' This is an application under section 561-A, Cr. P. C. For quashment of proceedings under section 501, P. P. C. Against Majid Nizami, Editor, Printer and Publisher, Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore in case titled Mat. Nafisa Ahrnad, Director, Administration and Co-ordination, Pakistan National Centre, Head Office, Rawalpindi Cantt. v. Ch. Javid Mahmood and others under section 500/ 501, P. P. C. Pending in the Court of the Ilaqa Magistrate, Rawalpindi.
2. According to the private complaint filed by respondent No, 1 it was inter alia alleged that the accused mentioned in the complaint had defamed the complainant herself in her capacity as Director, Administration and Coordination, Pakistan National Centre as well as the Pakistan National Centre in the news item published in the 'Daily Nawa-i-Waqt' in which four accused ex-employees of the Pakistan National Centre had held a Press Conference. The detail of allegations is not very much relevant for decision of this matter.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that bare reading of the news item in the 'Daily Nawa- i-Waqt' issue of 16--1975 published from Rawalpindi does not disclose that any allegation is attributable to the complainant-respondent No,
1. Learned counsel further submits teat at the most it is a case of group defamatory nature. He relies on a quotation in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 24, p. 5 that "a class of persons cannot be defamed as a class nor can an individual be defamed by a general reference to the class to which he belongs". He has also referred to Hosseinbhoy Ismailji v. Empercr (1) in which it was held that where the editor of a paper writes an editorial which is highly defamatory of a spiritual head of a certain community, an individual of that community is not an aggrieved person within the meaning of section 198, Cr. P. C.
Learned counsel for the petitioner stressed that the news item published in paper was not specifically directed against the complainant due to which the complainant was not competent to file it as the complainant was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of law.
' Learned counsel for respondents submits that according to the complaint filed before the learned trial Magistrate the complainant as also the institution as a whole had been defamed and that the headquarter of the complainant as also of the institution was at Rawalpindi while its branches were all over the country due to which the complaint had been filed at Rawalpindi. Learned counsel for the respondents also submit that he policy decisions are taken and publication of all mate rial is done at Rawalpindi which is headquarter of the Pakistan National Centre and the literature so published is distributed through its branches all over the country. Reliance was placed on Sir Edward Snelson v. Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan. Lahore and others (2) in which it was held that a reference to a limited class may be reasonably understood as reference to every member of the class and in such a case every such member would have a cause of action and that the same principle is embodied in Explanation 2 to section 499, P. P. C. Which defines defamation and that the High Court Judges in this country constitute a limited class.
4. Section 499, Explanation 2, P. P. C. Reads as under:- "It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or association or collection of persons as such."
' In the case of Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper Ltd. (3) it was held that
(1) AIR 1934 Sind 188 (2) PLD 1961 SC 237
(3) 1944 A C 116 "if a defamatory statement made of a class or group can reasonably be understood to refer to every member of it, each one has a cause of action". In the case of Sir Edward Snelson mentioned above the aforementioned case of Knupffer was relied upon. The argument of learned counsel who attempted to urge that if there was a defamation of large number of persons taken collectively but no individual member was named or in any way referred to, the publication could not form the basis of an action for libel did not find favour with our Supreme Court. The Supreme Court referred to an observation in the same Knupffer's case that a reference to a limited class may be reasonably under-stood as reference to every member of the class and in such a case every member would have a cause of action and held that the same principle was embodied in Explantion 2, section 499, P. P. C. And the High Court Judges in the country constituted a limited class.
5. In the case in hand the private complaint was filed and the accused had only been summoned.
Although the petitioner appeared and as stated by learned counsel for the petitioner the personal attendance of the petitioner was dispensed with under section 205, Cr. P. C. While rest of the accused have yet to appear. No proceedings have so far been taken and no evidence has been recorded by the trial Court as yet. The failure in this behalf is not attributable to the complainant exclusively. In view of the law discussed above and in particular Explanation 2 to section 499, P. P. C.
Pakistan National Centre is a limited class and prima facie reading of the news item leads one to the conclusion that it is preferable to the limited class of persons in authority at Rawalpindi Headquarter of the Centre including the complainant who is Director of Administration and Co- ordination. In any case, I am of the view that it is premature to come to any conclusion even for the purpose of quashment of proceedings before the trial Court because on the basis of complaint and news item it cannot be said that the complaint was not competently filed or it was not referable to the complainant or for the matter of that to the institution to which the complainant belongs. The case involv a question of fact and in view of the law enunciated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Khowaja Fazal Korim v. The State and another (1) inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A, Cr. P. C. Is neither alternative nor additional which is to be used rarely in the interest of justice of redress of grievances and not to obstruct or divest the ordinary course of criminal procedure. In the circumstances, I do not consider it a fit case for quashment.
6. As a result of above discussion, the application is dismissed.
(1) PLD 1976 SC 461