1. ' WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J.---This is an appeal of the Provincial Government by right under Article 185(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan. The same arises from the acquisition proceedings.
2. Commenced by issuance of the notification dated 4-4-1984 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the subject matter of the notification being 29 Acres and 15 Marlas of land, situated within the municipal limits of Rajanpur, for putting up a Low Income Housing Scheme. The possession of the land was taken over on 11-3-1985. The Collector, on 23-12-1989, announced his award, determining compensation to the land owners at the rate of Rs,804 per Marla. The landowners, but not all of them, asked for reference to the Court, which enhanced the compensation to Rs,2,500 per Marla. Cross-R.F.As., were taken to the High Court. The High Court over-ruled the preliminary objections that the application seeking reference to the Court was barred by time and that all the landowners not having questioned the award, those who did were precluded from challenging the award. None of these conclusions has been challenged before us in the subject appeal and also in the objections preferred by the landholders; all that is agitated remains confined to the determination of compensation allowed, the appellant-Government asking that the rate in the award be restored and the landowners expressing dissatisfaction both over "Rs,2,500 and Rs,2,000 per Marla, respectively finding favour with the civil Court and the High Court. We have gone through the record. The conclusion of the High Court that the average worked out by Patwari Muhammad Sharif, R. W.1, was not sustainable because the calculator included all kinds of transactions including those pertaining to waste and barren lands is manifestly sound and unexceptionable. The only question is whether the reduction of the rate from Rs,2,500 to Rs,2,000 per Marla, effected by the High Court in appeal, was well-founded and, if not, what should have been the correct basis for determination of the market value of the lands in question. Before such aspect is adverted to, it seems advisable to take up the cross-objections preferred by the aggrieved landowners. The High Court order was pronounced on 12-3-1995 and this appeal was preferred on 8-5-1995.
3. ' The landowners state that they were served with the memo. Of appeal on 26-6-1995, preferring the cross-objections on 25-7-1995, and thus, within the period prescribed for such cross-objections in terms. Of Order 41, Rule 22, C.P.C. Question, however, remains whether such cross-objections at the level of this Court lie and correspondingly what are time and other constraints in such behalf.
4. ' Before the promulgation of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, like Rules of the year 1956 held the field, themselves having earlier displaced the Federal Court Rules, 1950. Pertaining to the applicability of Order XLI, rule 22, C.P.C. With specific reference to joining of respondents, after the expiry of the period envisaged for an appeal, it was observed in Paresh Chandra Baswas and others v. Tapen Kanti Choudhury and others, PLD 1963 SC 598, that Order XLI, rule 22, C.P.C., was not applicable to an appeal before the Supreme Court and the jurisdiction of the Court to implied parties in an appeal was not limited by any technical rule that may be embodied therein, though the general principle, that, the right of a person against whom an appeal has become time-barred should not ordinarily be interfered with, would require consideration.
5. ' Incidentally, Order XLI, rule 22 also provides for cross-objections and with pointed reference to the same, it was said in Pakistan v. Waliullah Sufvani, PLD 1965 SC 310, that the corresponding rules and procedure of the Supreme Court did not permit presentation of cross-objections as in appeals under the Civil Procedure Code. If, therefore, it was intended to call in question any decisions taken in the judgment of the High Court adverse .To a respondent's interest, the proper course' was to move the Supreme Court by way of special leave to, appeal from that judgment. For such petitions, a specific period of limitation was applicable and where necessary condonation as to limitation could be resorted to. As to the pointation from the side of the respondent that in the schedule of the old Rules there was a provision showing that Rs,40 were payable towards court-fee on cross- objections, it was recorded that the respondent could point to no rule which entitled him to put in cross-objections without special leave. In conclusion it was observed that the relevant appeal itself being subject to such leave the same rule applied to the cross-objections, which were in the nature of a cross-appeal.
6. ' Reference, at this stage, may also be made to T.N. Angami v. Revoluei, AIR 1972 SC 42, to which also our attention has been drawn by Mr. Kiyani, representing the respondents landowners. In that case the Supreme Court of India reiterated the rule spelled out in Ramanthai Ashabhai Patel v. Debhi Ajitkumar, AIR 1965 SC 669, to the effect that the Indian Supreme Court had power to decide all the points arising from the judgment appealed against and even in the absence of an express provision, such as Order XLI, rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court could devise appropriate procedure to be adopted at the hearing and there could be no better way of supplying the deficiency than by drawing upon the provisions of a general law like the Code of Civil Procedure and in particular those provisions therein as were found suitable. This Court itself in Province of West Pakistan v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd., 1973 SCM R 367, held that the Court had, in an appeal before it, due power to pass any order that ought to have been passed even though a party in whose favour the order is to be passed had not appealed. It was observed that an ordinary appellate Court possessed such a power by virtue of Order XLI, rule 33, C.P.C., and a similar provision existed in Order XLIX, rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1956 and even apart from that rule, this Court had inherent power to pass any order which in its opinion should have been passed.
