' The petitioner and respondent No,1 were married but on account of differences, the marriage was dissolved on 5-10-1994. Thereafter, on 16-11-1994, respondent No,1 filed suit for the recovery of dower amount of Rs,75,000, basing her claim on the agreement (Exh.P/1), which according to her, was executed by present petitioner on 6-11-1993 whereby the amount of dower was increased and refixed at Rs,75,000 as prompt dower. The suit was decreed on 3-12-1996 by the learned Judge, Family Court, Sheikhupura and the appeal of the present petitioner was also dismissed on 24-10- 1997 by the learned Additional District Judge, Sheikhupura.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner makes two fold submission. Firstly,that the evidence of the petitioner was not considered by the learned Courts on the ground that instead of the petitioner making statement himself, his agent, Muhammad Iqbal (D.W.1) had made the statement. Secondly, the dower having been fixed at the time of marriage, could not be increased subsequently.
3. With regard to the first submission, the learned counsel has referred to paragraph-9 of the judgment of the learned Judge, Family Court wherein it is stated as follows: "9. The defendant himself did not appear in the witness-box. There is no provision in the Family Laws that the defendant may appear through special attorney. The defendant himself has not come into the witness box and did not deny the execution of the agreement Exh.P-1."
4. In support of this submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to section 18 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 and argued that the petitioner could appoint an agent and the latter could make statement before the Court, which ought to have been considered. Section 18 reads as follows: "18. Appearance through agents. ---If a person required under this Act to appear before a Family Court, otherwise then as a witness, is a pardahnashin lady, the Family Court may permit her to be represented by a duly authorised agent."
5. Section 18 (ibid) permits pardanashin lady', who is party to the suit, to be represented by an authorised agent, with the permission of the Court. However, she is to appear in person, if she is required as a witness. The petitioner not being a 'pardanashin lady', section 18 does not apply to him. Besides, the controversy was with regard to the execution of the agreement, dated 6-11-1993, which according to respondent No,1, was signed by the present petitioner. Therefore, the present petitioner was the only person who ought to have appeared before the learned Trial Court and denied the execution of the agreement. He chose not to appear in the Court and instead his agent, D.W.1, Muhammad Iqbal, appeared in the Court and denied the execution of this document.
6. In my opinion, the direct evidence with regard to the execution or otherwise, could only be given by Muhammad Riaz, petitioner, who is said to have signed this agreement on 6-11-1993. D.W.
Muhammad Iqbal was not one of the witnesses to the document, therefore, had no personal knowledge of the execution of this document. Therefore, his evidence was of no avail to the petitioner, nor was section 18 (ibid) attracted to petitioner's case. On the other hand, the marginal witnesses, Shaukat Ali son of Qasim Ali and Muhammad Malik son of Ilam Din, appeared before the Trial Court and testified the execution of this document on 6-11-1993 by Muhammad Riaz, the present petitioner. Therefore, the learned Trial Court has justifiably held that the execution of the agreement was proved by the marginal witnesses.
7. The second submission that the amount of dower can be fixed only at the time of the solemnization of the marriage and not thereafter, is based on the fact that the marriage was solemnised in 1990 whereas, even according to respondent No,1, the agreement refaxing the dower amount of Rs,75,000, was executed much later on 6-11-1993. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not shown me any law in support of the contention that the dower amount could not be subsequently increased by the parties.
8. On the contrary, the Islamic Law on the subject allows the parties to enhance the amount of dower at any time subsequent to the marriage, albeit during the subsistence of the marriage.
Reference in this behalf is made to Muhammadan Law by Syed Ameer Ali (Vol. II of Pakistan Edition 1976 P.397) which states that: "The dower specified at the time of the marriage, can be increased subsequently."
' Section 219 of the Principles of Muhammadan Law (11th edition) by D.F. Mullah, states that: "The amount of dower may be fixed either before or at the time of marriage or after marriage and can be increased after marriage."
This enunciation is based on the judgment in Mst. Amina Bibi v. Sheikh Muhammad Ibrahim and another (ILR 1929 Vol. 4 page 343) and Jahurdan Garib Khan and others v. Sakina Bibi and others (Indian Cases Vol. 149, 1934 p.1150). In "Mst. Amina Bibi" it was held by a learned D.B. Of Allahabad High Court, "That the dower could be fixed at a period later than the celebration of the marriage is a proposition which cannot be disputed." In the latter judgment, it was held that: "There is authority for the view that under the Muhammadan Law, an addition may be made to the dower at any time during the continuance of the marriage and the husband's promise to add to the dower, if accepted by the wife, becomes incorporated with the marriage contract and is binding on him..."
In Mst. Nasiban Bibi and others v. Mst. Lqbal Begum (AIR 1935 Lah. 816), a learned Division Bench of this Court held that: "Taking the question of Muhammadan Law first, there is ample authority in support of the proposition that not only the amount of dower can be fixed at any time before or after marriage but that the amount so fixed can be increased at any time during the continuance of marriage."
' In Chan Pir v. Faker Shah (AIR 1940 Lah. 104), it was held by this 'Court that:--- "In the case of a Muhammadan woman, however, it is open to the husband to fix the dower at any time before or after the marriage. It is further open to the husband, to increase the amount of the dower at any time during the continuance of the marriage."
In Mst. Rukiayia Begum and another v. Radha Kishan and others (AIR 1944 Allahabad 214), it was held that: "The law on the point seems to be as stated by Taybji in his Muhammadan Law, 3rd Edition page 176: At any time during the continuance of the marriage an addition may be made to the Mahr: the husband's promise to add to the Mahr, if accepted by the wife, becomes incorporated into the marriage contract and binds him." vide 3 All. 266 at p. 274, 41 Bom. 5 and 59 CU 258.
' The Bombay and the Calcutta cases deal with this point specifically."
9. Thus, the agreement (Exh.P/1) enhancing and refixing the amount of dower at Rs,75,000 was validly executed on 6-11-1993 by the petitioner during the subsistence of the marriage between the petitioner and respondent No,1, which was accepted by the latter. This agreement states as follows:- {{URDU TEXT}} 1998. In the light of the afore-discussed legal position, this agreement (Exh.P/1) had validly refixed the amount of dower at Rs,75,000 and had the binding effect. Thus, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are without substance. Resultantly, this petition has no force and is dismissed in limine.