' SHAH JEHAN KHAN, J.---By this single judgment both the appeals, i,e, Regular First Appeal No,1 of 1992 and Regular First Appeal No,8 of 1992, arising from the same Award are disposed of together.
2. Facts of the case are that an area measuring 1456 acres, 5 Kanals and 17 Marlas situated in Dhap Chapak, Tehsil and District D.I. Khan, was acquired for the construction of Dera-Darya Khan Bridge Project (Jheel Area Sharqi) at the public expenses and for the public purpose. A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 8-3-1979. There was no objection from the affected landowners with regard to acquisition. The acquisition was confirmed under section 6 of the Act ibid issued on 12-7-1984 by the Commissioner, D.I.Khan Division, D.I.Khan. Notices under sections 9 and 10 of the Act (ibid) were issued to interested landowners on 11-10-1984 to attend the Court of Collector on 28-10-1984. The Project Director and Patwari Halqa along with record were also issued notices to participate in the proceedings. The land owners so appeared in the proceedings demanded compensation at the rate of Rs,1,000 per Kanal for the Sailabi area and Rs,11895.20 per Kanal for Nalchahi area. After conducting a probe in the matter, the Collector, Land Acquisition in his Award dated 18-11-1984 determined the compensation for Nalchahi type of land as Rs,6,000 per Kanal and for the Sailabi type of land Rs,400 per Kanal. The Project Director, Dera Darya Khan Bridge filed an objection petition to the effect that that an area of 275 Kanals, 3 Marlas has wrongly been described as 'Nalchahi' and it was alleged that at the time of Notification under section 4, there was no Nalchahi land. The objection petition was sent for disposal to the Court of District Judge, D.I.Khan under section 12 of the Act (ibid). The case was ultimately entrusted to Senior Civil Judge, D.I.Khan for disposal. The learned Senior Civil Judge, D.I. Khan recorded the evidence of the contending parties and at the conclusion, he dismissed the objection petition filed by the Project Director, Dera-Darya Khan Bridge, vide his Order dated 14-9-1991. The Project Director without joining Collector, Land Acquisition or Provincial Government or making them respondents, has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under section 54 of the Act (ibid). The appeal was filed on 9-1-1992. There is no period provided for filing of an appeal under section 54 of the Act (ibid).
However, under Article 156 of the Limitation Act the period of 90 days has been provided for an appeal to the High Court under C.P.C., 1908 except for cases covered by sections 151 and 153 of the Limitation Act. The period has to run from the date of decree. Since the appeal was filed beyond 90 days, therefore, the petitioner also moved Civil Miscellaneous No,2 of 1994 for condonation of delay on the sole ground of lengthy correspondence for seeking sanction from the Provincial Government. The instant appeal can only be decided on merits if the delay caused in filing appeal is condoned.
2-A. In these state of affairs the learned counsel argued that the decree was passed on 14-9-1991 and application for obtaining a copy of the same was submitted on 26-9-1991. The copy was duly supplied on 6-10-1991. On the calculation it was found that appeal was filed after 105 days of the decree excluding the days spent in getting the copy of decree. Thus, the appeal was prima facie barred by 15 days. The reason given for condonation of delay as stated earlier is that due to lengthy correspondence for seeking sanction of the Provincial Government, the appeal could not be filed within time. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the case "Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab v. Makhdoom Syed Nazar Hussain Shah and others reported in 1975 SCM R 352 and another case titled "Deputy Collector Customs v. Muhammad Tahir" reported in PLD 1984 SC 627 and maintained that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have condoned the delay caused due to carelessness of the Government officials. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for condonation of delay if reasonable grounds are shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring appeal within the stipulated period. The cause mentioned by the appellant/applicant does not seem to be well- founded. In the instant case sanction was granted by the Provincial Government on 27-11-1991 much earlier than filing of the instant appeal and within the stipulated period fixed for appeal. Thus, the reason given for condonation is not well-founded, satisfactory and legal. The judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner are in different circumstances and on different footings. In both the cited judgments the delay caused by the carelessness of the State officials was condoned for the reason that the officials held liable for negligence and carelessness were proceeded departmentally but in the instant case the sanction was duly granted before the expiry of period of limitation and no action or proceedings have been taken against the defaulting officials. It was observed in case "Government of Balochistan v. Abdul Nabi" reported in 1988 SCM R 1906 that under the law each day of limitation must properly and satisfactorily be explained and the excuse that the matter got delayed because of its having remained under examination at differential levels is never a valid ground for extension of period of limitation and does not constitute a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. It was observed that the Government departments so organize their business that legal cases are not unnecessarily delayed and are instituted in Court within the time limit for such matters. It was observed in case "Commissioner of Income Tax v. Raees Pir Ahmad Khan reported in 1981 SCM R 37 that: "Government cannot claim to be treated in any manner differently from an ordinary litigant. In fact the Government enjoys unusual facilities for the preparation and conduct of their cases and its resources are much larger than those possessed by ordinary litigants. If in spite of these facilities, the Government cannot comply with the requirements of law of limitation then it is for it to take steps to have that law changed."
