' MUHAMMAD BASHIR JEHANGIRI, J.---This appeal by leave of the Court filed by the defendants/appellants has called in question the dismissal by the High Court of a Civil revision whereby the judgment and the decree of the appellate Court were upheld and that of the trial Court non-suiting the plaintiffs/respondents in a pre-emption suit had been set aside and the suit had been decreed.
2. The learned trial Judge found on issue No,6 which covered the plea that the requirements of Talabs' as envisaged by Section 13 of the Punjab Preemption Act (IX of 1991) (the Act) have not been fulfilled. In this context it had been observed by the learned trial Judge that the plaintiffs, according to their own showing, came to know of the sale of the disputed land on 3-6-1991 whereas the sale had taken placed on 28-5-1991; that this assertion of the plaintiffs/respondents is belied by Ghulam Ghous who had stated that the plaintiffs had expressed their intention to exercise their right of pre-emption after 2/3 days of the sale and that, therefore, making of ' Talb-i- Muwathibat "in this way was not proved". As regards 'Talb-i-Ishhad', according to the trial Judge, the plaintiffs/respondents had averred in the plaint that the defendants were approached by the plaintiff in the presence of the witnesses and that the notice was served but the evidence of the plaintiff reveals that the plaintiff had approached defendant No,2 only along P.W.1 i.e, one witness and the second witness had only put his signatures on the notices Exh.P-1 and Exh. P-2. The trial Court further observed that the plaintiffs/respondents were required to have proved the making of '
Talb-i-Muwathibat' in the presence of truthful witnesses which assertion was missing in his evidence. The learned trial Judge, however, conceded that the receipt of notices had been acknowledged by the appellants. In this way, the plaintiffs/respondents were found to have failed to prove the making of ' Talb-i-Ishhad' as well and issue was thus decided against the plaintiffs/respondents.
3. The learned Additional District Judge, who was seized of the appeal filed by the plaintiffs/respondents, observed that the plaintiffs/respondents had examined Amir Muhammad Khan as P.W. 1 who supported the plea of the plaintiffs/respondents that the latter had made 'Talb- I-Muwathibat' in the former's house when the witness had informed the latter about the sale of the disputed land. Likewise, Amir Muhammad Khan P.W.1 had testified to have signed the notices Exh.
P-1 and Exh. P-2 on the following day; that on the Court question the said witness had stated that he had come to know about the sale in the first week of June. The learned Appellate Court then referred to the evidence of Nadir Ali P.W.2 who deposed that the plaintiffs had come to know about the disputed sale in the first week of June from Amir Muhammad Khan PW-1 upon which plaintiff/respondent expressed his intention to pre-empt the transaction. This witness had also acknowledged his signatures on the notices Exh.P-1 and Exh.P-2. According to the learned Appellate Court, Ghulam Ghous P.W.3, attorney of the plaintiffs/respondents, had stated that when the father of the plaintiffs was informed after 2/3 days of the sale, he had made ' Talb-iMuwathibat' at once.
The learned Appellate Court noted that the notices, according to the plaintiffs/respondents, had been sent to the defendants which were acknowledged by the defendants/appellants to have been received. According to the learned Appellate Court, the plaintiff/respondent in answer to the Court question had stated that he had come to know about the sale in the first week of June and so had been deposed to by Nadir Khan P.W.2. The contradiction in the statements of Amir Muhammad Khan P.W.1 and Nadir Ali P.W.2 on the one hand and that of Ghulam Ghous P.W.3 attorney of the appellants on the other hand, was held to be the result of misreading 01 evidence.
In'this context, reference was made to the admission of Ghulam Ghous P.W.3 who was not present at the time of making of 'Talb-i-Muwathibat', therefore, the statements of Amir Muhammad Khan and Nadir Ali P.Ws., were more credible. Similar is the case with ' Talb-i-Ishhad'. The learned Appellate Court observed that service of the notices Exh.P-1 and Exh.P-2, on the defendants/appellants duly supported by the two attesting witnesses of the said notices, has not only been established but stood admitted by Fateh Muhammad one of the three appellants in his cross-examination acknowledging the receipt of the notices. The objection raised on behalf of the appellants that Ajaib Khan appellant being out of country had been served on the address given in the sale deed, which was, according to the learned Appellate Court sufficient compliance of 'Talb- i-Ishhad'. The findings of the learned trial Judge on issue No,6. As stated earlier, were thus set aside and it was held that the plaintiffs/respondents had duly complied with the requirements of ' Talabs' under section 13 of the Act.
4. The learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court while agreeing with the findings of the learned Appellate Court on the issue involved observed as follows:-- "The sale deed in this case was registered on 28-5-1991 and it was averred by the plaintiff that he came to know about the factum of sale on 3-6-1991, i.e, only 5/6 days later. Ghulam Ghous P.W.3 had given this period as 2/3 days which cannot be said to be a discrepancy being fatal to the entire case of the plaintiffs. Amir Muhammad Khan P.W.1 had specifically stated that he came to know about the sale during first week of June. Similarly P.W.2 Nadir Ali had stated that he came to know about the sale during the first week of June. These witnesses are signatories of the notices Exh.P-1 and Exh.P-2 and in these circumstances it cannot be held that the plaintiffs had failed to make Talb-i-Muwathibat in accordance with law. The view adopted by the learned Additional District Judge appears to be well justified in the matter. Similarly the requirement of making of Talb-i-Ishhad was also effectively proved by the plaintiffs. The talb was made in presence of two witnesses P-1 and P.W.2 who had also supported the plaintiffs' version in its entirety. The notices were also sent to the vendees at the addresses given in the sale deed and receipt thereof was also admitted by the defendants. The requirement of law was thus adequately fulfilled. The observation of the learned first court regarding non-making of Talb-I-Ishhad are not based on proper application of the law, The findings given by the learned Additional District Judge reflects the correct position of law. No misreading or non-reading in the evidence by the learned Additional District Judge has been found. The impugned judgment and decree do not suffer from any illegality or procedural impropriety. The same calls for no interference in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The civil revision petition is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs."