7. It may be mentioned here that Order XLIX with all its rules, including rule 6, which spells out inherent powers to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process, has verbatim been reprc luced in Order XXXIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980.
8. Article 185(1) of the Constitution postulates that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from judgments, decrees, final orders or sentences of the High Courts. Such Article has to be read with Article 175(2), which enjoins that no Court shall have any jurisdiction save as is or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law. Apart from other provisions in the Constitution and law, Article 185(2) and (3) regulate this Court's jurisdiction in appeals from judgments, decrees, final orders or sentences of the High Courts. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of clause (2) of Article 185 deal with criminal appeals, whereas paragraphs (d), (e) and (t) of the same clause are addressed to appeals in civil matters. The last mentioned paragraphs pertain to appeals as a matter of right and are confined to matters where jurisdictional value of the judgment, decree or final order appealed against is not less than Rs,50,000 or such other sum as may be specified by an Act of the Parliament and the judgment, decree of final order of the Court appealed from has varied or set aside the judgment, decree or final order of the Court immediately below or, independently of the foregoing, where the High court has certified that the case involves a substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution. If, however, clause (2) of Article 185 does not apply, an appeal in terms of clause (3) thereof lies only where the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal. The Supreme Court Rules, 1980 in Order XII, Part II, are specific to civil appeals in contemplation of Article 185(2)(d)(e) and (0. Rule 5 of Order XII, aforesaid, expressly stipulates that a respondent may, within 30 days of service upon him of a petition of appeal, if he so choose, file in the Court his objections, if any, to the grounds taken by the appellant in the petition of appeal and to the appellant's right to raise in the appeal any question other than those bearing on the question of law to which the certificate relates. Such rule, which has a limited scope and operation, to be precise, is this: "5...Within thirty days of the service on him of the petition of appeal, a respondent may, if he so desires, file in the Court his objections, if any, to the grounds taken by the appellant in his petition of appeal, and to the appellant's right to raise in the appeal any question other than those bearing on the question of law to which the certificate relates . "
9. Ex facie it would appear that in the rules of the Supreme Court, 1980, there is nothing as specific nor as restrictive as rule 22 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, though rule 5 in Order XXXIII of the Rules is, in essence, a reproduction of the broad rule finding place in Order XLI rule 33 of the Code. Rules 22 and 33 of Order XLI, C.P.C. And rule 5, Order XXXIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, run as under:-- "22. Upon hearing, respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred separate appeal.- -(1)
10. Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree on any of the grounds decided against him in the Court below, but take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him Or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow.
11. Form of objection and provisions applicable thereto.- -(2) Such cross-objection shall be in the form of a memorandum, and the provision of rule 1, so far as they relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal, shall apply thereto.
(3) Unless the respondent files with the objection a written acknowledgement from the party who may be affected by such objection or his pleader or having received a copy thereof, the Appellate Court shall cause a copy to be served, as soon as may be after the filing of the objection, on such party or his pleader at the expense of the respondent.
(4) Where, in any case in which any respondent has under this rule filed a memorandum of objection, the original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, the objection so filed may nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the Court thinks fit.
(5) The provision relating to pauper appeals shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to an objection under this rule."
12. "33. Power of Court of Appeal.--The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection: ' Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under section 35-A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order."
13. ORDER XXXIII, SUPREME COURT RULES, 1980.
14. "5. The Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection."
15. It would immediately be noticed that rule 22 of Order XLI, C.P.C., could, at times work as a clog on the generalised power visualised in rule 33 of the same Order. Such power, as per rule 5 (supra), in so far as this Court is concerned, has consciously been saved and left unimpinged by any technical constituents. The position becomes clearer when rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, which immediately follows and which expressly articulates inherent powers of the Court for advancement of the ends of justice and prevention of abuse of the process of Court, is seen in juxtaposition.
16. ' This is so far as the inherent and generalised powers of the Court, as reflected in the Rules and the abovequoted precedents go. Synonymous with such, Article 187(1) of the .Constitution confers a wide jurisdiction on this Court to issue such directions, order, or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it. This is a self-executory provision and is invocable in every case of which the Court is seized provided always that justice of the case warrants its recourse. Article 187(1) is as below:-- "187.(1) Subject to clause (2) of Article 175, the Supreme Court shall have power to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, including an order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person or the discovery or production of any document."
