' MUHAM/viAD ZAMAN QURESHI (CHAIRMAN).---The National Bank of Pakistan has filed this appeal against the order of the Single Bench of N.I.R.C. Dated 17-5-1995 accepting the petition filed by Mian Iftikhar Ahmad and holding that the dismissal or the resignation of the petitioner was obtained as an unfair labour practice and because of his political affiliation with the Pakistan Peoples Party.
2. The learned Counsel for the appellant in support of the appeal vehemently contended that the respondent through application dated 21-9-1978 applied for grant of leave from 25-9-1978 to 30- 11-1978 which was refused and the respondent was informed through letter dated 16-10-1978 to join duty. He failed to join. Again a notice was given to him through a notice in daily Imroze, Multan which was published on 4-12-1978 to resume duty within 7 days. Instead of joining duty the respondent tendered a back dated resignation bearing dated 1-10-1978 received through post on 14-12-1978 which was accepted on 12-3-1979. The respondent thereafter joined as Manager in the Express Commercial Finance International Limited Bahawalnagar and worked there for some time: Then he joined PASSCO on 14-5-1980 and was dismissed therefrom on 16-8-1982. He contested the general election but lost. The bank filed a Civil Suit for recovery of loan which was decreed. The respondent made an application that his accounts including provident funds be adjusted towards the outstanding advances. As such the matter became past and closed transaction.
3. The learned Counsel further argued that after about 15 years of the acceptance of resignation, the respondent filed a review petition before the Chairman, N.I.R.C. Praying for reinstatement wherein it was alleged that he was a trade unionist and General Secretary of National Bank of Pakistan Employees Union C.B.A., Main Branch, Bahawalnagar and have been taking active part in politics as P.P.P. Worker, which was accepted vide impugned order. The petition filed before the N.I.R.C. Was highly belated and suffered from serious laches. The Single Bench erred in condoning the delay without sufficient cause. It was further added that wither any particular act of unfair labour practice was mentioned in the petition by the respondent nor was proved through evidence and as such them. N.I.R.C. Lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate in the matter. In any case he added, political affiliation could not be treated as an unfair labor practice within the meaning of section 15 of the I.R.O., 1969. It was also urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the respondent himself tendered the resignation which was accepted. In fact the respondent joined the other employer thereafter and was dismissed from PASSCO. He also contested the general elections. His removal from the bank service had thus become a past and closed transaction. It was further mentioned during the arguments that the Single Bench did not record any evidence and decided the case on mere presumptions and conjectures. Lastly; it was added that a terminated employee did not fall within the definition of workman.
4. The learned Counsel for the respondent in reply contended that the appeal stood abated in view of insertion of section 2-A in the Federal Services Tribunal Act, 1973. Further, the appellant had filed an appeal before the Federal Services Tribunal wherein it was stated that the appeal before the Full Bench, N.I.R.C. Had abated. That appeal was dismissed by the Federal Services Tribunal on the ground that the amendment was not retrospective. As such the present appeal became dead under section 6 of the Federal Services Tribunal Act, 1973. It was next contended that the then Chairman, N.I.R.C. Decided the case as a Review Board, and therefore, no appeal against his order was competent. The next contention made was that the Chairman, N.I.R.C. Through a letter was authorised to act singly as Review Board in order to accomplish the pending review cases. Further, he submitted that the Review Petition was decided by the ex-Chairman, therefore, the present incumbent of the office of the Chairman could not sit in the Full Bench. And hear the appeal.
Moreover, the then Chairman had heard the review petition as a persona designate because under the law such power could be conferred to the Commission and against that order no appeal was competent. It was next contended that the letters sent to the respondent were not delivered to him.
It was also not known in which paper the notice was published. The respondent sent resignation through registered postdated 14-12-1978 which was accepted on 12-3-1979, effective from the retrospective date which was in fact obtained by force due to Martial Law. It was further stated by the learned counsel that no limitation was provided for filing a petition before the N.I.R.C. Under section 22-A (8)(g) of the I.R.O., 1969. The respondent was a trade unionist, and therefore, he was victimized. In fact, the Martial Law Authorities had got him terminated from PASSCO, but the employment of the respondent would not affect the present case as the respondent was reinstated without back benefits.