' Reliance was placed on the dictum laid down in 1970 SCM R 558, 1979 SCM R 45 and 1979 SCM R 191.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner while calculating the period of limitation laid stress upon the point that High Court was not functioning due to winter holidays commenced from 24th December, 1991 to 8th January 1992 and this period has to be excluded. The learned counsel misconceived the law and the facts. In fact the winter holidays were scheduled from 24th December, 1991 to 1st January, 1992 and the office had to be opened on 2nd January, 1992 for institution purpose etc. However, the Court work commenced from 9th January, 1992. The period of limitation prescribed for filing of an appeal had expired before commencing of winter holidays.
However, even if the expiry date occurs in the Winter Holidays, the appellant should have instituted the appeal on the opening of the High Court on 2-1-1992.
4. Since the appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and no cogent reasons have been given for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act and the appeal is going to be disposed of on this short ground. The Civil Miscellaneous No,54 of 1994 for transposition of respondents 202 and 203 as appellants and Civil Miscellaneous No,12 of 1994 for substitution of Executive Engineer, Highway Division C&W Department, D.I.Khan for Project Director, Dera Darya Khan Bridge Project, D.I. Khan as appellant, filed after two years, are also dismissed being without any substance.
5. For the reasons noted above the instant appeal is dismissed being time-barred and without any force, with no order as to costs.
6. Now we take up Regular First Appeal No,8 of 1992 which also arises from the same award (impugned in Regular First Appeal No,1 of 1992). The appellants feeling dissatisfied with the Award preferred an objection petition that their land has wrongly been classified as 'Sailaba' instead of Nalchahi'. It was also objected that the compensation for the Nalchahi land has wrongly been worked out by the Revenue Officials, and it was far below than the prevailing market rates in the vicinity. The objector waived of all their latter objections and only objected to the classification of their land as 'Sailaba' as evident from the impugned order. Even before us the learned counsel restricted his arguments to the classification of land only. In order to substantiate his arguments he took us to the Award wherein the disputed Khasra Nos. Owned by the appellants have been described as Nalchahi and some parts of these Khasra Nos. Were described as Sailaba. It is an admitted fact that the land acquired is situated near the River Indus and the disputed Khasra Nos.
Were then partly Nalchahi and partly Sailaba on the basis of Revenue Record available at the time of Notification under section 4 of the Act (ibid). The learned Counsel for the petitioners referred to Khasra Girdawari Exh. P.W.1/D2 for Rabi 1981 and submitted that the same has been shown as Nalchahi. The learned counsel was confronted with Exh.P.W.1/1 Jamabandi for the year 1979-80 wherein the disputed Khasra Nos. Have been shown as Banjar Qadeem and Sailaba. Under section 23 of the Act ibid, for determining the "Yaksala Ausati" is to be prepared on the basis of one year average of the preceding year. The subsequent change has no bearing on the determination of compensation. Section 23 of the Act ibid envisages that for determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under the Act (ibid), the Court shall take into consideration the market value of the lands on the date of Notification under section 4 of the Act ibid as observed in "Land Acquisition Collector v. Muhammad Iqbal" reported in 1992 SCM R 1245(C), the Court cannot take into consideration the improvement or subsequent change. The learned counsel for the appellants could not point out any evidence to show that their lands were Nalchahi on the date of Notification under section 4 of the Act (ibid).
7. This appeal (Regular First Appeal No,8 of 1992) being devoid of any force is also dismissed with no order as to costs.
8. In the result both the Regular First Appeals along with Civil Miscellaneous are dismissed, with no order as to costs.