1. ' SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, J.---This High Court Appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 19- 6-1997 of a learned Single Judge of this Court in. Constitutional Petition No.S-10 of 1997, whereby the aforesaid Constitutional petition was dismissed as it did not merit any consideration.
2. ' The brief facts of the case are that the appellants are a private limited company carrying on the business of Pharmaceuticals and in accordance with the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, a Trade Union under the name and style of M/s. Hakimsons Chemicals Industries (Pvt.)
3. Limited Employees' Union has been in existence since 1970 and has also been declared as Collective Bargaining Agent. The appellants used to employ/hire temporary workers on daily payments/wages and on the last occasion such workers were hired on 31-10-1996 when their services were terminated on 31-10-1997 as a result of which some of them with mala fide intentions joined hands to form a Trade Union and applied to the Registrar of. The Trade Union for registration of Union under the name and style of M/s. Hakimsons Chemicals Industries (Pvt.) Limited, Labour Union, respondent No.2 herein and also sent intimation to the appellants. It has further been submitted that on the date when respondent No. 2 applied for registration, all the office- bearers/workers thereof were outsiders as their services had been terminated on 31-10-1996. The appellants by their letters dated 12-12-1996, 16-1-1997, 27-1-1997 and 29-1-1997 addressed to respondent No. 1 intimated him of the aforesaid factual position and requested him to make a positive and proper inquiry but the respondent No. 1 did not hold any positive and proper inquiry and also did not associate the appellants in the alleged inquiry before registering the respondent No. 2 as a Trade Union and issued certificate on 25-1-1997, which act of respondent No. 1 was illegal and void as it contravened the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. After issuance of certificate of registration in its favour, respondent No. 2 applied to the respondent No. 1 for the determination of the Collective Bargaining Agent in the appellant's establishment in accordance with the provisions of section 22(2) of the I.R.O. And Assistant Director Labour (Registration), West Division, Karachi vide his letter dated 20-2-1997 called upon the appellants to submit complete list of all workmen/workers, employed in their establishment with full details relating to their names, parentage, age, date of appointment, the department or place of employment and working as required by section 22(4)(a) of the I.R.O., 1969.
4. ' The case of the respondent No. 2 Union as submitted by its General Secretary Bakht Zamin is that when the aforesaid Union was formed and application for registration was submitted, all the workers who had formed the Trade Union were in the employment of the appellant's establishment and further that they continue to be in their employment till date as their services have never been terminated. It has further been submitted on behalf of the respondent No. 2 Union that the appellants had also raised the above objection before the respondent No. 1 in reply to his letter addressed to them calling for information/verification of employment of office-bearers. It has further been stated that respondent No. 1 failed to hold a proper inquiry/investigation with regard to the factum of employment of the members/workers, who had formed the respondent No. 2 Union; in the appellant's establishment and after fully satisfying himself that they were the employees of the appellant's establishment had proceeded to register the respondent No. 2 Union as a Trade Union in accordance with the provisions of law.
5. ' Respondent No. 1 vehemently denied either to have failed to conduct an enquiry with regard to the determination or ascertainment of the factum of employment of the workers/members of respondent No. 2 Union in the appellant's establishment or that he violated any provision of the No.2 Union thereby complying with the requirement of notice to employer which is not spelt out from section 7 of I.R.O.
6. According to the scheme of registration of Trade Unions as envisaged in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, the employer is not required to be associated or participate in any inquiry or investigation which is to be undertaken by respondent No. 1 for verification of certain facts relevant for registration of a Trade Union. Furthermore, the respondent No. 1 had called upon the appellants to submit a complete and detailed information of all the workers/workmen employed in their establishment for ascertaining whether workers/office-bearers who had formed the respondent No. 2 Union were in the employment of the appellant establishment on the relevant dates. The appellants ought to have availed of this opportunity and should have produced reliable, satisfactory and cogent evidence before the respondent No.1 to substantiate their claim that the office-bearers/workers who formed the respondent No. 2 Union had ceased to be their employees on the date when the respondent No. 2 Union was formed. Instead, they vide their letters dated 12- 12-1996, 16-1-1997, 27-1-1997 and 29-1-1997 addressed to respondent No. 1 stated that the proposed office-bearers/workers of respondent No. 2 Union were daily paid temporary workers and were all "outsiders" as they were not in the employment of the appellant with effect from 30-10-1996 whereas the application for registration of respondent No. 2 Union was filed on 3-11-1996. These facts were emphatically denied by the office-bearers/members of respondent No. 2 Union, all of whom filed their affidavits before respondent No. 1 claiming themselves to be the employees of the appellant's establishment and vehemently denying the stand of the appellants of having been dismissed or terminated.
