' NASIR ASLAM. ZAHID, J.---This appeal, by leave of this Court, is directed against the judgment dated 31-8-1995 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant. We have heard at length the arguments of Mr. Hamid Khan, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the appellant, Maulvi Anwarul Haq, learned Deputy Attorney-General for respondents Nos.1 and 2, Federal Government and Secretary Communications, and Hafiz S.A. Rehman learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court, who appeared for respondent No,3, Pakistan Telecommunications Corporation. Respondents 4 to 37, are colleagues of the petitioner in service but they chose to remain absent and are all ex parte. It has been informed by learned counsel who have appeared before us, on instructions that respondent No,25 Engineer Muhammad Saleem Butt and respondent No,37 Engineer Fayyazuddin have since retired from service. With the assistance of the learned counsel, we have perused the relevant record.
2. Appellant joined the T & T Department in 1960 as a Class I Officer. According to learned counsel for the appellant, he remained away from Pakistan for 5 years from June, 1974 to June, 1979, on deputation to the Government of Kuwait. At that time he was in BPS-18. Again he was abroad on ex-Pakistan leave from April, 1981, to May, 1982. According to learned counsel for the appellant, in April, 1982, the Central Selection Board considered the cases of officers of his batch for promotion to BPS-19 but his case was deferred as, it is informed that after his return from abroad, it was required that he should have earned one A.C.R. When his case was considered, such A.C.R. Had not yet been recorded. It appears that, in August, 1983, the Central Selection Board again met and his case was again considered for promotion to Grade-19 but he was superseded due to his incomplete A.C.R. Dossier. His reports from 1960 to 1969 were not available. Apparently these were not recorded. According to Mr. Hamid Khan, for this period the reports of all other officers of his batch were also missing. As observed, appellant was superseded and several officers of his batch who were junior to him, were promoted. In 1984, he challenged his supersession by filing an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal, but the same was dismissed by judgment dated 24-5-1988 on the ground that the same was not maintainable and also being barred by time. The judgment of the Tribunal is reported as 1989 PLC (C.S.)
127. Admittedly, appellant did not file any appeal against the judgment dated 24-5-1988 of the Federal Service Tribunal before this Court. The judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 24-5-1988, therefore, attained finality.
' In November, 1985, his case was again considered for promotion to grade 19 along with other officers by the Central Selection Board but again he was superseded for the same reason i,e, incomplete A.C.R. Dossier, and all the officers of his batch and junior to him and others belonging to the next batch were promoted.
' Then, the Central Selection Board met in June, 1987, and he was again superseded. There was another Central Selection Board meeting in December, 1987, and by now the A.C.Rs,, which were not available previously, became available having been obtained from the reporting officers as well as countersigning officers, who had retired long ago. This time appellant was promoted to Grade-19 and this promotion was made effective from June, 1987, as his supersession in June, 1987 converted to a case of deferment by the Secretary Establishment. Here it may be observed that, prior to 31-10- 1982, the promotion policy required consideration of only the last three reports whereas, under the new policy introduced in 1982, the Central Selection Board was required to consider the entire career record.
3. The case of the appellant in his appeal in question before the Service Tribunal was that, in view of the decision of Secretary Establishment that appellant's case of supersession in June, 1987, had been converted to deferment as the A.C.Rs, for the years in question were not available which by the time of the meeting of the Central Selection Board in December, 1987, had become available, as appellant had been superseded in 1982 as well as in 1985 on account of non-availability of the A.C.Rs, for the said years, the decision of deferment in place of supersession should date back to 1983, but the Tribunal declined the prayer of the appellant by dismissing his appeal and confirming the decision of the Department that his promotion should not be further ante-dated i,e, it should remain effective only from June, 1987
4. In its impugned judgment dated 31-8-1995, the Federal Service Tribunal noted that the appellant was superseded in August, 1983, November, 1985 and June, 1987. It has further been noted by the Tribunal that his A.C.Rs, for 1966, 1967, 1968 (part) and 1969 (part) were not available in 1983, 1985, and in the first meeting of 1987 held in June and in all these Boards he was superseded, but his record was completed thereafter and then the appellant was cleared by the Central Selection Board in its meeting held on 9-12-1987 after consideration of his complete record. In November, 1987 on the representation of the appellant, his supersession in June, 1987 was converted to deferment by the Establishment Secretary, being the competent Authority. Later on, according to the Federal Service Tribunal, again the officer represented that he was superseded in 1983 and 1985 on account of his incomplete record and as such these supersessions were also liable to be converted to deferment so that he might regain his original position. On the representation of the petitioner, Establishment Division prepared his case on the basis of his revised quantum (his A.C.R.
