' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal has been directed against the order of the High Court, dated 13-11-1996, whereby the appeal filed by Muhammad Shafi, respondent, was accepted and the case was remanded to the trial Court to proceed with it according to law.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that Muhammad Shafi, respondent herein, brought a pre-emption suit in the Court of Sub-Judge, Dhirkot, alleging that the compromise decree, dated 30-6-1992 was in fact a sale and the same has been disguised as a compromise decree to deter him from exercising the right of pre-emption. Muhammad Aziz and others, vendees, submitted an application that as after the amendment of the relevant law, the period prescribed for filing a suit on the basis of right of prior purchase has been fixed as four months instead of one year, the suit was time-barred; because it was filed beyond the period of four months. The application filed by Muhammad Aziz and others was accepted and the suit was dismissed as being time-barred. The appeal before the District Judge filed by the plaintiff- respondent also failed. However, on appeal to the High Court, the orders of the trial Court and the first Appellate Court were vacated and an issue on the point of limitation was framed by the High Court with the direction to decide it after giving the parties opportunity of leading evidence.
3. Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued that the High Court has committed an error in remanding the case because the trial Court was competent to reject the plaint under rule 11 of Order VII, C.P.C., as bare reading of the plaint clearly shows that the suit was filed after the expiry of a period of four months from the date of the passing of the compromise decree. He has further argued that the High Court has also committed error in holding that Article 10 of the Limitation Act was not attracted in the instant case. The learned counsel has submitted the following authorities in support of his contentions:--- ' In case reported as Fatima Moeen v. Additional District Judge, Sheikhupura (1992 SCM R 1199), it has been observed that the Court is competent to reject the plaint as being time-barred. However, it was held that in the circumstances of the case the order of the trial Court declining to determine the question of limitation without recording the evidence could not be interfered with. Obviously, the authority does not support the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that in all cases, the trial Court can resolve the point of limitation without framing the issue and giving the parties an opportunity of leading evidence in support of their contentions.
' In case reported as Asghar Ali v. P.K. Shahani (1992 CLC 2282, it was observed that if bare reading of the plaint reveals that the suit is time-barred, the Court has the jurisdiction to reject the plaint at interlocutory stage without any application by the opposite-party for rejecting the plaint.
' In Khuna Gul v. Mian Said Farid (PLD 1983 SC 209), it was observed that the provisions of Pre- emption and Limitation Acts cannot be invoked to revive and bring back cause of action already having become barred by time under law of limitation prevailing before the extension of time of such laws.
4. In reply, Sh. Abdul Aziz, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that he has no quarrel with the proposition that the Court has got the jurisdiction to reject a plaint if after reading the plaint, it comes to the conclusion that the suit is time-barred. But he has contended that in the instant case, it is not correct to suggest that the suit was time-barred; he has argued that the pre-emption suit was filed against a compromise decree alleging that it was tantamount to a sale within the meaning of Pre-emption Act. Thus, the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that Article 10 of the Limitation Act, whether amended or not, would not be applicable to the instant case. The learned counsel has further argued that in view of section 29 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act, if Article 10 is not applicable to a case, section 29 of the Prior Purchase Act would apply provided the eventualities stipulated therein exist. The learned counsel has argued that in the instant case neither Article 10 of the Limitation Act nor section 29 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act would determine the period of limitation; the case would be governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, under which the period of limitation would be six years reckoned from the date of accrual of cause of action. He has cited a case reported as Sher Alam v. Mir Alam Khan (PLD 1989 SC (AJ&K) 41) in support of his contentions.
5. We have given our due consideration to the matter. We are of the view that irrespective of the fact as to which of the provisions of law could govern the limitation in the instant case, the fact remains that the point cannot be decided without framing the issue and giving the parties an opportunity of leading evidence. Whether the question of limitation in the instant case is covered by section 29 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act or Article 120 of the Limitation Act, it would require evidence to resolve the same. Thus, the High Court rightly held that the point of limitation cannot be resolved without first giving the parties an opportunity of leading evidence in support of their contentions.
' In the light of what has been stated above, finding no force in this appeal, it is hereby dismissed with costs.