17. Seen in the foregoing perspective, even though there is no specific provision for filing of cross- objections of the kind in contemplation of Order XLI, rule 22,C.P.C. From the side of a respondent, who is served with a petition for leave to appeal or with a petition of appeal, and, in all likelihood, such cross-objections, at the level of this Court, should either be in the form of a petition for leave to appeal or a memo. Of appeal, there is nothing to preclude either in the Constitution or law .To treat such purported cross-objections, if any, as a petition for leave to appeal or as a petition of appeal, in either of which cases the normal rules as to limitation should apply, condonation being extended wherever a just or sufficient cause is shown. As pointed out by Mr. Kiyani, in Muhammad Nawaz v. Hussain Shah, 1990 SCM R 1621, a petition for leave, in essence being a direct appeal, was treated as such and condonation, in the circumstances, allowed. Likewise, in Abdur Rauf Khan v.
18. Land Acquisition Collector, 1992 SCM R 1181, it was ruled that their Lordships had discretion to treat a petition for leave to appeal as an appeal under Article 185(2) of the Constitution. All this is in consonance with the principle that, in appropriate cases, a Court, unless prohibited by law, is ordinarily competent to treat one set of proceedings as another.
19. None of this, however, detracts either from the inherent powers or the constitutionally recognized jurisdiction under Article 187(1) of the Constitution, vesting in this Court, from doing complete justice in a case pending before it. In such behalf even where a respondent has neither preferred a petition for leave nor resorted to an appeal, the Court has ample authority and full power to extend relief to him provided that such is necessary either to do complete justice between the parties or the case otherwise involves invocation of the Court's inherent powers. In so doing, however, the party likely to be affected adversely, would be entitled to be heard and place its own point of view as regards the order proposed to be, thus passed.
20. In the circumstances of this case, it is obvious that if an appeal lay, as a matter of right for the benefit of the Provincial Government under Article 185(2)(d), so did not lie for a recourse by the respondents/landholders. It was under a misconception, probably generated by rule 1 of Order XLII, C.P.C., prescribing the rules of Order XLI, C.P.C. To appeals from appellate decrees, that, instead of an appeal, cross-objections, apparently, in line with Order XLI, rule 22 were preferred and, so far as they went, such were preferred within time but only if that provision was attracted to the case.
21. Because it emerged that if the cross-objections were to be deemed an appeal, such would be barred by time, a case for condonation comes up. For like reasons, as found favour with this Court in Waliullah Sufyani's case, above we have felt inclined to condone the delay, explainable on the above plane and treat the same as a regular cross appeal.
22. ' Having said as much, it arises for consideration as to whether the High Court was right in reducing the rate of compensation from Rs,2,500, allowed to the respondent, to Rs,2,000 per Marla. In coming to such conclusion the High Court seems to have been impressed, and probatly unduly, by the fact that another piece of land situates on the same (Aqilpur) road acquired for the District Complex, near about the same time when the disputed land was acquired, was assessed at Rs,2,000 per Marla, which assessm ent was maintained both by the High Court and in this Court. It seems to us that a yardstick of another acquisition could not be applied to the present case, without examination all the attending circumstances and analogies applicable to the instant acquisition.
23. Even such reduced compensation was not acceptable to Mr. Altaf Elahi Sheikh, Additional Advocate-General Punjab, who represents the appellant-Provincial Government. It needs, however, to be observed that evidence in the case showed the referred contemporaneous acquisition for the District Complex to have taken place some two years before the acquisition in question. Such land, besides, was stated to have been barren with no drinkacle water on it. In addition, the same situated at a distance of 2 kilometres from the land in the current acquisition. Even Mr. Kiyani has not contended that the acquired land was not situated within the limits of the Municipal Committee Rajanpur or that industrial, commercial and residential areas were not in the vicinity or that the disputed land did not have like potential, all such aspects being relevant to the evaluation.
24. These and many others were circumstances, which do not appear to have been adequately adverted to. There is, in addition, other material on record, which shows the acquired land to have been more valuable than in the precedent acquisition. No recourse was had to the same in the High Court. A crucial document in this behalf is on the record (Exh.A.12) under the title "Approved Yardstick for Assessm ent and Collection ofOf Capital Gains Tax In Rajanpur Area". Such pertains to the year 1984 and the applicable rate shown at Serial No,4 (Railway Station to Aqilpur Road) is reflected as from Rs,2,500 to Rs,5,000. Examining the document with other evidence on the record, it seems to us that the appropriate rate per Marla, 91 Kanals having remained in dispute, which ought to have been allowed, was around Rs,3,000 per Marla. To such extent, we revise and modify the rate allowed by the Court of first instance and in appeal. However, it lies within our discretion to accord or not to accord interest, as regards the difference between the rates in terms of section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. We, correspondingly, exercise that discretion by declining to allow such interest though, at the same time, saving the solatium at the rate of 15% on account of compulsory acquisition under section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act.
25. ' In the above terms, the titled appeal is dismissed and appeal of the respondent is allowed, the last subject to payment of court-fee within 6 weeks. However, there would be no order as to costs.