7. ' Faced with above situation, respondent No. 1 discarded the stand of the appellants that the office- bearers/members forming the respondent No. 2 Union were not in the employment of the appellants. The appellant did not produce orders/letters of termination of employment of the officebearers/workers who had formed the respondent No. 2 Union. The reason advanced for not issuing the termination letters/orders was that such workers were temporary daily-paid workers and were paid wages on daily payment sheets. No letters of termination of their services were required to be issued and non-existence of daily wages payments sheet in respect of such workers after 30-10-1996 was sufficient proof of their termination and also amounted to termination orders.
8. On this reasoning the appellants admitted to have violated the provisions of S.O. 2-A and 12(3) of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance which require the employers to issue letters of appointment and termination in respect of every worker irrespective of the nature of his employment. The terms daily wages worker or casual worker do not appear in the category of workmen as defined in Standing Order 1 of the (Standing Orders)
9. Ordinance and every worker employed in an Establishment to which the (Standing Orders)
10. Ordinance is applicable would necessarily be covered by any one of the categories enumerated in Standing Order 1. Thus, the appellants were legally required to issue letters of termination containing specific reasons for the termination of the services of such workers. In the circumstances, the respondent No.1 was justified in holding such workers to be in the employment or service of the appellants on the dates when the respondent No. 2 Union was formed by them and when application for registration was filed by respondent No. 2 Union. The appellants having failed to avail of the opportunity for establishing that such workers had ceased to be in their service at the relevant times have come up with a belated, frivolous and baseless allegations of no proper and valid inquiry having been conducted as they were not joined or associated therewith which deprived them of the opportunity to dislodge the factum of such workers to be in their employment. A further opportunity had been made available to the appellants seeking cancellation of registration of respondent No. 2 Union, when it applied to respondent No. 1 for holding referendum for determining the Collective Bargaining Agent. The appellants could have produced material before respondent No. 1 to substantiate their allegations of respondent No. 2 Union having been registered in contravention of the provisions of the I.R.O. And to pursue him to file a complaint before the Labour Court for cancellation of registration of respondent No. 2, which they failed to make use of insisting that they should have been associated or allowed to participate in the inquiry allegedly held by respondent No. 1 and grant of registration certificate to respondent No. 2 Union behind their back was illegal, ultra vires and void which they have failed to make out as the case-law relied upon by them does not help them.
11. ' Mr. S. Qamaruddin Hassan also referred to us the case of Muhammad Yaqoob v. The Punjab Labour Court No. 1 and others, reported in 1990 SCM R 1539 wherein the issue involved was determination of whether a temporary worker had acquired the status of permanent worker on account of length of his employment which has no application or relevancy to the facts of this case.
12. ' It is pertinent to note that for invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, the appellants were required to show that no other adequate alternate and efficacious remedy was available to them under any other law. The appellants in their petition made a statement that no other adequate, alternate and efficacious remedy was available to them under any provision of law which statement was absolutely contrary of the provision of section 10 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance which empowers the respondent No. 1 to file a complaint in writing before the Labour Court for cancellation of registration of a Trade Union on the grounds contained subsections (1), (2) and (3) thereof. The respondent No. 1 can lodge a complaint for cancellation of the registration on coming to know of any of the aforesaid causes warranting cancellation of a Trade Union. Such information can be acquired by respondent No. 1 on his own accord or through some other source, which may include the employer. As such, after registration of respondent No. 2 as a Trade Union and issuance of certificate of registration by respondent No.1, the appellants could approach the respondent No.1 for cancellation of registration of respondent No. 2 Union on the ground that on the date when it was formed the office-bearers/workers thereof were not in their service and so was the fact when the application for registration was filed, but as already pointed out the appellants did not resort to the above statutory remedy available to them.
13. It is a settled principle of law that exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction would be declined, in favour of a party who has c not exhausted the remedy available to him before filing the Constitutional petition. In support of the above proposition several authorities can be cited. In the case of Shaikh Gulzar Ali & Company v. Special Judge Banking Court and others, reported in 1991 SCM R 590, the Supreme Court made an emphatic declaration that the High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction could not be allowed to take over the function of the machinery provided by the statute.
14. In the case of Adamjee Insurance Company v. Pakistan, reported in 1993 SCM R 1798, the Supreme Court categorically declared that the condition precedent for exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction was that no other remedy was available to aggrieved party. In the case of Abdur Rehman v. Haji Mir and others reported in PLD 1983 SC 21, the Supreme Court observed that Constitutional jurisdiction could not be invoked in the presence of alternate adequate remedy. The Supreme Court in the case of Mumtaz Ahmed and others v. Assistant Commissioner and another, reported in PLD 1990 SC 1195 propounded the principle that when a statute creates and also provides machinery for redress of the party complaining of breach or violation of any provision of the statute, then it must avail himself of the remedy provided by the statute for such breach before invoking Constitutional jurisdiction. Thus, the appellants before invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court did not exhaust the alternate adequate and efficacious remedy available to them under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, which is condition precedent for invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction. On this ground too the Constitutional petition filed by appellants was liable to be dismissed.