Dossier being complete) and submitted it before the Central Selection Board on the basis of his complete record with that of the officers who were cleared by the Board with less scores in August, 1983 and February, 1985. From the comparative statement, the Establishment Division noticed the following points: "In favour of the appellant.
(i) Mr. Muhammad Ishaque's qualified score in over all assessment is better than the two officers cleared by the Board in its meeting, held in August, 1983 and February, 1985.
(ii) Though he had lower score in quality and output of work than the other two officers in August 1983, none of them met the requisite standard.
(iii) The quality and output of work he had higher score than M/s. Bashir Ahmed and Aslam Jadoon who were cleared in February, 1985.
(iv) Officers with lower score both in overall assessment and quality and output of work were cleared by the Board in 1985.
' However, the following points go against Mr. Muhammad Ishaque:
(i) The officer had filed an appeal in Service Tribunal in July 1984, for restoration of his a seniority.
The appeal was dismissed being not maintainable and also barred by time. It was for the officer to proceed on step further to the Supreme Court against the Service Tribunal's judgment.
(ii) His A.C.Rs, for 1960, 1967, 1968 (part) and 1969 Part) were not available in 1983, 1985 and 1987 in the first meeting of 1987. In fact these were initiated in 1987 i,e, after a lapse of 21 years, 20 years, 19 years and 18 years respectively. Both the Reporting Officer and Countersigning Officers stood retired at that point of time.
(iii) The guidelines do not encourage writing of Confidential Report by retired officers, especially after a lapse of unreasonable period of time.
(iv) The later Central Selection Board of 1987 had taken all the factors into account and went reasonably for enough in restoring his seniority vis-a-vis earlier batch of officers promoted in 1987.
It was not considered prudent to re-open his entire record of supersessions.
(v) Supersession of over ten years back should not be lightly opened. Such redressal should be sought through Courts where other affected individual can also be heard (29 officers are likely to be affected); and
(vi) The Service Tribunal rejected appeal of Mr. Ishaque for conversion of his supersession in 1983, 1985. No appeal was filed against this judgment. As such it has attained finality and vested right of seniority of his juniors who superseded him in 1983 and 1985, have been created and cannot be upset by administrative decisions."
' The Federal Service Tribunal by its impugned judgment then held as follows:-- "31. In view of the position stated above the following options in deciding this case were available to the Board:--
(a) To recommend conversion of supersession for promotion to B-19 of Mr. Ishaque in 1983 and 1985, into deferment (this will up set vested seniority rights of 29 officers).
(b) Not to interfere administratively in the decision of Service Tribunal and consequently not to accede to the request of the officer for conversion of his supersession in 1983 and 1985 into deferment.
32. The case was submitted to Central Selection Board, in its meeting held on 30-10-1984. However, the Board recommended that his supersession made in August, 1983 and February, 1985 might not be converted into deferment.
33. Keeping all the aspects of the case in view, we come to the conclusion that his supersession in 1983 seems to have been hit by Service Tribunal decision, which dismissed the appellant's appeal, not only on the basis of non-maintainability but also on basis of time limitation. The appellant did not file an appeal against the Tribunal's judgment, in the Supreme Court as such it attained finality.
34. As regards his supersession in 1985, we have to consider certain important factor before we say anything.
35. The fact, that the appellant was superseded, because of non-availability of certain A.C.Rs, And that these A.C.Rs, were initiated much later say 19 to 22 years later. By this time not only his Recording Officer retired but his Countersigning Officer as well. Now, the question is would their assessm ent be objective after such a long time? And when they were no more in service? The benefit of these A.C.Rs, has partially be enjoyed by the appellant in the form of quantification, resulting in his promotion to Grade-20 in 1987. The conversion of appellant's supersession in 1985 into deferment would not be justified in our opinion, as it would be the outcome of A.C.Rs: written much later and by the retired officers, whose assessment it is doubtful might be objective.
Moreover, it will affect adversely the seniority of other 29 officers, which has created their vested right.
36. We are, therefore, constrained to accept the appeal and it is, therefore, dismissed having no merits with no order as to costs."
