1. ' G. SIVARAJAN, J.---In this petition under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessee seeks reference to the following question, as one arising out of the appellate order of the Tribunal: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the expression 'regular assessment' in section 214(1) refers to the first original assessm ent made by the Income-tax Officer under section 143 or 144 and not to an order giving effect to the appellate order?"
2. ' The question raised by the assessee is whether the expression "regular assessment" used in section 214(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, refers to the first original assessment made by the Income-tax Officer under section 143 or 144 of the Act and not to an order giving effect to the appellate order. This is for the reason that an assessee who pays advance tax, when it exceeds the assessed tax is entitled to interest on such excess amount from the 1st day of April, next following the said financial year to the date of the "regular assessment". The question that arises for consideration is whether the term "regular assessment" referred to in section 214 of the Act means the first assessm ent made under section 143 or section 144 or the consequential order that may be passed by the assessing authority giving effect to the appellate orders. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal relying on the Full Bench decision of this Court in CIT v. G.B. Transports (1985) 155 ITR 548 held that the liability of the Government under section 214, as it stood before the amendment in 1984, to pay interest on the advance tax paid is limited to the period up to the date of the first assessm ent under section 143 or section 144 of the Act and on the amount found to be in excess on that date and interest is not enhanced on reduction of tax liability by a revised order.
3. ' It is brought to our notice that the very same question has come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Modi Industries Ltd. v. CIT (1995) 216 ITR 759 and the Supreme Court has taken the very same view, as taken by this Court.
4. ' In view of the authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court in the abovementioned decision, the question now sought to be referred at the instance of the petitioner has become academic. We, accordingly, decline to direct reference to the question sought for in the original petition.
5. ' Original petition is accordingly dismissed.