15. ' The appellants, who had invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, were required to show as to how they were aggrieved by order dated 25-1-1997 of respondent No. 1 ordering registration of respondent No.2 as a Trade Union in the appellant's establishment and the order dated 20-2-1997 ordering referendum for determination of Collective Bargaining Agent. With regard to the order dated 25-1-1997, the appellant in accordance with the scheme of registration of a Trade Union by respondent No. I as per the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, neither had any right to participate in the proceedings before respondent No.1 relating to the registration of respondent No.2 nor could force or insist upon the respondent No.1 to associate or join them in any inquiry or investigation which respondent No.1 had desired to undertake for determination or ascertainment of certain facts relevant to the registration of respondent No.2 Union. The respondent No.2 Union was the second Trade Union in the appellant's establishment and its registration by respondent No.1 did not result or caused any injury or harm or adversely effected the interest of the appellants.
16. The registration of the respondent No. 2 Union neither resulted in violation or contravention of any provision of Industrial Relations Ordinance nor in denial or violation of any right, privilege or interest of the appellants. It is a cardinal principle that a party while approaching this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is necessarily required to show existence of a legal right and violation or denial thereof by an order or action of a Court, Tribunal or a Government functionary, because only then a person could be said to be an aggrieved person within the meaning of Article 199 of Constitution. The appellants were required to disclose their legal or fundamental right or interest which had been denied or violated by performance of the legal duty by respondent No. 1 resulting in the loss or curtailment of any right or privilege. The respondent No. 1 in exercise of his statutory and legal duty had passed an order and the appellants as a necessity had to show as to what legal or fundamental right was violated by the impugned order as well as what illegal wrong had been inflicted or was likely to be inflicted to them, which they had miserably failed.
17. ' The next question which requires to be considered is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellants were entitled to seek cancellation of the order of respondent No. 1 allowing registration of respondent No. 2 Union by this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction.
18. There is a marked difference between power of this Court in exercising its appellate and revisional jurisdiction and when dealing with a case in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It is well-settled and an admitted principle that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution does not sit as a Court of appeal or of revision. Reliance for the above is placed on the views expressed and declared in the cases of (i) Akhtar Ali v. Member, Board of Revenue, Consolidation, Punjab and others reported in 1980 CLC 159 and (ii) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto v. The State reported in PLD 1978 SC 40. Thus, this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction will not undertake examination of a case with a view to satisfy itself as to the correctness or propriety of the decision arrived at by a Court, or any other forum so as to decide what the proper view or order ought or should have been or to substitute the finding of the Court, Tribunal or Government functionary by its own finding and such exercise would be limited to the cases of lack of or excess of jurisdiction or when proceedings of the Court or a Tribunal are coram non judice, as has been observed in the cases of: (i) Chairman, Employees' Old-Age Benefit Institution and others v. M.
19. Ismail Munawwar, 1984 SCM R 143; (ii) Saleem Ahmed v. Central Board of Revenue and others, reported in 1990 CLC 812; and (iii) Yaqoob Ali v. Presiding Officer, Summary Military Court, reported in PLD 1985 Kar.
243. In the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction this Court will confine itself to rectification and modification of the illegalities and irregularities committed by a Court, Tribunal or any other forum or if it finds that in passing an order, the Court, Tribunal or forum had exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction or had exercised jurisdiction not vesting in it or had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vesting in it or that the order or finding in question is in violation of any provision of law or which had resulted in contravention or violation of legal right of the aggrieved person and had occasioned and caused legal wrong or harm to such person. Even an erroneous decision on question of fact or law by a Court, Tribunal or other forum having jurisdiction to decide and determine such question of fact and law, would not entitle this Court to interfere with such an erroneous decision in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction, unless the same is completely perverse and not based on any evidence at all. Reliance for the above proposition is placed on the observation made in the case of Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. The Custodian, Evacuee Property, Sindh and others reported in 1985 CLC 395. Coming to the facts of the case in hand it is to be observed that respondent No. 1 in exercise of the power conferred on him by the Industrial Relations Ordinance relating to the registration of Trade Union had ordered registration of respondent No. 2 Union and issued certificate of registration. The respondent No. 1 had acted in accordance with the provision of law and the learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show as to what illegality or wrong was committed by respondent No. 1 in making the impugned order for declaring the same as illegal, ultra vires and void ab initio so as to render the same liable for interference by this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction. In the circumstances the learned Single Judge who was seized of the Constitutional petition of the appellants was justified in concluding that the impugned order of respondent No. 1 did not suffer from any illegality and no interference was required therewith.
20. ' Upon the above discussions we have no doubt in our minds that the appellants have failed to make out a case for interference with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid Constitutional petition and this appeal is without any force and substance and merits no consideration. Accordingly, the aforesaid appeal stands dismissed in limine alongwith the listed C.M.A. With no order as to costs.