5. We find no infirmity in the finding of the Tribunal rejecting the claim of the appellant regarding his supersession in 1983. The appellant had challenged his supersession of 1983 before the Service Tribunal, which found his appeal not maintainable, and also being barred by time. It has also been noted that the said decision dated 24-5-1988 of the Service Tribunal was not challenged by the appellant before this Court and as such the said judgment of the Tribunal attained finality. The appellant, therefore, cannot challenge again his supersession of 1983.
6. As regards his supersession in 1985, the appellant did not file any appeal and as such no judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal comes in his way. However, the question of limitation requires consideration as regards his challenge to his supersession in 1985. Apparently the appeal filed by the appellant on 26-1-1987 before the Federal Service Tribunal against his supersession in 1985 is time-barred, but it was submitted by Mr. Hamid Khan that on the representation of the appellant that the view of the competent Authority, the Establishment Secretary, was that his record was not complete in June, 1987 and on receipt of the A.C.Rs, for the years in question (1966 to 1969) in December, 1987 when the appellant was cleared by the Board for promotion, appellant's supersession, in June, 1987, was liable to conversion into deferment. It was argued that logically this decision should have been made applicable to appellant's supersession in February, 1985, when also appellant was superseded on account of non-availability of the same A.C.Rs, and as such his supersession of 1985 was also liable to be converted to deferment. On his representation, the Establishment Division prepared his case for the Central Selection Board for consideration but his representation was rejected and this was communicated to him by letter dated 27-12-1994 of Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation, which reads as follows:-- "No, S/M-104 (Coll-III), dated the 27-12-1994.
' SUBJECT: REPRESENTATION OF MR. MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE FOR RESTORATION OF HIS SENIORITY ON PROMOTION TO BPS-19 AS DIRECTOR/DEPUTY CHIEF ENGINEER IN THE ENGINEERING BRANCH OF P.T.C.
' The undersigned is directed to inform you that the Central Selection Board of Establishment Division recommended that your supersession made in August, 1983 and February, 1985 may not be converted in deferment.
(Sd.)
(Mahmood Elahi), Director (Staff).
' To ' Mr. Muhammad Ishaque, ' General Manager (Customer Services), Lahore." ' to was submitted by Mr. Hamid Khan that despite the representation being allayed, from the above order dated 27-12-1994, it is evident that the Authority declined to give any relief to the appellant and dismissed the representation on merits. It was pointed out that the representation was not dismissed on account of the same being time-barred. It was additionally submitted that the Authority must be conscious of the fact that the representation was delayed, yet the Authority did not dismiss the representation on merits. In this context, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Muhammad Yousaf v. Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan (1970 SCMR 170). The dispute in that case related to consolidation proceedings and a scheme was framed and confirmed. The scheme was challenged before the Collector in appeal by the respondents which appeal was accepted and the Collector made certain amendments in the said scheme. Petitioner challenged the order of the Collector before the Additional Commissioner which was accepted. The provisional authority set aside the order of the Collector inter alia on the ground that the Collector should not have interfered with the appeal because the appeal was barred by time. The respondents filed a further revision before Member, Board of Revenue which was allowed. In the circumstances, the petitioner filed a writ petition which was dismissed by the High Court. Decision of the High Court was challenged before this Court. One of the points raised before this Court on behalf of the petitioners was that the appeal before the Collector was barred by time and without deciding that question he had decided the appeal of the respondent. This contention was rejected by this Court as follows:-- "It is correct that the appeal was barred by time but it cannot be said that the learned Collector was not conscious of this fact. The question of limitation was specifically brought to his notice and in spite of that he allowed that appeal of the said respondents. In these circumstances the view of the High Court that the learned Collector, by deciding the appeal on merits, has impliedly condoned the delay appears to be quite correct. The decision of this Court in the case of Ahsan Ali and others v. District Judge and others (PLD 1969 SC 167) lays down that the authority concerned should be conscious of the question of limitation before deciding the proceedings pending before it."
' On merits, the appellant had a good case inasmuch as the decision of the Establishment Secretary, the competent Authority, taken in December, 1987, that the supersession of the appellant in June, 1987, be converted to deferment was based on the reason that in June, 1987 the A.C.R.
Dossier of the appellant was not complete and this was precisely the reason why the appellant was superseded in February, 1985. If the question of limitation does not come in the way of the appellant, on parity of reason, his supersession in February, 1985 was also liable to be converted to deferment.
