MAMOON KAZI, J.---This appeal, by leave of this Court, calls into question the judgment of the High Court of Sindh dated 25-10-1993, dismissing Constitutional Petition No, D-1380 of 1992 filed by the appellants before the said Court.
2. The facts of the case which are already set out in the leave granting order of this Court are reproduced as under:-- Respondent No, 2 was the Director, Customer Services of the appellant. His services were terminated on 11-1-1981 with immediate effect as his services were no more required by the Corporation. On 20-5-1989 the Government of Pakistan by its notification constituted a Review Board for the purpose of revising the cases of employees of industrial and commercial establishments set up, managed or controlled by the Government, who were removed or dismissed from employment under a Martial Law Regulation or as a result of conviction by a Summary Military Court or otherwise purely on political grounds as the case may be. The Review Board consisted of three persons including a representative of the Administrative Ministry responsible for the administration of the establishment to which the employee belongs. The Review Board was authorised to take up review of cases after inviting applications from the affected persons and make its recommendations after examining available records and affording to the applicant an opportunity of being heard. The affected employees were required to submit a review petition before the Board by 31-5-1989. On 31-5-1989 respondent No,2 made an application to the Board praying that termination of his service dated 11-1-1981 may be declared as nullity in law and he may be reinstated with effect from the date of termination with all back benefits. After hearing both the parties, the Review Board verbally announced its decision recommending to the Federal Government to give retirement benefits to respondent No,2. It is an admitted position that decision in writing of the Board was not made available. On 5-11-1990 respondent No,2 submitted an application for settlement of his claim in view of the recommendation made by the Board. As there was no response from the petitioner, in September, 1991 respondent No,2 made a complaint against the/appellant to the Wafaqi Mohtasib, respondent No,1, praying that the decision of the Board dated 28-9-1989 be implemented by the petitioner. The petitioner filed objections, inter alia, challenging the jurisdiction of respondent No,1 and further that the case of respondent No,2 being a normal one, having been determined on 11-1-1981 by the competent authority, the same could not be reviewed by the Board, and that the compensation and back benefits could not be allowed in view of the management policy of the petitioner. After hearing the parties respondent No,1 passed an order on 30-4-1992, operative part of which reads as follows:-- For the view, I have taken in the matter while accepting the complaint of the complainant I hold that the Review Board vide its findings dated 28-9-1989 did in fact recall the retirement order of the complainant and made direction that full back benefits shall be paid to the complainant from the date of retirement including retirement benefits till the day the order was made by the Review Board. I, therefore, direct Chairman PIAC, Karachi and Ministry of Defence (Aviation Division) that the petitioner may be given all benefits by virtue of the order/finding in his favour from the date of illegal termination till the order is made. The Agency complained against shall also pay an amount of Rs,3,000 as compensation to the complainant for injustice done to him through gross maladministration on its part. I also recommend that an inquiry may be launched with regard to the non-availability of file with immediate effect. The result may be conveyed to me within one month from the date of issue of this finding.
3. The appellant challenged the order of the respondent No,1 before the High Court of Sindh through a Constitutional petition but the petition was dismissed, vide judgment dated 25-10-1993. The learned Judges of the High Court were firstly of the view that the appellant had not availed the remedy against the order of the respondent No,1 as provided in Article 32 of P.O. No. 1 of 1983 and secondly, that the appellant had failed to challenge the vires of the said notification dated 20-5- 1989 but instead it submitted to the jurisdiction of the Review Board. The order of the Review Board, though oral, had been made in presence of the parties, therefore, it could take effect. Further, according to the learned Judges the appellant was also unable to show that the respondent No,1 lacked jurisdiction in the matter. Therefore the petition was dismissed by them, as just pointed out.
4. Leave was granted by this Court to consider the various questions A involved in this case which on first impression appeared to be of general legal importance.
