' By a judgment, announced on 20-9-1995, by the learned Labor Court. Rawalpindi, grievance petition filed under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, by Manzoor Hussain, was dismissed: and he has come up in appeal to this forum.
2. Manzoor Hussain desired correction of his date of birth as 16-5-1942, -the same having been entered as 8-7-1938 in his service record. He was serving the company as a Mechanic (permanent mechanic). He is stated to have produced his birth certificate before the management in proof of his claim that he had actually been born on i6-5-1942.
3. Respondent pleads that at the time of his induction into service, in September, 1960, Manzoor Hussain, appellant, had himself declared his date of birth as 8-7-1938. Appellant states that somebody might have, on his own, recorded his date of birth as 8-7-1938, and that he had tendered his school-leaving certificate, at the time of his initial appointment. He has, however, not been able to produce the same or even a copy of it, in evidence led in the lower Court. Aforesaid assertion also runs counter to his claim that he could not sign and that the application Exh. P-1 did not bear his signatures. Now he pleads that he has studied up to Middle. For the first time, according to Manzoor Hussain, in November, 1993, he was made aware of the wrong entry about his date of birth in the service record. But he is estopped from saying so, as on 7-7-1993 he had himself obtained extension in his span of service, by making application Exh. R-2, in which he said that he had attained the age of 55 years on 7-7-1993 and was making a request for extension in service for one year, under the existing terms and conditions of service. Learned counsel for the appellant has endeavoured to urge that the management actually harbored grudge against him and decided to retire him, and, for the purpose, extorted his signatures on a typed application Exh.R-2, under coercion, and that all this was done with ulterior considerations and mala fide intentions. The appellant, or his learned counsel, however, has not the cheek to say why after all, vide Exh. R-2, had extension in service for one year been sought, on admitting the date of birth as 8-7-1938. It has also not been explained as to why had Manzoor Hussain remained silent over several years and had not made a move for correction of his age. The grievance petition was filed on 13-1-1994, whereas employment with the respondent concern had been obtained in September, 1960. Nobody is going to believe the appellant and his counsel, alleging that signatures on the application Exh.R-2 had been obtained under duress. He had not lodged any criminal complaint against those alleged to have made him a victim of coercion or fraud. The learned lower Court has rightly remarked that the application Exh.R-2 alone is enough to entail dismissal of the appellant's plea about his date of birth.
4. Manazar Hussain is the real brother of Manzoor Hussain. He got employment with the respondent concern afterwards, when Manzoor Hussain was already an employee. Exhs. R-10 and 11 are respectively the employment sheets of Manzoor Hussain and Manazar Hussain. They did not make mention of the fact that they were real brothers, although even close relations were required to make a statement in that behalf and were not supposed to conceal the kinship. Manazar Hussain could be proceeded against for suppressing a material information, as also for misstating his age.
How can it be deduced, as a matter of certainty, that Manazar Hussain is elder brother of Manzoor Hussain; he may well be the latter's younger brother, his date of birth having been entered as 20-6- 1939; else he had stated his age not correctly and made him younger than his actual age, Manzoor Hussain having declared his date of birth at the time of his employment as 8-7-1938 (Exh. R-5). Exh.
R-5 carries the signatures of Manzoor Hussain, although he denies the genuineness of the same.
Learned counsel for the respondent has invited the attention of the Court to the similarity between the two signatures, the genuine signatures on Exh. R-1 and the disputed one on Exh. R-5. For any misstatement about age, both the brothers would be responsible and the company could not be held to have indulged in any misrepresentation or misstatement on the count, nor has it been established that the company had resorted to any interpolation in the age or in the service record of the appellant.
5. The mere fact, as has been admitted by Manzoor Hussain, in cross-examination, that the document Exh. R-2 carries his signatures, and it was on that basis that he had secured extension of one year in service, would displace his claim about his date of birth being 16-5-1942, instead of 8- 7-1938. His age was described as 20-1/2 years, at the time of his entry into service, on 12-9-1960 (Exh. R-11). It was, however, a rough statement about age. He would be 57 years of age, according to that. But even if his claim of having actually been born on 16-5-1942 is treated as correct, he will be acquiring the age of 55 years in mid-May, 1997; and as a matter of right he cannot claim extension in service, beyond the age of 55 years, which is the normal age of retirement for the employees of the company. It is not understandable as to what for has Manzoor Hussain been endeavoring. It has been held in 1988 PLC 494 (Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab), 1992 PLC 380 (Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh) and .1993 PLC 33 (National Industrial Relations Commission) that the age or the date of birth stated by a person at the time of his initial appointment carries presumption of truth, and without any strong evidence to the contrary, it cannot be ignored and no variation therein would be admissible. Medical certificate gives the age only approximately, as it is based on general appearance, and it cannot be said to be the opinion of an expert.
6. Considering the factual position, as also the case-law on the subject, it cannot be assumed that what is now being maintained by Manzoor Hussain has an element of truth. His grievance petition was rightly dismissed by the learned lower Court; and his appeal having no merit is also liable to rejection. I proceed to dismiss the same, with no order as to costs.