' MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---This appeal, with the leave of the Court, has been preferred against an order passed by the High Court on March 16, 1996, whereby the writ petition filed by Muhammad Sharif, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1 to 7, was accepted.
2. The precise facts, forming the background of the present appeal, are that Plot No,5-E measuring 1 Kanal, situate in Sector E-2, Mirpur Town, was allotted in the name of one Baba Abdul Ghani, as early as in the year 1976. Muhammad Sharif, deceased, claimed that he purchased the above mentioned plot from the said Baba Abdul Ghani through an affidavit executed on July 8, 1976.
Subsequently, vide a general notification, issued by the Government on December 16, 1980, all the allotments made during a certain period, were cancelled which included the allotment in question and the matter was sub judice before the Revising Authority in pursuance of the aforesaid notification. Meanwhile, another notification was issued on February 14, 1985, whereby certain Sectors of Mirpur Town were transferred from the jurisdiction of the Mirpur Development Authority to Municipal Committee Mirpur on the basis of which Sector E-2 was also transferred to Municipal Committee. The Municipal Committee re-marked the aforesaid plot and re-numbered it as Plot No,5-E and 5-E/1 bifurcating, it into two plots. The pro forma-respondent No,8 who was Chairman of the Municipal Committee allotted Plot No,5-E/1 from special quota of Prime Minister to Syed Agha Hussain Maghmoom, respondent No,12. The appellant herein purchased the aforesaid plot from Agha Hussain Maghmoom and also got the plot transferred in his name from respondent No,10, the Estate Officer, Municipal Committee, Mirpur. Muhammad Sharif, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1 to 7, filed a writ petition in the High Court, claiming that in view of the notification, whereby the jurisdiction of the concerned Sector was transferred to Municipal Committee, it had no jurisdiction so far as the allotment of present plot was concerned, because the matter was sub judice before the Revising Authority; according to Muhammad Sharif the matters which were disputed, the jurisdiction to deal with such plots vested with the Mirpur Development Authority as the same was not transferred to the Municipal Committee in pursuance of the aforesaid notification. Thus, the allotment in favour of Agha Hussain Maghmoom was violative of law and without jurisdiction. The High Court accepted the writ petition filed by Muhammad Sharif, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1 to 7. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant herein to assail the said finding of the High Court.
3. Arguing the case on behalf of appellant, Raja Hassan Akhtar, the learned counsel, submitted that the High Court did not take into consideration the affidavit by virtue of which Muhammad Sharif alleged to have purchased the plot in question. The said affidavit, on the face of it, appears to be fake and fictitious. According to the learned counsel, the application claimed to have been filed under the Special Regulation before the Revising Authority was also not filed by Baba Abdul Ghani, the original allottee, but by an unauthorised person. This application alleged to have been filed before the Revising Authority was liable to be rejected as the same appears to have been filed by a person practising fraud in the name of original allottee. Respondents 1 to 7, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, have no locus standi to challenge the allotment made in favour of Syed Agha Hussain Maghmoom, respondent No,12, who subsequently transferred the same in favour of appellant as they were neither allottees of the plot in dispute nor they ever applied for the allotment of the same. The learned counsel strenuously contended that Baba Abdul Ghani, the original allottee of plot, through deceitful means and by fraudulently showing himself to be a Mangla Dam affected person and claiming to be the owner of House No,MD/1844, Mohallah Naloi, Mirpur, got allotted the plot in dispute in his favour. This fact was brought to the notice of Chairman M.D.A. By one Abdul Karim, the owner of the above mentioned house, but this fact too escaped the notice of the learned Judge in the High Court which goes a long way to establish the deceitful and fraudulent means adopted by the original allottee. The learned counsel contended that the impugned judgment for having been passed illegally and against the admitted facts on record was not sustainable.
