1. ' This appeal has been filed by the tenant who was ordered to vacate the premises and hand over possession to the respondent by 1st Rent Controller Sukkur, who allowed Rent Application No,43 of 1992 on the ground of default nuisance and personal need vide the impugned judgment, dated 17th May, 1993.
2. ' Facts of the case are that the appellant was in possession of premises No,C.S. B-21/2-A (98 sq.
3. Yds.) situated at Babarki Bazar, Sukkur. He claimed that he has purchased the premises from the Settlement Department. Admittedly the litigation between the appellant and the predecessor-in- interest of the respondent went up to the Supreme Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court vide judgment, dated 28-2-1991 decided the case in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent who has subsequently transferred the premises to the present respondent.
4. Respondent after becoming owner of the premises served legal notice which is, dated 25th March, 1992 in which he has stated that he is landlord and since the premises were transferred in his name, he claimed the rent from 26-2-1992 at the rate of Rs,1,000 from the appellant but the appellant did not pay the rent although he continued to occupy the premises. Thereafter, rent case was filed on 21st June, 1992 in which inter alia defence has been taken that the appellant is a trespasser, he is occupant of the premises. He is not the tenant and, therefore, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction. After the ejectment application was filed the only plea urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant is either unathorised occupant or a trespasser but he is not the tenant firstly because he was not the tenant of the Settlement Department who transferred the premises to the respondent and secondly because he is not the tenant in terms of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. He has relied upon the judgment of this Court Muhammad Tufail v. Barkat Ali PLD 1967 Kar. 151 wherein it has been held that mere occupancy does not create tenancy. He has further relied upon the judgment reported as Qassim through Legal Heirs v. Aziz Baig (1993 CLC 2385) in which it has been held that by virtue of being owner of the premises the person does not become landlord.
5. ' Learned counsel for the respondent stressed that the appellant is tenant and relied upon the definition of tenant given in section 2(j) which reads as follows: "tenant means any person who undertakes or is bound to pay rent as consideration for the possession or occupation of any premises by him or by any other person on his behalf and includes---
(i) any person who continues to be in possession or occupation of the premises after the termination of his tenancy;
(ii) heirs of the tenant in possession or occupation of the premises after the death of the tenant; and"
6. ' He has further relied upon the judgment reported as Muhammad Shabbir and another v. Mst.
7. Hamida Begum 1992 M LD 323 in which it has been held that tenant is a person who is in possession or occupation of premises owned by someone else although he may not have undertaken to pay rent to owner thereof, but was normally bound to pay the rent to him as a consideration for being in possession or occupation of that premises and such person in fact would be a tenant. He has further relied upon 1990 CLC 2019 in which late Mr. Justice Qaiser Ahmed Hamidi, again defined the tenant in the case of Mst. Perveen Akhtar v. Shafique Ahmed on the same pattern. He further relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Rifatullah Alvi v. Imran Ansari PLD 1990 SC 369 in which their lordships were pleased to define the concept of possession in relation to the rent laws and held as follows:--- "In the area of the law relating to landlord and tenant, the tenant as well as the landlord are both in possession of the demised premises, but their respective possession falls under different species of possession. The possession of the landlord is 'mediate possession' and that of the tenant what is described as ' immediate possession.'
8. ' Their lordships have also defined the word 'occupation', as follows: "The word 'occupation' means, inter alia, actual holding or possession especially of a place or of land. In the context of subsection (2) of section 14 of the Ordinance, the word carries the meaning of actual physical possession of a building. This specie of possession is immediate or direct possession."
9. ' Admittedly the appellant claimed to be the owner of the premises, that claim of the appellant was denied by Hon'ble Supreme Court who ruled in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent who transferred the ownership of the premises by means of registered gift-deed.
10. Strictly he may not be the tenant, in terms of section 30 of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, 1958 as he was not the tenant under that law which has 1t been repealed .He became tenant in occupation of the premises when the notice was served on him that the respondent has become owner and demanded rent from appellant. In his notice which is on record, vide paragraph 5 rent was demanded from him at a rate with effect from 26-2-1992.
11. Paragraph 5 of the notice is reproduced: "5. That you are also liable to regularly pay rent of the property in possession as a tenant of my client at the rate of Rs,1,000.00 per month from 26-2-1992 uptodate and in future till you vacate and deliver the possession of the said premises to my client. It may be pointed out that the property in question is very valuable property and is situated in a thickly populated area where the properties adjacent and around the said property fetch rent of similar accommodation and location at Rs,1,500 and above per month."
12. The appellant has admitted that he received the notice but he did not reply the same. Admittedly, the appellant is in possession of the premises. He is also in occupation of the premises. He does have any title to possess those premises or occupy those premises but since he was bound to pay the rent for possession/occupation of the premises, therefore, he was tenant. The word bound has been defined in the Balck's Law Dictionary and means as follows: "As an adjective, denotes the condition of being constrained by the obligations of a bond, contract, covenant, or other moral or legal obligation."
13. ' The appellant was under moral obligation to compensate the owner of the use of premises and for continuing to remain in possession of the premises. In spite of the notice that the respondent is owner and demanded rent, the appellant was unmoved and did not discharge his obligation.
14. Although strictly there may not be the legal obligation but moral obligation binds a person to compensate the owner for continuing to remain in occupation as well as in possession. I would therefore, hold that since the appellant was bound to pay the rent, therefore, he was tenant in terms of section 2(j) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979.
15. Admittedly, the appellant in spite of notice did not pay any rent to the respondent, as such, default is established on the face of record. In view of my finding that the appellant has committed wilful default in spite of notice and demand from the owner as he did not pay the rent, therefore, I would maintain the judgment of Rent Controller. Since I have held that the appellant is defaulter, it is not necessary to go into other grounds of ejectment i,e,, personal use or nuisance.
16. ' For these reasons after hearing the parties in open Court this appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.