5. The learned Counsel for the appellant repelled the arguments by further stating that the Chairman, N.I.R.C. Singly could not act as the Review Board, which, according to Notification issued by the President of Pakistan consisted of three members and it was wrongly stated by the Counsel for the respondent that the Chairman, N.I.R.C. Alone was authorized to act as Review Board and decided the cases. He further added that no review petition filed by the respondent was pending with the Review Board which could be heard by the Chairman as stated by the learned Counsel. In fact the petition was filed under a wrong heading although it was decided on the basis of unfair labour practice in exercise of the powers under section 22-A(8)(g) of the I.R.O., 1969. He referred to para. (1) of the judgment and added that the Single Bench in the impugned judgment had held that the resignation was obtained as an unfair labour practice. As such the Chairman had accepted the petition on the basis of unfair labour practice sitting as Single Bench and the Full Bench as constituted was competent to hear the appeal.
6. We have considered the arguments thoroughly and have gone through the record and have also read the impugned order. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner proceeded on leave without prior sanction and thereafter, tendered his resignation, which was accepted. He did not challenge that order and rather first joined as Manager in the Express Commercial Finance International, Bahawalnagar where he served for some time. Then he joined PASSCO on 14-5-1980 from where he was dismissed on 16-8-1982. He then contested the general election on P.P.P. Ticket in 1988. After the acceptance of the resignation a suit was also filed by the Bank for recovery of advances and the respondent made an application in writing that the same be adjusted from his Provident Funds etc. Thus, the matter had become a past and closed transaction.
7. According to Notification dated 20-5-1989, issued by the President of Pakistan, the Review Board consisting of Chairman, N.I.R.C. And two other Members was constituted to review the cases of those employees who were dismissed or terminated on account of Political victimization. The Review petitions could be filed before the Review Board up to 31st May, 1989. The respondent filed the petition for reinstatement before the Chairman, N.I.R.C., Lahore on 13-10-1994 which was certainly not competent. The plea raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that the petition was decided by the Chairman as the Review Board is, therefore, not correct, firstly because no petition was pending before the Review Board which was decided by the Chairman and secondly because no authority vested in the Chairman to act alone as Review Board. There is no letter on record authorizing the Chairman to act singly as Review Board. The respondent in his petition himself took up a plea that he was an active trade unionist and was General Secretary, National Bank of Pakistan Employees Union, C.B.A., Main Branch, Bahawalnagar and he also took active part in politics and was member of P.P.P. Similarly, in para. 5 of the impugned judgment, the Single Bench of the Commission held that the dismissal or resignation of the petitioner was obtained as an unfair labour practice and because of his political affiliation with P.P.P. Thus, it is clear that the petition was treated as an application under section 22-A(8)(g) of the I.R.O., 1969 and decided as such against which the present appeal is competent.
8. The decision was given by the Chairman as .Single Bench of this Commission and not as a persona designata and the preliminary objection taken by the learned Counsel for the respondent is not correct.
9. The plea raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the present appeal stood abated in view of insertion of section 2-A in the Federal Services Tribunal Act, 1973 is self-destructive because the Federal Services Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that the amendment was not retrospective. After dismissal of the appeal of the Federal Services Tribunal against the decision of Single Bench of N.I.R.C. How the present appeal could become dead. Under section 22-D of the I.R.O., 1969 an appeal against the decision of Single Bench was competent only before the Full Bench of this Commission.
10. It is clearly mentioned in the petition by the respondent that his resignation was accepted on 12- 3-1979. He joined as Project Inspector PASSCO on 24-5-1980 and was dismissed from service on 16- 8-1982. He filed the petition before the N.I.R.C. On 13-10-1994 after about 15 years. The petition was, therefore, highly belated and suffered from serious laches. The Single Bench condoned the limitation period while accepting the petition without sufficient cause and without taking into consideration the two important factors that the resignation after acceptance was acquiesced by the respondent and he joined as Manager Express Commercial Finance International for some time and then PASSCO where he worked for about two years and was dismissed. Thereafter, the present petition was filed. Hence there was no sufficient cause, in the above circumstances, to condone the delay. The impugned order is therefore erroneous in the eyes of law.
11. Besides the above, the Single Bench failed to notice that the respondent joined service in PASSCO and he was dismissed from there. He did not challenge that order in any forum. That order had, therefore, attained finality. By no stretch of imagination a dismissed employee could be re-trusted upon the Bank.
12. We are also in agreement with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent after proceeding on leave tendered anti-dated resignation. That was accepted on 12-3-1979. Thus, the respondent was not removed from employment because of his lawful trade union activities constituting unfair labour practice or on account of political reasons. The findings of the Single Bench are not maintainable.
13. For the reasons discussed above, we are inclined to accept the appeal and set aside the impugned order dated 17-5-1995 recorded by the B Single Bench of this Commission, with no order as to costs.