons, we find no force in the petition. The impugned order does not suffer from any illegality warranting interference. This petition is, therefore, dismissed and .