5. Mr. Umar Atta Bindial, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that relationship between the appellant and the respondent No,2 was purely governed by the law of master and servant and that the respondent No,1 had no jurisdiction under Article 9 of the President's Order No,1 of 1983 to entertain the complaint for investigation from the respondent No,2 as the matter between the appellant and respondent No,2 relates to "agency" and it was a case of the latter's personal grievance relating to his services therein. It has been further contended that the Review Board had also no jurisdiction in the matter as no case of termination on political grounds had been made out. In any case, according to the learned counsel, as no recommendation to the Federal Government was made by the Review Board in the case of the respondent No,2 there was nothing before the respondent No,1 which could be given effect to.
6. The notification, dated 20-5-1989, whereby the Review Board was constituted reads as follows:-- GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN MINISTRY OF LABOUR, MANPOWER AND OVERSEAS PAKISTANIS (LABOUR DIVISION)
Islamabad, the 20th May, 1988.
NOTIFICATION
1. No, DR. 17(6)188.---The President has been pleased to constitute a Review Board for the purpose of revising the cases of employees of industrial and commercial establishments set up, managed or 'controlled by. Government who were removed or dismissed from employment under a Martial Law Regulation or as a result of conviction by a Summary Military Court or otherwise purely on political grounds, as the case may be.
2. The Review Board shall comprise the following:
(1) Chairman, National Industrial Relations Commission Chairman
(2) Syed Rizwan Hussain, Central Labour Adviser, Labour Division Member
(3) A representative of the Administrative Ministry responsiblef for the administration of the establishment to which the employee belongs. Member
3. The Review Board shall take up review of cases after inviting applications from the affected persons and make its recommendations after examining the available record and affording to the applicants an opportunity of being heard.
4. Any employee of an industrial or commercial establishment referred to in the first paragraph of this notification who was removed or dismissed from employment under a Martial Law Regulation or as a result of conviction by a Summary Military Court or otherwise purely on political grounds, as the case may be may submit a review petition to Review Board by the 31st May, 1989.
5. The National Industrial Relations Commission shall be responsible for all administrative and financial matters relating to the Review Board.
(FAZAL KARIM KHAN), Deputy Secretary.
7. No doubt, as is evident from the preamble of the notification, the Review Board was constituted for the purpose of revising cases of employees of industrial and commercial establishments set up, managed or controlled by Government, who were removed or dismissed from employment and the appellant is one of such establishments referred to in the said Notification, but as is further indicated by the preamble, such removal or dismissal from employment must have taken place under a Martial Law Regulation or as a result of conviction by a Summary Military Court or otherwise purely on political grounds, as the case may be. Admittedly, services of the respondent No,2 had neither been terminated under a Martial Law Regulation nor as a result of conviction by a Summary Military Court. So far as the question whether services of the said respondent had been terminated purely on political grounds is concerned, it has been pointed out that neither such ground can be spelt out from the letter whereby the respondent's services had been terminated nor it was the case of the respondent at any time before he had approached the Review Board that his services had been terminated on such ground. Even in his application to the Review Board, no such allegations were made by the respondent from which such a ground could be clearly spelt out. However, notwithstanding the same, the Review Board entertained the respondent's application. The case was heard on the 23rd September and the 28th September, 1989 and at the conclusion of the hearing, verbal announcement is said to have been made in favour of the said respondent indicating that a recommendation would be made to the Federal Government. It is further said to have been observed by the Review Board that although, the respondent would not be reinstated in service but he would be paid full retirement benefits up to the date of the decision.
It is interesting to note that the decision of the Review Board was not reduced to writing neither any such recommendations were forwarded by the Review Board to the Government. The notification dated the 25th May, 1989 clearly indicates that the Review Board had only been authorised to take up review of cases after inviting applications from the affected persons and make recommendations after examining the available record and affording to the applicants an opportunity of being heard. Such recommendations were to be forwarded to the Government and thereafter, the same were to be implemented. The circumstances of the case, therefore, clearly indicate that, in the first instance, the Review Board clearly acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the application made by the respondent No,2 and in the second place, there was no recommendation made by he former to the Federal Government in accordance with the said notification dated 25-5-1989.