5. In support of this appeal, Mr. Muhammad Munir Peracha, learned ASC, argued that under Section 13 of the Act, the pre-emptor on learning about the sale is required to exercise the right of pre- emption against the said sale immediately and therefore, the expression "as soon as thereafter as possible" occurring in Section 13(3) of the Act would imply that the action shall be taken without any delay. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that on the plaintiff's bwn showing he had come to know of the sale on 3-6-1991 which had factually taken place on 28-5-1991 and, therefore, the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad issued on 6-6-1991 did not satisfy the requirements of "as soon thereafter as possible" occurring in Section 13(3) of the Act (ibid). In support of his contention Mr. Muhammad Munir Peracha, learned ASC, placed implicit reliance on the precedent of this Court in the cases of Mir Sahib Khan v. Muhammad Rauf Khan (1992 SCM R 1780) and (2) Zafar Ali v. Zainul Abidin and another (1992 SCM R 1886). In so far as the proposition laid down in these two precedents is concerned there cannot be two opinions that provisions of subsection (3) (ibid) have to be strictly interpreted and the pre-emptor has to give the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad "as soon as possible" without wasting a single moment. In the first precedent however, it appears that the pre- emptor instead of making Talb-i-Ishhad as soon after making Talb-i-Muwathibat as possible waited for the last day of the two weeks. Obviously it was not the real compliance of subsection (3) of Section 13 ibid. In the second precedent of Zafar Ali the preemptor had admitted in the witness- box that "he had learnt about the sale mutation on 12th or 13th August, 1988 and had obtained a copy of the mutation and sent the notices to the vendees under registered cover AD on 16th August, 1988 and on the same day he had expressed his intention to pre-empt the suit land. In this background, it was held that the pre-emptor ought to have made Talb-I-Muwathibat without loss of any time on 12th or 13th August, 1988 when he had learnt about the sale transaction. But he admittedly made it on 16-8-1988. In this factual background. It was, therefore, held that there was no escape from the conclusion that Talb-I-Muwathibat had not been made by him in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. It was opined that in view of the law laid down in Ghulam Jilani and 3 others v. Ghulam Muhammad and 7 others) (1991 SCM R 2001) the second Talab is by way of confirmation of the first Talab and that if there is no first Talab there can be no confirmation thereof. It would thus be seen that even the dictum in the second precedent is also not attracted to the facts of the case in hand. We have already noticed that the Talb-I-Muwathibat had been made immediately on getting the knowledge of the sale on 3-6-1991. The notice of Talb-i-Ishhad Ex.P-1 was dated 6-6-1991 by Syed Abid Hussain Zaidi, an Advocate of Chakwal. The pre-emptor belongs to village Karyala and notice of Talb-i-Ishhad was addressed to village Bhalla Tehsil and District Chakwal whereas notice was scribed by the Advocate at Chakwal. In this view of the matter it must have taken a day or 2 to go to Chakwal; to contact a counsel of the pre-emptor's choice and then get the notice scribed and despatched.
6. Mr. Abdul Karim Khan Kundi, learned ASC, representing the respondents, contends that the.Sale deed had been registered on 28-5-1991 the knowledge about which was conveyed to the respondents on 3-6-1991 notwithstanding the stance of the pre-emptor that he had got the knowledge of the transaction in the first week of June, 1991. According to the learned counsel, the witnesses to the Talb-I-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad are unanimous that the pre-emptor had come to know of the factum of sale on 3-6-1991 and that he had immediately expressed his intention to exercise the right of pre-emption. Learned counsel further submitted that if the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad was sent through a counsel it had certainly taken 2 or even 3 days to comply with the requirements of Talb-i-Ishhad as has occurred in this case. The learned counsel then referred us to the interpretation of the expression "as soon as possible" in Blacks Law Dictionary recorded at page 146 which is re-produced hereunder:-- "As Soon As Possible. When used with reference to the time of performing some act, such as the shipment of goods, these words mean merely within a reasonable time. Birmingham Paper Co. v.
Holder, 24 Ga. App.630,101; S.e.692; National Cash Register Co. v. Mc Cann, 140 N.Y.S. 916, 920,80 Misc.
165 ("as soon as possible" requires a much more speedy fulfilment than within a reasonable time)."
According to this expression it means that the action had to be taken within a reasonable time.
According to Mr. Abdul Karim Khan Kundi in the instant case 2 to 3 days after making the Talb-i- Muwathibat was a reasonable time within which the Talb-i-Ishhad had been made at Chakwal and that too through a counsel. We agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that in the instant case Talb-i-Ishhad' made within 2/3 days of the 3rd June, 1991 which was actually made on 6-6-1991 is sufficient compliance of Section 13(3) of the Act and satisfies the expression "as soon thereafter as possible" occurring in Section 13(3) of the Act.
7. Thus, in this case the impugned judgment for the aforesaid reasons is unexceptionable. This appeal having no merits is dismissed with no order as to costs.