7. In our view, question of limitation does not come in the way of the appellant as regards his appeal to the Tribunal in so far as his claim for conversion of supersession in 1985 to deferment is concerned. When the competent Authority in December, 1987, approved the promotion of appellant and gave it effect from June, 1987, by converting the supersession in June, 1987, to deferment, it gave the appellant a fresh cause of action for challenging his earlier supersession. As regards the supersession in 1983, we have already given reasons in the earlier part of this judgment that such supersession cannot be challenged in view of the finality attaching to the previous judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal holding such appeal to be not maintainable and time- barred. However, as regards the supersession in 1985, the reasons being the same for supersession then and later in June, 1987, (i,e, non-availability of A.C.Rs, for the period from 1966-1969), the decision of the competent Authority in December, 1987, gave a fresh cause of action to the appellant to challenge his supersession of 1985. His representation in that regard was dismissed on 27-12-1994 and he filed the appeal on 26-1-1995. The appeal was, therefore, within time and not barred by limitation.
' There is a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Abdul Wahid v. Chairman, Central Board of Revenue (1998 SCMR 882) dealing in detail with the question of limitation as regards filing of appeals before the Service Tribunals. This judgment was also cited during the arguments but, as observed earlier, the appeal filed by the appellant in relation to his supersession in 1985 is not barred by limitation and was filed within 30 days of the passing of the order by the Authority which order had been passed on the representation of the appellant on the basis of a fresh cause of action which had accrued to him. The judgment in the case of Abdul Wahid (supra) is, therefore, of no help to the case of the department that the appeal of the appellant before the Tribunal was barred by time.
8. There is another question requiring consideration and that is that the A.C.Rs, of the appellant for the period from 1966 to 1969 were not written by the concerned officers for nearly 20 years. A.C.Rs, were apparently written some time between June, 1987, and December, 1987, and by that time the concerned officers had already relied long ago. Mr. Hafiz S.A. Rehman, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Pakistan Telecommunications Corporation, has drawn our attention to pages 16 and 17 of "A Guide to Performance Evaluation", which is a digest of the orders/instructions regarding writing of Annual Confidential Reports and maintenance of Character Roll Dossiers. According to learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court for the Pakistan Telecommunications Corporation, relevant guide line No, 2.39-A does not favour writing/countersigning ' C.Rs, by retired or expired officers. Instruction No, 2.39-A reads as follows:-- 2.39-A. (i) Writing/Countersigning of- A.C.Rs, by retired or expired officers.--It has been decided that as in the case of Government Officers, who are transferred, the officers proceeding on retirement whether voluntary or on attaining the age of superannuation, should be asked to write/countersign reports, on the officers and staff who have worked under them for more than three months before their retirement. If an officer proceeds on retirement without writing/countersigning the reports and cannot be contacted or fails to oblige despite repealed requests, the following procedure should be adopted--
(1) The officer who would have countersigned, had the report been initiated by the retired officer, should initiate the report, provided he has seen work of the officer, reported upon, for a minimum period of three months. The next higher officer, if any, should countersign it.
(2) If the report has already been initiated but the countersigning officer has retired, the next higher officer, if any, should countersign, provided he has personal knowledge of the work of the officer concerned.
(3) If both the initiating and the countersigning officers have retired, officer next higher than both of them, if any, should initiate and the next higher officer, if any, should countersign it. In such cases both the initiating and countersigning officers must have personal knowledge of the work of the officer reported upon.
(4) In case the report cannot be initiated at all, a suitable note to this effect be recorded in the C.R.
Dossier. If the report has been initiated but cannot be countersigned, the reasons, therefore, be recorded in Part IV of the A.C.R.
(ii) These instructions shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to cases where the reporting countersigning officer have expired."
Perusal of the aforesaid instruction does not show that the retired officers cannot write or countersign A.C.Rs, of their subordinate officers. However, for periods about two decades back, the proper course to follow should have been to docket the A.C.Rs, for the period in question.
9. As a result, this appeal partly succeeds inasmuch as the decision of February, 1985, superseding the appellant is converted to deferment, the A.C.Rs, for the years in question that is from 1966 to 1969 will be docketed and the case of the appellant will be reconsidered along with the other officers who were considered for promotion in February, 1985 and then a decision taken strictly on merits regarding ante-ration of appellant's promotion in accordance with the policy in force at that time for promotion.
' Civil Appeal No, 824 of 1996 stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.