8. Be that as it may, but, as was pointed out earlier, the respondent No,2 after waiting for some time filed a complaint before the Wafaqi Mohtasib (respondent No,1), seeking implementation of the decision of the Review Board, dated 28-9-1989. The appellant filed various objections including those relating to the jurisdiction of the respondent No,1 under Article 9 of P.O. No,1/83 and the jurisdiction of the Review Board nevertheless, the complaint was entertained by the respondent No,1. The jurisdiction of the said respondent is confined to matters as enumerated in Article 9 of P.O.
No,1/83. The said Article provides as under:-
9. Jurisdiction, functions and powers of the Mohtasib.---(1) The Mohtasib may on a complaint by an aggrieved person, on a reference by the President, the Federal Council or the National Assembly, as the case may be, or on a motion of the Supreme Court or a High Court made during the course of any proceedings before it or of his own motion, undertake any investigation into any allegation of maladministration on the part of any Agency or any of its officers or employees: Provided that the Mohtasib shall not have any jurisdiction to investigate or inquire into any matters which--
(a) are sub judice before a Court of competent jurisdiction or Judicial Tribunal or Board in Pakistan on the date of the receipt of a complaint, reference or motion by him; or
(b) relate to the external affairs of Pakistan or the relations or dealings of Pakistan with any foreign State or Government; or
(c) relate to, or are connected with, the defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, the military, naval and air forces of Pakistan, or the matters covered by the laws relating to those forces.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1), the Mohtasib shall not accept for investigation any complaint by or on behalf of a public servant or functionary concerning any matter relating to the Agency in which he is, or has been, working in respect of any personal grievance relating to his service therein.
(3) For carrying out the objectives of this Order and, in particular for ascertaining the root causes of corrupt practices and injustice, the Mohtasib may arrange for studies to be made or research to be conducted and may recommend appropriate steps for their eradication.
(4) The Mohtasib may set up regional offices as, when and where required."
9. Our attention has been invited by Mr. Umar Atta Bandial to Clause (2) of Article 9, which clearly indicates that the jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib is expressly excluded, in case of personal grievance of a public servant or a functionary serving in any "Agency" in respect of matters relating to his service therein. The term "Agency" has been defined by Article 2(1) in the said Order to mean " a Ministry, Division, Department, Commission or Office of the Federal Government or a statutory corporation or other institution established or controlled by the Federal Government". As the appellant-Corporation is a statutory corporation and is controlled by the Federal Government, it clearly falls within the purview of the term 'agency'. 'Therefore, the jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib is clearly barred by Clause (2) of Article 9 of the said Order. This question was considered by the learned Judges of the High Court, but a distinction was drawn between cases which may be accepted by the Wafaqi Mohtasib for investigation and another category of cases which may only be accepted for consideration. Although no such distinction appears to have been made by Article 9, but reference has been made by the learned Judges to Article 11 of the said Order which provides for the procedure to be followed by the Wafaqi Mohtasib after receiving a complaint for investigation. As the bar provided for in Clause (2) of Article 9 relates to a certain category of cases which may be accepted by the Wagaqi Mohtasib for investigation, it was concluded by the learned Judges, that matters which did not require investigation by the former, were excluded from the purview of Clause (2) of Article 9. The findings arrived at by the learned Judges appear to be erroneous on the face thereof.
A plain reading of Article 9 indicates that barring matters referred to in the proviso to Clause (1) in the said Article, the Mohtasib has been empowered to undertake any investigation into any allegation of maladministration on the part of any ' ' Agency" or any of its officers or employees.
