' MUNAWAR AHMAD MIRZA, J:---Appellant on 18th August, 1980 was appointed as Upper Division Clerk, B-7, on temporary-ad hoc basis subject to regularization and qualifying examination for recruitment of Upper Division Clerk. New policy for regulating promotion of accounts staff to the post of Senior Accounts Clerk (B-11) was issued towards 9th August, 1988.
2. On the completion of eight years' service in B-7 name of appellant was forwarded alongwith others for appointment/promotion in B-11 vide letter dated 19th December, 1988. Subsequently, appellant was promoted as Senior Accounts Clerk, B-11, with effect from 3rd August, 1991.
3. Since under the policy letter appellant was qualified for being promoted on 9th August, 1988, ne, therefore, on 17th September, 1991 preferred an appeal seeking promotion as Senior Accounts Clerk, B-11, with effect from 16th September, 1988 instead of 3rd August, 1991, which was however rejected on 8th June, 1992.
4. It is the case of appellant that he continued pressing for ante-dated promotion in B-11 and ultimately on 15th December, 1994 submitted departmental appeal praying for granting him seniority as Senior Accounts Clerk (B-11) with effect from 16th September, 1988 and considering for Selection Grade in B-15 from 3rd August, 1991 because under the Policy Letter dated 9th August, 1988, on completion of eight years' service, he had become entitled for promotion.
5. Appellant aggrieved from abovesaid rejection of departmental appeal representation, challenged the same by way of Appeal No,319(R)/95 before Federal Service Tribunal. Alongwith this appeal an application for condonation of delay was also filed. It may be seen that after considering all aspects, the appeal was dismissed vide judgment dated 5th September, 1995 for being barred by time. Operative portion appearing in para 4 is, thus:- "4....Under Rule 3 of the Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977, every civil servant is entitled to appeal to be made to the appellate authority, within thirty days. However, in the cases of determination of fitness of a person to hold a particular or to be promoted to a higher post, under second proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Appeal Rules, no appeal or review is competent. Similar provision is contemplated in proviso to subsection (2) of section 22 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. In view of these provisions of law, the appellant was entitled to only one representation which he exhausted by making on 17-9-1991 which was duly considered and rejected and was informed as admitted by him in departmental appeal as also indirectly in para. 11 of Memo. Of Appeal. There being no provision of review as provided in the Act or the Rules, referred to above, the second appeal was not competent, even if it was considered and rejected by the department, it could not enlarge limitation period for bringing a grievance before the Tribunal. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel have got distinguishing features, as in that case, there was provision for appeal and review petition was entertained by the departmental authority, whereas in this case, as stated above, there is provision for appeal or review as the matter relates to fitness for promotion, and at the most, a representation could be made. Therefore, the case relied upon by the learned counsel is not applicable, in this case. We are of the view that the appellant was supposed to have preferred appeal before the Tribunal within thirty days of the rejection of the first appeal, and this appeal having been filed on 20-8-1995 is badly time-barred, and there are no cogent grounds in the application for condonation of more than three years and the application is rejected.
Consequently, the appeal being hopelessly time-barred is dismissed in limine."
6. Appellant assailed above decision of Federal Service Tribunal through petition for leave to appeal No,602 of 1995, which was granted on 27th March, 1996; and reproduced hereunder:-- "FAZAL KARIM, J.---Leave to appeal is granted to consider whether in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was right in dismissing the petitioner's appeal as barred by time."
7. Mr. M. Munir Peracha, ASC, learned counsel for appellant strenuously urged that whenever departmental appeal of aggrieved employee is decided on merits, a fresh cause of action arises, therefore, according to him, rejection of service appeal merely for being barred by time was materially defective. Reliance was placed on the observations in the case of Zafar Mahmood v.
WAPDA (1991 SCM R 640).
8. We have carefully perused the entire material and considered relevant case-law. It is quite apparent from record that appellant was duly informed on 8th June 1992 about rejection of representation initially submitted by him. Admittedly, despite being fully conscious, appellant practically did not take any legal step till 15th December, 1994 when appeal/review was filed wherein correction in fixation of date regarding promotion to B-11 was challenged. There is absolutely no explanation for extraordinary long silence of about thirty months. Firstly, it may be seen that second appeal/review filed by petitioner on 15th December, 1994 was rejected without adverting to merits, which is manifestly reflected on bare perusal of order dated 4th July, 1995.
Therefore, reference to abovequoted report has no applicability. Secondly, appellant has not been able to furnish sufficient ground for condoning inordinate delay. Needless to say that mere repetition of representation or appeal hoping to receive some reply from department cannot help to extend period of limitation which on broad principles is co-related with date for cause of action.
The Federal Service Tribunal has exhaustively discussed the legal aspects in the concluding para. Of the impugned judgment, which does not suffer from any legal defect or infirmity. This legal position also finds support from the observations in the cases reported as Malak Muhammad Khan v. Inspector-General of Police (1992 SCM R 1136), Muhammad Raz Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P.
(PLD 1997 SC 397) and Muhammad Hasham v. Inspector-General of Police (1990 SCM R 1440).
' For the above reasons we do not find any merit in this appeal, which is consequently dismissed with no order as to costs.