4. On the other hand Mr. Muhammad Riaz Inqilabi, the learned counsel for respondents, strenuously argued that plot in dispute was purchased by Muhammad Sharif, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1 to 7 from the original allottee, Baba Abdul Ghani, whose locus standi to file a writ petition could not be challenged as he was aggrieved person within the meaning of section 44 of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974. In pursuance of a notification all the allotments made during a certain period were cancelled by the government and under Special Regulation only the previous allottee was eligible to reapply for the allotment of the said plot. The learned counsel maintained that in accordance with the Government Notification the matter of allotment of plot vested with the Mirpur Development Authority as the matter was subjudice before it. During the pendency of the dispute before the Revising Authority, the bifurcation of plot in dispute in two plots and its allotment in favour of Syed Agha Hussain Maghdoom and its ultimate transfer in favour of appellant was an act beyond the jurisdictional competence of the Municipal Committee. The High Court, according to the learned counsel. Committed no error in setting aside the allotment made in favour of Syed Agha Hussain Maghdoom and its subsequent transfer in favour of appellant. Thus, the impugned judgment was open to no exception, submitted the learned counsel.
5. After hearing the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record made available with carev it may be stated that the High Court by attending to the points in controversy between the parties and accepting the writ petition filed by Muhammad Sharif, deceased, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1 to 7, reached the following conclusions:-- "(i) The Sector wherein the plot in dispute is situated was, though, transferred to the Municipal Committee in pursuance of a notification issued by the Government, however, it was provided in the notification itself that the disputed plots/areas pending in any Court of law, or before any allotting, revising or appellate authority of the Mirpur Development Authority shall be transferred to Municipal Committee after finalisation of the disputes;
(ii) that the application filed by Muhammad Sharif, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1 to 7, was pending before the Revising Authority of Mirpur Development Authority, therefore, keeping in view the relevant provisions of notification, Mirpur Municipal Committee had no jurisdiction to make the allotment of an area which never fell within its jurisdiction;
(iii) that the question whether the affidavit executed in favour of appellant is false or fictitious cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction as the same relates to disputed question of fact; and
(iv) that the appellant has brought on record an affidavit claiming his rights on its basis, therefore, he cannot be deprived of the right of filing the petition. The right considered sufficient for maintaining a writ petition is not necessarily a right in the strict juristic sense but it is enough if the applicant discloses that he has personal interest in the performance of a legal duty which if not performed in the manner provided by law, would result in the loss of some personal benefit.
Reliance was placed on Mian Fazal Din's case reported as (PLD 1969 SC 223)."
6. In our considered view in arriving at the aforesaid conclusions the High Court committed no illegality warranting our interference in the impugned judgment. It may be pointed out that the admitted position between the parties is that plot No,5-E measuring 1 Kanal, situated in Sector E-2, Mirpur, was allotted in the name of one Baba Abdul Ghani, son of Muhammad Shafi. It is also agreed upon that the area wherein the plot in dispute is situated, though, has been transferred to the jurisdiction of Municipal Committee but the matter of allotment of plot is still within the jurisdiction of Mirpur Development Authority. The above-stated position stands admitted by the functionaries of M.D.A. Respondents 8 to 11 in their written statement who were arrayed as respondents 1 to 4 in the writ petition. When the matter of allotment of plot in question was pending before the Revising Authority, Mirpur Municipal Committee, or its Chairman, was not vested with any jurisdiction to allot the same to anybody. Thus, the allotment of plot in question to Syed Agha Maghmoom Hussain and its subsequent transfer to the appellant was beyond jurisdiction of Municipal Committee or its Chairman and as such of no legal effect. Thus, the findings recorded by the High Court are maintained.
7. The learned counsel for the appellant not only in the High Court but also in this Court strenuously pressed the point that under the Special Regulation it was pre-requirement 01 law that only the previous allottee could re-apply for the allotment of plot. Elaborating his view point it was contended that in the instant case Baba Abdul Ghani, the original allottee, did not re-apply for the appointment of plot in question before the revising Authority, as he had already died at the relevant time and it was only Muhammad Sharif, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1 to 7 who re-applied. It was also urged that the affidavit executed by Baba Abdul Ghani was fake and fictitious. The High Court very rightly did not resolve the aforesaid points as the same were in its opinion complicated questions of facts. In our view the High Court was right in not dilating upon these questions because High Court was not the proper forum to raise these points. The appellant, if so advised, may agitate these questions before the Revising Authority or any other appropriate forum as permitted by law. With these observations, finding no force in the appeal, the same, therefore, stands dismissed, with no order as to costs.