Clause (2) in the said E Article, however, bars the jurisdiction of the Mohtasib to accept any matter for investigation relating to the " Agency" if a complaint has been made by its functionary in respect of a personal grievance relating to his service therein. The said clause being a nonobstante clause stands on a higher pedestal than clause (1). The legislative intent is, therefore, clear that, the matters referred to in clause (2) have been excluded from the jurisdiction of the Mohtasib. Article 11 of P.O. 1 of 1983 only relates to procedure and it cannot be construed in a manner so as to nullify the clear and unambiguous provisions of Article 9(2), which specifically deal with matters relating to jurisdiction and powers of the Mohtasib. It is an elementary rule of construction that words , which are plain and unambiguous are to be expounded in their natural and r ordinary sense. Therefore, the learned Judges of the High Court were clearly in error while holding that the complaint of respondent No,2 before the Mohtasib was competent. See National Bank of Pakistan v. Wafaqi Mohtasib PLD 1992 Kar. 339.
10. It is, therefore, evident that although the Review Board, in the first instance, acted without jurisdiction by entertaining the application by the respondent No. 2, but the Review Board decided not to make a written recommendation to the Government. A final decision in the matter was to be taken by the Federal Government on the recommendation of the Review Board as pointed out earlier, but evidently no decision in favour of the respondent No. 2 was taken by the Federal Government. In fact, it has been pointed out that the matter was referred to the Federal Government by the appellant which also took decision that the Review Board had no jurisdiction in the matter. The order passed by the Wafaqi Mohtasib dated 30-4-1992, therefore, suffered from infirmities as firstly, he had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of respondent No,2 for investigation and even on merits, the respondent had no case as there was no recommendation in writing by the Review Board, as required by the said notification dated 25-5-1989, which he sought to be implemented. The question of any maladministration on the part of the appellant also did not arise since admittedly, the Federal Government had not taken any action on the basis of the oral order of the Review Board which had itself not been communicated to it in the form of a recommendation. The said respondent therefore, had no legal right to seek redress from the respondent No,
1. Consequently, the order passed by the respondent No,1 was clearly without jurisdiction and of no legal effect. In view of such circumstances, the learned judges of the High Court appear to be clearly in error while upholding the decision of the respondent No, 1.
11. As to the question, whether the Constitutional petition filed by the appellant before the High Court was competent, it may be pointed out that the learned Judges of the High Court have first referred to Article 32 of P.Q.1 of 1983 which provides for a representation to the President in respect of an order passed by the Mohtasib. Reference was also made to Article 29 in the said Order, which bars the jurisdiction of the Courts in this regard. They then went on to hold that since the petition filed by the respondent No,2 before the Mohtasib was competent, no interference with the same in the exercise of the Constitutional jurisdiction was warranted. It may however, be pointed out that, now it is well established that any order passed by the Mohtasib can be interfered with under Acticle 199 of the Constitution if it suffers from lack of jurisdiction. In fact, the learned Judges of the High Court have themselves referred to the case of International Cargo Handling Company (Pvt.)
Ltd. v. Port Bin Qasim Authority (PLD 1992 Kar. 65) wherein it was held: ' No doubt, the jurisdiction of Courts is barred, inter alia, in respect of any decision or order made including order of injunction or stay, by the Mohtasib but where the order from the face of it is repugnant to law under which it was made or suffers from want of jurisdiction, a Court may invoke its inherent jurisdiction vested in it under law so as to prevent injustice done to an aggrieved person."
There can be no cavil with the above observations. Having already held that the said order of the Mohtasib is without jurisdiction, the same could, therefore, be interfered with by the High Court. The learned Judges, therefore, erroneously declined to set aside the said order.
12. In the end, it was pointed out by Mr. Umer Atta Bandial that, the respondent No,2 after termination of his services had been employed in different senior positions in Dubai, carrying a handsome salary far in excess of what he would have been paid by the appellant. Therefore, there was no justification for claiming a sum of about Rs,40 lacs for the said period. This factual position has not been denied either by the said respondent or his learned counsel during the course of arguments.
13. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. However, in view of the questions raised, the parties are left to bear their own costs.