1. 'The facts forming the background of this First Rent Appeal are that the respondent filed application under Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereafter referred to as the Ordinance, 1979) for eviction of the appellant on the ground of default in the payment of rent and addition/alteration causing impairment of the utility of the rented premises which consists of bungalow No,C-92, Block 2, Karachi Administration Employees Cooperative Housing Society, Karachi and which was let out under agreement dated 28-7-1986 on a monthly rent of Rs,4,400 excluding the electricity, gas and water charges. The rent was payable in advance and was subsequently enhanced to Rs,6,000 per month.
2. The appellant in his written statement denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and also the allegations constituting the ground of his eviction. The learned Rent Controller (Mrs. Tahira Mohsin) framed the following issues:-- "(1) Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant does exist between the parties?
3. (2)Whether the opponent has defaulted in payment of rent w,e,f, 1-5-1989 till the filing of the case?
4. (3)Whether opponent has made addition/alteration in the case premises, and impaired the utility and value of the case premises?
5. (4)What should the order be?"
6. All the above issues were decided against the appellant who as a consequence thereof was directed to be ejected from the demised premises vide judgment dated 4-12-1993, which has been impugned in this appeal.
7. I heard Mr. Iftikhar Javaid Qazi, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Ismail Padhiar, learned counsel for the respondent and also perused the record.
8. The main contest in this case emanates from the appellants preliminary objection based on the denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the respondent. The relevant evidence on this issue is that Muhammad Ishaque who is said to be the attorney of the respondent through whom the application for ejectment was also filed. The most important document in this connection is that agreement of tenancy dated 28-7-1986 (Exh.O/1) which was admitted by the parties. Additionally, there are rent receipts also produced in the evidence. The agreement is between the appellant and Muhammad Ishaque who was described in that agreement as owner.
9. He signed the said agreement as owner and and lord of the disputed bungalow and not as attorney of the respondent whose name does not appear at all in that agreement. The rent receipts were also issued by Muhammad Ishaque as landlord. The following portion in the statement of Muhammad Ishaque in cross-examination is relevant:-- "It is a fact that there was no direct tenancy agreement between applicant and the opponent. The witness clarifies that he in capacity of the attorney of the applicant entered into tenancy agreement with the opponent. The agreement of tenancy dated 28-7-1986 which is on record is only tenancy agreement which is singed by me and the opponent. It is a fact that in the said agreement I am shown as owner and landlord and not as attorney of applicant. It is a fact that applicant has never received rent directly from the opponent. It is a fact that from the very beginning I deal with the tenancy."
10. There is nothing in the record to show that there was any subsequent agreement or arrangement resulting in the substitution of the respondent as the landlord in place of Muhammad Ishaque.
11. There is also no evidence to the effect that Muhammad Ishaque was acting as attorney of the respondent while dealing with the appellant. No doubt respondent is son of Muhammad Ishaque but the fact remains that he neither let out the premises to the appellant nor did he ever act as the landlord within the meaning of the Ordinance, 1979. It was for the first time that in the application for ejectment the respondent proclaimed himself to be the landlord of the appellant and indicated Muhammad Ishaque as his attorney. Learned Rent Controller observed in the impugned judgment that since respondent was the owner of the disputed premises he would be a landlord as defined by section 2(b) of the Ordinance, 1979. It is pertinent to note that neither in the application for ejectment nor in the affidavit of evidence of Muhammad Ishaque the respondent was described as the owner of the bungalow in question. Moreover, no document showing respondent's title in respect of that property was filed. Furthermore, even if the respondent was owner that would by itself not make him also the landlord of the appellant in the absence of a privity of contract between them. The respondent relied upon the agreement of tenancy dated 28-7-1986 to seek eviction of the appellant but to that agreement he was not a party and the executants thereto were admittedly Muhammad Ishaque and the appellant. Under these circumstances, the respondent was not the landlord and had no locus standi to file the application for ejectment.
12. Muhammad Ishaque was of course before the Court not as landlord but as attorney of somebody who was not the landlord and as such the proceedings instituted by him were not maintainable.
13. The term attorney has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition p.128 as under:-- "In the most general sense this term denotes an agent or substitute, or one who is appointed and authorized to act in the place or stead of another. An agent or one acting on behalf of another.
14. Sherts v. Fulton Nat Bank of Lancaster, 342 Pa. 337, 21A. 2d 18. In its most common sage, however, unless a contrary meaning is clearly intended, this term means 'attorney at law', 'lawyer' or 'counsellor at law' ."
15. Attorney can, thus, act only within the limits permissible to his principal and as aforesaid in the instant case the respondent being himself not entitled to file the application, his attorney was not competent to do so.
16. The up shot of the above discussion is that the relationship of landlord and tenant being non- existant between the appellant and the respondent, the ejectment proceedings were not maintainable and this being the conclusion it is not necessary to advert to the issues involved in this case. As a consequence, this appeal is allowed and the order of the learned Rent Controller is set aside with no orders as to cost.